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Government policies in agriculture have been costly  to avoid reciprocity in trade policy reform and to
and misdirected worldwide, argue Knudson and Nash.  protect infant industries or use quantitative restric-
tions for balance of payments purposes.
In developed countries, those policies have cost
taxpaycrs and consumers hundreds of billions of'  *  Get all countries to reform their agricultural
dollars yet failed to provide low-cost food while  policies, to reduce the many policy-induced distor-
sustaining farm incomes. They have disrupted world  tions that plague the sector.  Measures that need
trade and could create divisive trade coonilicts with  reform include import restrictions, export subsidies,
ramnifications  well beyond agriculture. They cnrich  and dumping of surplus commodities by the OECD
larger farmers and agroindustrialists and probably  countries; and subsidies to fertilizer, irrigation, and
accelerate the replacement of the fainily farim  w\ith  the  credit that distort trade incentives in both developed
large farm business.  In thc long run they have  and developing countries.
contributed to degradaltion  ol' the environmClt.
Such a bargaini  would result in a redel'inition of
In developing couintries.  those policics h ve  uovereillients' role in agriculture, increased sectoral
impoverished  rural people  ,ilhouLt  prov idiing  the f'oo(d  efficiency nationally,  and a more  smoothly  function-
security urban consumers andl  polrcs nnuker  s  want.  ilnc and lightly knit world agricultural trading system.
Immense  funding  wasled  on subsidies  of' lertli/er,
credil, andi urban consumers  shoUld ha..\  c been  Mlany Of the unproduclivc  policies  deLailed by
invested in areas wher, prkate  markets  do not w\ork  Knudsen  and Nash have a coimmon  cause, they say:
Ncil  because  the costs or benefits are dil'licullt tO  eov\ernments'  tendency to see problemils as resolvable
initcrnalizc  l'or private agents - - inlIrastructurQ  or  by taking incomiie  trom somile  and giving it to others.
sonie basic research, lor e.\anmple.  What is needed, they say, is to reconsider the
government's proper role in agriculture --  and the
'This  inelficienc\  need.l  not  ontinuc,  argct  inslitutional  changes  that would  follow  from that.
Knudsen and Nash.  'I'he  L.ruguay  RouLn(d  is an1  ideal  Knudsen anLi Nash  are specific  in their suggestions
opportunity lor dcveloped and dle eloliillg na1tions  to  i'or change.
strike a bargain, the clements  of wn  hihti stoLil(d  be to:
Resolving the problemis  in agricultural policy
MNake  agricultural trade subject to the lull  requires withdrawing most goverrmcnt intervention
discipline Of  the GA-1  by eliminating w\aivers  andl  frorn  agricultural markets and recognizing economic
exemptions that ha\ e set aericultural comrmnodities  righits: the farmers - to produce whatever commo(ii-
apart from other products in their treatmient  under the  ties they f  eel will profit them best and scil them freely
GATT,  at home or abroad: the traders - to move goods in
expectation of profiLs,  without fear of reprcssion: antid
*  Bring developing counLtrics  fully into the CGATF'  consumers - to buy foods at the lowcst prices, f'rotn
by eliminating their spcial1  stLIats w hic  h  allows  st heim  foreign or domesLic sourccs.
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THE GOVERNMENT  AND AGRICULTURE
Agricultural  policy  in developed  and  developing  nations  is a tangle  of
contradictions.  Throughout  the world, governments  have "one foot on the
accelerator and  one  foot on  the  brake"--simultaneously  encouraging  and
discouraging  increased  farm  production.  'n the  United  States,  the  governmenL
is  pressuring  many  farmers  to leave  good  farmland  unplanted--while  paying  other
farmers  bonuses  of 50  percent  over  market  prices  to  boost  their  production.  In
Europe,  if  farmers  produce  more  than  a government-set  limit,  they  are  penalized
by  reductions  in their government-set  prices.  In many African nations,
governments  refuse  to  pay  farmers  the  true  value  of  their  crops,  yet  sell  farmers
fertilizers  and  seeds  for  far  less  than  they  are  worth.
At  a  time  when  East  European  economies  are  moving  rapidly  away  from  central
planning,  many agricultural  policy  makers  in industrial  countries  show  little
sign  of  a  willingness  to  deregulate  and  de-control  the  production  of  food. Yet,
programs  that  were  begun  with  a rationale  of  avoiding  food  shortages  are  now  the
primary  cause  of cutbacks  in  production  and the  wasting  of food.  In both the
United  States  and  European  Community,  the  more  generous  governments  have  become
to farmers,  the more controls  governments  have imposed  upon farmers.  And
unfortunately,  the  United  States  and  European  Communities  have set  precedents
that  are  encouraging  other  governments  to  increase  their  controls  over  their  own
farmers.
While  developed  nations  have  been  squandering  their  agricultural  resources,
developing  nations  have been squandering  their  farmers.  In much of Africa,
farmers  have no right  to market  their  crops  on their  own or to bargain  with
buyers  for a fair  price.  The  government  buys their  crop at less than  world2
pr'ces  and sells it for even less to relatively  better-off  urban dwellers.
Farmers  have been arrested  and punished  simply  for seeking  to sell  their  own
grain. Agricultural  restri:tions  and  controls  frequently  drive  down  the  market
price  of food.  Farmers  usually  react  to suppressed  prices  by reducing  their
production--which  results  in perennial  shortages,  repeated  famines in sonme
nations,  and the need to seek imports or food aid.  Regrettably,  many
politicians  have reacted  to food  shortages  by imposing  new government  controls
on farmers  and markets  and creating  more inefficient  govsrnment  enterprises,
rather  than  abolishing  the  controls  that  caused  the  original  problem.
Farm  programs  in developed  countries  are  costing  taxpayers  and  consumers
between  $200  and  $300  billion  a  year (Goldin  and  Knudsen). The  aggregate  costs
of developing  countries'  p licies  is less  well known,  but estimates  place  the
net  benefits  to  developing  countries  from  more  liberalized  agriculture  at  about
$60  billion  per  year (Anderson  and  Tyers). In  industrial  countries,  annual  farm
subsidies  ex:eed  the total  World Bank lending  since  1980,  and the total IMF
lending  since  1970;  annual  subsidies  also  exceed  the  total  amount  of  development
aid  given  to sub-Saharan  Africa  since  1980.  Farm  programs  have been  allowed
to become  so costly  partly  because  programs  are so complex  and the  costs so
hidden  and  diffuse  that few  people  realize  their  true  magnitude. One recent
study  estimated  that  the  effects  of existing  farm  trade  barriers  amounted  to a
tax  of 233  percent  o0i  sugar  by the  United  States  and  of 421  percent  on dry  milk
by the  European  Community. It is  not  unusual  to find  in  developed  countries  a
hidden  tax  on consumers  from  agricultural  trade  barriers  of 50 to 100  percent
on basic food grains.  In developing  countries,  costs  also ar, hidden,  with
relatively  well-off  urban  consumers  eating  food  subsidized  at  the  expense  of  much
poorer  and  hungrier  farmers.3
This  costly  intervention in  private production and  marketing is
unjustified;  in  both de eloped  and  developing  countries  it benefits  primarily
the  relatively  well-off.  This  massive  level  of  misguided  government  intervention
in agriculture  has  no precedent  in any  other  sector  of the economy.  If such
policy  were  found  in  social  welfare  programs,  say  for  the  unemployed  or  homeless,
it  would  be a  major  scandal  of  waste  and  misuse  of government  power. Yet  this
intervention  continues,  misusing  taxpayers'  and consumers'  money to support
relatively  few  farmers  and  taxing  farmers  in  developing  countries  under  mistaken
notions  of what agriculture  is really  about  and  what governments  can actually
accomplish  in  the  farm  sector. Furthermore,  the  dev-loped  nation  farm  policies
have spilled  over into  the  international  markets,  disrupting  trade  and  taking
income  producing  opportunities  away from much poorer farmers in developing
countries.  In  1986,  the  World  Development  Report  described  the  abuses  and  costs
of  these  misguided  agricultural  policies.  Unfortunately,  farm  programs  have  not
been fundamentally  reformed.  At the time this report is being written,
governments  are  meeting  in Geneva  in the  Uruguay  Round  of trade  negotiations,
attempting  to  reduce  governments'  heavy  intervention  in  agriculture.  It  is  hoped
that  this  report  will  assist  in  pushing  the  negotiations  forward  to  a  resolution
of this  incredible  mismanagement  of  human  and  natural  res^urces.
IS  AGRICULTURE  SPECIAL,
SO SPECIAL  SO AS TO NEED HEAVY GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT?
Agriculture  is unique in economies.  Farm sectors comprise highly
competitive  businessmen,  producing  a relatively  homogenous  commnodity  for  sale
in a market  with numerous,  price and quality  conscious  consumers.  In other
words,  agriculture  would  appear  to  be the  ideal  industry  in  which  to realize  a4
textbook-perfect  competitive  market to the benefit of both producers and
corsumers.  Consideriag  the potential  fcr  pervasive  competition  and lack of
market  dominance  by any one  producer,  one  would  think  that  agriculture  is the
least  likely  sector  of the  economy  to find  extensive  government  intervention.
But  throughout  most  of the  world,  governments  are  dominating  agriculture.
For  instance  in the  United  States,  there  is  one  government  bureaucrat  for  every
three  full-time  farmers  and  the  budget  of the  Department  of  Agriculture  exceeds
the  net  income  cf all  farmers  together. In  Europe,  two-thirds  of the  budget  of
the  European  Commission  goes  to  support  farmers.  In  developing  countries,  nearly
every  government  owns  an enterprise  which  monopolizes  the  trade  of  at least  one
major agricultural  commodity.  The heavy hand of government  disrupts the
international  markets  for  many  major  crops  through  intricate  barriers  to trade
and subsidized  dumping  of surplus  commodities.
Why is this?  One reason  is that farmers  are politically  organized.
Throughout  the world  farmers  have  formed  lobbying  groups--even  in remote  areas
of India  or in  the  coast  of  Ecuador. But  now!  ?  are  they  as  well organized  as
they  are  in  the  United  States,  Europe  or  Japan--the  havens  of  the  world's  largest
government  handouts  for  farmers. It is  widely  recognized  that two  of  the  most
powerful  lobbies  in  Washington  are  the  dairy  and  sugar  associations.  In  France,
farmers  routinely  go  on strike  and  seek  to  close  down  major  highways  until  their
damands  are  met.  In Japan,  the  backbrne  of the  Liberal  Democratic  Party,  the
party  that  has  ruled  Japan  virtually  ever  since  the  end  of  World  War II,  is  the
farm lobby.  Farmers  have a political  voice that  often  makes  politicians  and
policy  makers  support  unwise  and  costly  farm  programs. As a consequence,  most
farmers  in developed  nations  receive  for their  commodities  prices  that are
higher--sometimes  six times  higher--than  those  in international  markets.  In5
fact,  international  markets  have become  the dumping  ground  for farm products
that  cannot  be sold  at  home.
Ironically,  around  the  world,  food  is  .heap--that  is,  if  your  country  does
not produce  the particular  imported  food.  Food is  much cheaper  in Hong  Kong
than in  Japan--primarily  because  Hong  Kong  has almost  no farmers. The curse
of the consumer  in the 1980s is to live in a country  self or r.early  self-
sufficient  in food--for  it  is  almost  a  certainty  it  will  cost  more  in  countries
where  it  is  produced  (particularly  developed  countries)  than  where  it  comes  off
a ship. Historically,  the  greatest  beneficiaries  of  United  States  and  European
Community  farm  programs  have  been  the  food  importing  countries,  especially  the
USSR and Eastern  Europe,  and the lesser  developed  countries,  especially  in
Africa,  which  unfortunately  have taken  advantage  of cheap  imported  food  whiie
undercutting  the  development  of their  own  agricultural  sectors.
But  the  strength  of  farm  lobbying  groups  is  not  the  whole  reason  for  farm
policies  being  so  costly. People  in  general  are  concerned  about  adequate  food
supplies. Most people  in the  world  have occasionally  experienced  hunger,  and
some,  perhaps  a  billion,  for  all  their  (shortened)  lives. Even  today  in  a  world
filled  with food surpluses  and  waste  millions  of  children  die  of malnutrition
or a disease  related  to it.  No one  wants to  wish hunger  or death  on anyone.
Isn't  then  a little  food  security  and  over-production  justified?
It  would  be wonderful  if food  production  could  end  hunger  in the  world.
If it could,  hunger  would have ended in 1986 when the world over-produced
millions  of tons  of cereals,  of meat,  of dairy  products,  and of high calorie
sugar.  Surpluses  accumulated  in  government  stocks  despite  the  government  paying
for  millions  of  hectares  of land  to be set  aside  from  production,  wnile  surplus6
milk  was fed  to  calves  and  government  bureaucrats  rewarded  farmers  for  killing
two  million  cows in  order  to reduce  milk supplies.
The  world  has  had  petaistent  grain  surpluses  for  most  of the  last  thirty
years. If  hunger  were  caused  by insufficient  food  production,  then  the  problem
of hunger  could  have been solved  long ago.  Rather,  hunger  is overwhelmingly
the result  of poverty--of  not  having  money  to purchase  widely  available  food
supplies.  The  solution  to  the  problem  of  hunger  is  largely  the  same  as  that  for
poverty--it is  capital to  build  infrastructure,  research to  yield new
technologies,  education  and  health  care so people  can  be more productive  and
viable  economies  promoted  by stable  and  sound  fiscal  and  monetary  policies. In
other words, it is income  growth  along  with health and targeted  nutrition
programs  that is largely  the long term solution  to hunger  and malnutrition.
Hunger certainly  cannot  be solved  by food production  promoted  by expensive
subsidies  and  wasteful  trade  protection. That  is one  of the  clearest  lessons
of the  last  few  decades.
But  what about  the future? Will farmers  continua  to produce  sufficient
food  to  create  surpluses?  The  dominant  factor  in  agricultural  economies  in  the
past century  has been the  declining  real  prices  of food.  Crop  market  prices
have consistently  fallen  in r -l terms because  the cost of production  has
plummeted.  Mechanical  inventions,  the  development  of  new  seeds  and  fertilizer,
the  development  of sound  management  techniques  on the  farm,  and  the success  of
private  and  government-funded  research  have all  helped  drive  down the  cost of
food  production. Unfortunately,  politicians  have long  tended  to view falling
food  prices  as  an  economic  problem  rather  than  as  a  natural  and  inevitable  result
of technological  progress  and  an  opportunity  for  more  citizens  to  have  a  better
diet. And  the  political  responses  to  falling  prices--pushing  massive  subsidies7
and requiring  productive  land to be idled--have  reduced farming  efficiency
through  keeping unviable farms in business,  and destabilized  agricultural
markets.
In the  past  two  decades,  technology  in  plant  breeding  has experienced  the
greatest  advances  in the  world's  history. Wheat  yields  have increased  by 36
percent  since  1974;  rice  yields  by 38  percent;  and  coarse  grains  by 30  percent.
In  the  United  States  milk  production  per  cow  is  increasing  three  to  four  percent
per  year.  Since  3970,  the  PAO's  food  production  index  has increased  by over
45  percent  in  part  because  of this  technological  revolution  and  in  part  because
of the rapid  growth  in fertilizer  use and the increase  in irrtgated  area by
around 30 percent.  The Unittd States Congressional  Office of Technology
Assessment  estimates  that  yields  of  major  crops  could  increase  by  20  percent  by
the year 2000.  And further  advances  in biotechnology  promise  even greater
advances.  All  major  crop  plants  are  amenable  to  significant  yield  increases  from
biotechnology.  Advances  in  biotechnology  for  animals  are  already  here. Use  of
hormones  in  pig production  can  cut  feed requirements  by 25 percent,  saving  30
or  40  million  tons  of feed. Hormones  in  dairy  and  meat  production  can  save  even
more in feed grain  use and increase  yields  greatly,  but their  use has been
constrained  by health concerns, some perhaps well-founded  and  some not.
Furthermore,  developing  countries  currently use very small quantities  of
purchased  inputs  in their  food  production. Potential  expansion  in yields  in
developing  countries  from  moderate  _ vels  of input  use or extended  irrigation
is enormous.
And  so  it  continues--technology  pushes  forward  productivity  gains,  forcing
downward real producer prices.  Antithetical  to this economic progress,
Government  programs  attempt  to artificially  support  farm  prices.  Hence,  the8
root of the dilemma--progress  against  the resistent  forces  of fanm support
programs. The  results  are  surplus  accumulating  under  government  ownership  and
idle  productive  capacity.
This does not mean that there are not constraints  to agricultural
production. Soil erosion  is  a serious  problem  in some  parts  of the  world  and
does affect  localized  production. Increasing  productivity  in fc,od  production
in Africa  remains  the greatest  challenge  in agricultural  development  In the
world. And  carbon  dioxide  is  increasing  in  the  atmosphere  at  a  very  rapid  rate.
Furthermore,  misguided  agricultural  policies  in both  industrial  and  developing
councries  are causing  destruction  of the  environment  through  abuse  of water,
fragile  soils,  fertilizers,  pesticides  and  otherc  chemicals.  But  these  problems
should  be separated  from  the  overall  issue  of  w'nether  the  world  can  feed  itself
(which  it  can)  ard  whether  there  is  a  need  for  extraordinary  intervention  by  the
government.
Drastic  reform  of agricultural  policies  is desperately  needed in both
developed  and  developing  countries. In developed  countries,  governments  must
recognize  the  futility  of  attempting  to  oppose  the  fundamental  economic  tide  of
technological  change  and recognize  the environmental  destruction  reaped by
current  policies. In  developing  countries,  governments  must allow  farmers  to
freely  market  and trade  their  agricultural  products. They  must end policies
that  lead  to salinization  and  de-forestation,  many of  whic'.  az.e  followed  under
the misleading  banner  of fooa security.  The political  realities  appear  to
require that  this  reform take place  in  a  coordinated  manner, through
international  negotiations  such  as in the  Uruguay  Round.  The  purpose  of this
report  is  to  promote  these  agricultural  policy  reforms  by  documenting  the  waste
and distortions  caused by current farm policies  and  to redefine a more
appropriate  role  for  governments  in agriculture.9
CHAPTER  2
T'  MORASS  AND  CONSEQUENCES  OF INDUSTRIAL  COUNTRY
AGRICULTURAL  POLICIES
In  developed countries, rapid advances in  agricultural production
technology  have  vastly  increased  the  productivity  of farm  labor  and,  therefore,
greatly  decreased  the  number  of farm  laborers  needed. New  technology  has  also
resulted  in a steady  decline  in the cost  of production  and  a decline  in crop
price>. These  factors,  along  with increasing  opportunities  in  urban  areas  have
combined  to  create  a strong  incentive  for  rural-urban  migration. This  came  to
be seen  by governments  (spurred  on by the farm  lobby)  as a process  with dire
consequences  for  the  future  of a stable  society. So,  instead  of trying  to  make
the transition  as painless  as possible,  governments  have  perennially  tried  to
artificially  increase  the number  of people  remaining  on farms  and to support
their incomes.  Governments  have pursued this goal by prohibiting  free
agricultural  trade in international  markets,  by imposing  de facto taxes on
consumers  through  higher prices,  and by spending  taxpayers'  income  on farm
welfare  programs. The results  have been  the same  as those  from  other  efforts
to restrain  the  flow  of fundamental  economic  tides  behind  regulatory  bulwarks.
The bulwarks--in  this case, trade controls  and income transfers--have  of
necessity  been  built  higher  and  higher,  and,  as  a  consequence  become  more  costly
and  distortionary.
According  to OECD estimates,  thesn  farm  program  bulwarks  have risen  to
well over  $200  billion  a  year  in  the  OECD  countries  alone. In  this  chapter,  we
will review  for the three  major subsidizers  of agricultural  production--the10
United  States,  the  European  Community  and  Japan--the  evolution  of  their  programs
and  how they  have  distorted  both  domestic  and  international  markets.
I.  UNITED  STATES'  FARM  PROGRAMS
Introduction
For  over  50  years,  American  farm  programs  have  provided  large  benefits  to
large  farmers  and small  benefits  to small  farmers. Yet, the farm lobby  has
succeeded  in  persuading  the  American  public  that  the  programs  exist  to  preserve
the relatively  small  family  farmer. As a result,  the U.S. in the 1980s  has
essentially  the  same  farm  programs  that  it  had in  the  1930s.
The General  Accounting  Office,  the  premier  audit  agency  of the federal
government,  has  produced  scores  of reports  detailing  waste  and ineffectiveness
in farm  programs  Yet, federal  policy  makers  have generally  disregarded  the
evidence  of failures. Why?
Agricultural  policy  has long been dominated  by the influence  of farm
lobbies that have generously poured money into congressional campaign coffers.
Dairy  cooperatives  donate  almost  $2  million  a year to congressmen. The sugar
lobby  provides  $450,000,  and  grain  lobbies  provide  over $500,000  a year,  and
other  lobbies  add  to the  total. And  of course  the  United  States  Department  of
Agriculture, with  a budget greater than the net income of all United  States
farms,  has  a  vested  interest  in  maintaining  the  programs.
Farm  policy  reform  has  also  foundered  upon  a  public  choice  dilemma:  farmers
have  a strong  interest  in farm  legislation  while  consumers  and taxpayers  have
only  a vague interest  in ending  subsidies. Farm  subsidies  amount  to only two
percent  of the  federal  budget,  yet  often  exceed  10OZ  of  net  farm  income  for  the11
subsidized  crops. A NEW YORK  TIMES  poll  found  that  55Z  of the  public  favored
giving  more  government  aid  to farmers.
Though  the  farm  lobbies are  strong, there  are  still  grounds  to  be
optimistic  about  reform. In  2981,  legislation  to  perpetuate  farm  subsidies  was
almost  defeated  in the  House  of Representatives,  and the  House  or Senate  has
repeatedly  voted  to abolish  specific  individual  farm  programs  (though  failing
to get  the  concurrence  of the  other  chamber). If the GATT talks  succeed  and
major  industrial  nations  agree  to phase  down  their  trade-distorting  subsidies,
pressure to sharply  cut farm spending  will likely be overwhelming.
The Evolution of United States Policy
United States farm policy is still operating in the shadow of the Great
Depression.  The farm problem in the United States began when the government
distributed  hundreds of millions of acres of free farmland to former Union
soldiers  and  immigrants  after  the  Civil  War.  This  led  to  decades  of
overproduction in the Mid-West.  As early as the 1880s, activists were urging
farmers to "raise  more hell and less corn."  In the late 1880s, largely at the
behest of farmers, the federal government imposed  price controls on railroads.
(These price controls, which continued until the early 1980s, are now widely
perceived  as  the  primary  cause  for  the  decline  of  the American  railroad
industry).  In  the  1890s,  farmers  led a  drive  for  'cheap silver'--for  a
government  monetary policy  that  would have  meant the  minting of  unlimited  numbers
of silver dollars.  Farmers assumed that this would create a general price
inflation, which would make it far easier for them to pay off the mortgages on
their  farms  in  depreciated  dollars.  Even  before  the  United  States  entered  World12
War  I,  the  government  had  established  a  special  credit  bank  to  provide  subsidized
loans  to farmers.
Once  the  United  States  entered  World  War  I, the  government  encouraged
farmers  to  vastly  increase  their  plantings. The  government  guaranteed  farmers
an  extremely  lucrative  price  for  their  harvest,  and  Congress  perpetuated  the  high
price guarantee  until long after  the  war had ended.  The government's  price
guarantee  meant  that  major  crop  prices  in  the  United  States  were  more  than  double
world  market  prices.  Once  the  price  guarantee  expired,  farm  prices  in  the  United
States  collapsed,  and land values--which  had risen four fold since 1910--
declined  sharply.  The  falling  land  prices  boosted  the  bankruptcy  rate,  which
created  a  public  perception  that  farmers  as a group  were suffering  hard  times.
Politicians  focused  on the  post-war  adjustment  difficulties  of agriculture  to
argue  that  agriculture  was inherently  unstable  and  needed  perpetual  government
control. The  farm  lobby  was  convinced  that  farmers  were  being  unfairly  treated
by society  because  farm  prices  were  lower  in  the  1920s  than  they  had  been  during
the  boom  years  of the  previous  decade.
A few  months  before  the stock  market  crash  of October  1929,  President
Hoover  launched  the  Federal  Farm  Board,  a  new  agency  with  a $500  million  budget
and  a goal  of driving  up  U.S.  wheat  and  cotton  prices.  The  Board  succeeded  in
temporarily  driving  U.S.  prices  above  world  prices;  as  a  result,  American  exports
plummeted.  Large surpluses  quickly accumulated,  which completely  swamped
markets. The  net  result  was  the  de facto  takeover  of  the  agriculture  sector  by
the  Roosevelt  Administration  in 193j.
Though  the  condition  of  American  agriculture  has  changed  radically  in  the
last  60  years,  the  United  States  has retained  the  basic  farm  policy  tools  and
incentives that  it  developed in  the  Great Depression.  The  Roosevelt13
Administration  favored  an autarkic  farm  policy  and pressured  farmers  to plant
only  as  many  crops  as  could  be consumed  in  the  United  States. To achieve  this
goal,  the  government  rewarded  farmers  for  leaving  much  of their  land  unplanted.
At the same time that government  pressured  farmers  to leave land idle, it
rewarded  them for  boosting  production  on their  remaining  land.  The Roosevelt
Administration  believed  that  driving  up farm  prices  would  produce  a  multiplier
effect  of prosperity  on other  parts  of the  economy.  Instead,  the  higher  food
prices  reduced  food  consumption,  which  was especially  unfortunate  considering
the  extremely  high  United  States  unemployment  rates  throughout  the  1930s.
BOX  2.1  PAYMENT  LIMITATIONS:  DO THEY  WORK?
The  distribution  of  direct  farm  payments  and  the  gains  from  farm  programs
have long  worried  policy  makers. With over  40 percent  of the  direct  payments
of  the  United  States  government  going  to  large  farmers,  about  35  percent  to  large
to middle size farms and only 25 percent going to small farms in 1984,
administrators,  the  press  and  politicians  have  expressed  their  concern  whether
farm  programs  that  are  attempting  to  help  small  and  medium  family  farms  really
accomplish  their  objective.  This  is  particularly  the  case  when  it  is  considered
that  this  distribution  of direct  payments  understates  the skewed  distribution
of farm  program  benefits. Because  large  farmers  produce  more  output  and farm
programs  support  commodity  prices,  the  benefits  of farm  programs  are  even  more
unevenly  distributed  than  these  already  alarming  numbers  suggest. This  coupled
with press reports  of million  or even multi-million  dollar  payments  to some
farmers  has raised  concerns  that the support  from the public  may be being
undermined  by this  uneven  distribution  of benefits.
This  concern  goes  back to the  1960s  in the  United  States  when there  was
particular  furor  over  one farming  operation  receiving  a  direct  payment  of $4.1
million.  In 1970,  after  much debate  a limit  of $55,000  was placed  on direct
payments  under  the  wheat,  feed  grains,  and  upland  cotton  programs.  Although  this
payment  limit  was  even  lowered  at  times  to  $20,000,  large  payments  continued  to
large  farm  operations  because  of  various  exemptions  and  legal  loopholes.
The first  loophole  came  through  the  Findley  amendment  in 1981  which  was
later  amended  for  the  1985  United  States  Farm  Bill.  The  Findley  amendment  gave
the  Secretary  of Agriculture  the right  to allow  compensatory  payments  if the
nonrecourse  loan level is lowered to make United States  commodities  more
competitive.  Payments  under  this  provision  are  not  subject  to  any  payment  cap.14
And payments under this provision were not small, absorbing 40 percent of the
direct payments in 1986.
The second loophole is through direct, but legal evasion (according  to a
study  by the  Congressional  Research Service,  87-12  ENR,  January 16, 1987). Since
the payment limit applies to a person (in 1987, $50,000 per person) broadly
defined to include most legal entities--such as corporations, trusts, estates
etc.,  a  farmer  can  create  an  additional  entity  through  incorporation  or
partnership formation so as to receive more payments totalling to a sum well
above  limit.  For  example  by  adding  more  partners  to  a  partnership  or
establishing a trust with  two or more  beneficiaries, more  "persons" can be
created to receive payments.  While no  one has  firm data on the number  of
evasions of this kind, it is known that the number of farms have proliferated
(Investors  Daily noted that "it is common to find farms splitting like amoebas
from one to 10 or more units..." (August  28,1986)).
But the  problem  with the  payment limitation  is  not that it  is  being evaded.
The  more serious  problem is its  potential  effects on farm  productivity.  Payment
limiitations  places an incentive  to have smaller farms--many of  which may not be
as economic as larger farms.  Productivity could be hindered if truly small
farmers  proliferate  with the consequence  that United States agriculture becomes
less competitive--possibly  creating more pressure for additional farm payments
or programs "to save the small (shrinking)  family (multi-legal  entity) farm."
In 1953, the administration of President Dwight Eisenhower sought to try
to roll  back federal  controls  and subsidies  of farmers. Congress resisted,  and,
in 1954, imposed a system of mandatory controls which dictated the percent of
land upon which farmers were allowed to plant wheat, corn, rice, and cotton.
But, at the same time Congress imposed production controls, it also guaranteed
farmers extremely high prices for the crops they did produce.  As a result,
surpluses piled up, and by 1960, the United States was spending over a billion
dollars a year just to store surplus commodities. Throughout this period, U.S.
support prices for  major crops were far higher than world market prices.  As a
result, farmers dumped their crops on the government, which in turn dumped the
crops on world markets.  The United States sought to "solve" this problem by
creating an international  wheat cartel through  an International  Wheat Agreement
where all exports would agree on market share, but this effort collapsed.15
By the late 1960.,  farm policy  makers realized  the futility  of their
efforts to hold American prices above world market prices.  The federal
government  began  lowering  price  support  levels  to  provide  farmers  with a  strong
incentive for exports.  Because government  aid was  largely intended to
'compensate"  farmers  for  low  nrices,  the  high  grain  prices  of  the  early-mid  1970s
effectively  greatly  decreased  American  farmers'  reliance  on  government  support.
But,  in  the  1976  presidential  campaign,  candidates  got  into  a  bidding  war
for  farm  votes,  and  government  support  levels  were sharply  raised. Though  the
number  of farmers  had  greatly  decreased,  farmers  were  still  a  major  voting  bloc
in  many  important  states.  The  maintained  political  strength  of farm  commodity
groups  became  apparent  in  the  late  1970s  as  dairy  producers  continued  to  be  able
to  boost  support  prices  and,  more  importantly,  the  grain  producers  were  able  to
maintain  support  prices  near  the  boom-year  levels  of the  1970s. The  willingness
of Congress  to enact  these  support  levels  and  of subsequent  Administrations  to
accept  them  in 1977  and  J981  stemmed  largely  from  a  widespread  perception  that
any  commodity  price  declines  would  only be temporary  and  that the longer-term
trend  in  prices  had turned  positive  in the  1970s  (see  D. G. Johnson,  1985,  for
a  contemporary  critique  of scarcity  projections).
The  1980s  saw  a  complete  turnaround  in  the  United  States  (and  world)  market
outlook  from scarcity  to surplus  production.  Change  in the  policy  picture  is
apparent  in the  debate  on  and  provisions  of  the  two  principal  agricultural  laws
of the  1980s,  the  Agriculture  and  Food  Act  of 1981  and  the  Food  Security  Act  of
1985. The  1981  Act  established  target  prices  and  loan  rates  for  the  grains  and
cotton  at continuing  high levels  over  a four-year  period  even though  signs  of
market  weakness  were already  apparent. By 1982  government  stocks  had  grown  so
large that in 1983 the largest acreage reduction  program in history was16
introduced  as  a  one-time  supply  reducing  measure.  A  major  drought  helped  further
to  bring  a  short-term  respite  frzm  surpluses.  But  by  1985,  abetted  by  large  U.S.
production  and  weakening  export  demand  as the  dollar  had risen  (by  40 percent
since  1980  in real  terms  against  the  G-7  countr;es),  United  States  government-
held  stocks  had  again  accumulated  to  pre-1983  levels. It  was  by then  clear  that
no scarcity  scenario  was going  to emerge  to make the 1981  Act support  prices
economically  viable.
Consequently,  the  1985  Act sharply  reduced  price  support  loans.  However,
the  target  prices  which  established  producer  price  guarantees  were  essentially
maintained  at 1981  Act levels. The resulting  large  spread  between  target  and
market  prices,  the  difference  between  which  was  covered  by 'deficiency"  payments,
caused  budgetary  outlays  in the  neighborhood  of $25  billion  per  year.  This in
turn  led  to  acreage  diversion  in  1986  and  1987  that  rivaled  the  scale  of  the  1983
program. Thus ended  the  era  of farm  commodity  scarcity,  and  the  United  States
government's  hopes to phase down governmental  intervention  in United  States
agriculture.  In terms  of  budgetary  costs,  government  stock  levels,  and  acreage
idled,  the Reagan  years saw more massive farm programs  than any preceding
President's,  including  the  New  Deal  programs.  Unfortunately,  price  support  loans
were  often  still  higher  than  market  prices. As a  result,  the  United  States  came
to rely  increasingly  more on direct  export  subsidies.
But,  even though  American  programs  sought  to boost  exports  at almost  any
cost, the profusion  of regulations  and conflicting  interventions  sometimes
frustrated  the  exorbitant  export  spending. The  cotton  program  spent  more than
$7 billion  between  1986  and  1989,  even  though  America  has only  6,000  full-time
cotton  growers. But,  generous  government  cotton  payments  designed  to  encourage
farmers  to sell their cotton  on international  markets  at any price  were by17
another  regulation  designed  to benefit  cotton  growers. As part  of the  cotton
price  support  program,  Congress  requires  the  Agriculture  Department  to offer
cotton  growers  eighteen-month  interest-free  loans  to hold their  crop off the
market,  and  the  agency  also  pays  for  farmers'  storage  costs. The  eighteen-month
loan  allows  the farmer  to speculate  with his harvest,  guaranteeing  that the
taxpayer  will take  any loss  while  farmers  can  keep  any  profit  if  market  prices
rise above federal  price-support  levels  during  the eighteen-month  period.
Cotton  shippers  and millers  must pay cotton  growers  a bonus of six to eight
cents  a pound  above  world  market  prices  to persuade  them to sell  their  cotton
before  the  end  of the  eighteen-month  loan  period.  But  this  six-eight  cent  bonus
has  made  American  cotton  uncompetitive  on  world  market,  and  put  American  textile
mills at a disadvantage  in competition  with foreign  textile  mills.  This,  in
part, contributes  to unemployment  in the textile industry  and the need to
regulate  textile  imports.
American  farm  policy-making  has  not  been  goal-oriented:  regardless  of the
stated  goal of a program,  as long  as the government  transfers  a significant
amount  of resources  to farmers,  the program  is considered  a success.  The
contradictions  among  farm  programs  - such  as simultaneously  paying  for supply
controls  and offering  above-market  rewards  for  production--have  been obvious
for  decades,  yet  Congress  has refused  to  rationalize  the  system. The  goals  for
farm  programs  often  seem  to be only camouflage--existing  solely  to provide  a
plausible  reason  f  .r  transfer  payments  to  businessmen.  Agricultural  conservation
programs  have fit  this  category  for  many years. The  conservation  programs  are
justified  as  preserving  the  soil--but,  as  the  General  Accounting  Agency  has  long
pointed  out,  'conservation  payments"  routinely  are  used  to  pay  for  good  routine
farming  practices.18
Farm subsidies  have  been perpetuated  partly  because  Congress  and the
Agriculture  Department  understate  the  predicted  cost  of farm  programs.  The  1981
four-year  farm  bill  cost  four  times  as  much  as  Congress  announced  it  would  cost
in  1981,  and  the  1985  five-year  farm  bill  has  cost  more  than  double  the  expected
cost.  Since  1974,  the  average  annual  cost  of subsidy  programs  for  major  crops
has been 75 percent higher each year than the Agriculture  Department  has
predicted. Before  a program  is  begun  or expanded,  congressmen  and  bureaucrats
insist  that it is a minor  program  with minimal  costs;  after  the costs soar,
congressmen  and  politicians  insist  that  it is  too  late  to  worry  about  the  lost
money.
In 1987,  the  Reagan  Administration  attempted  to reform  the  Farmers  Home
Administration,  which was loaning  billions  of dollars  a year to technically
bankrupt  or  near-bankrupt  farmers,  thereby  sustaining  overproduction  of surplus
crops. Reagan  proposed  to restrict  government-subsidized  loans  to farmers  who
were less creditworthy  than before.  (Studies  have found  that 25 percent  of
bankrupt  government-subsidized  borrowers  went bankrupt  largely  from  receiving
too  many subsidized  .oans,  which  they  were subsequently  unable  to service,  the
low  interest  rates  notwithstanding.)  Yet,  there  was  a  firestorm  of  protest  from
Congress  and the  Reagan  Administration  and  any attempt  to reduce  lending  was
successfully  portrayed  as an attempt  to throw  farmers  "into  the  street."
United  States  Methods  and  Levels  of Support
Farm  policy  reform  has been stymied  partly  because  of the  complexity  of
farm  programs.  Farm  policy  terminology  is  a  maze  of  phrases  like  support  prices,
target  prices,  deficiency  payments,  conservation  reserve  payments,  set-asides,
etc.  These  phrases  attempt  to  portray  transfer  programs  as serving  the  public19
interest.  Programs  that impose  costs on consumers  are applauded for not
burdening  taxpayers;  programs  that  hit taxpayers  are  championed  for  protecting
consumers.  Farm  lobbies  have  fought  hard  to  avoid  reforms  of  farm  programs  that
would  make  more  clear  the  welfare  element  of farm  subsidies.
Grain  Policies
The  most important  set  of  programs  in  terms  of both  U.S.  budgetary  costs
and in international  impact  are  those  for  the  grains. For  wheat,  corn,  grain
sorghum,  oats,  and  rice  (as  well  as  the  principal  fiber  commodity,  cotton)  these
programs  have a common  structure. The  main elements  are set  by three  policy
instruments,  as follows.
1.  The "loan  rate",  or  market  support  price,  is the  price  at  which  the
Commodity  Credit  Corporation  (CCC)  accepts  grain  as collateral  for loans  to
farmers,  which the  farmers  need  not pay back.  The  CCC ends  up acquiring  the
commodity,  hence  removing  sufficient  quantities  from  the  market  to prevent  the
market  price  from  falling  much  below  the  loan-rate  level  for  any  sustained  period
such  as  a  marketing  year. Since  no significant  United  States  border  distortions
exist for the mailL  exported  crops,  supporting  the United  States  price means
supporting  price  at  all  other  locations  around  the  world  in  which  the  domestic
market  price  is  not  insulated  from  world  markets.  This  characteristic  led  some
economists  to say  during  the  early  1980s  when CCC  stocks  werc growing  rapidly
that  the  U.S.  was bearing  the  burden  of  worldwide  price  supports  by  having  CCC
loan  rates  set  too  high. In  the  1985  farm  bill,  loan  rates  were sharply  reduced
for all the major cormnodities.  The effect on world price was  seen most
dramatically  in  rice  and  cotton,  where  all  effective  market  price  support  ceased20
in  1986. Rice  and  cotton  prices  at  United  States  border  and  other  international
locations  fell  by as  much as 50  percent  within  a few  months.
2.  The  *target'  price  provides  price  insurance  by  making  payments  to farmers
to supplement  market  receipts.  The  payments  are  roughly  sufficient  to  guarantee
producers  the target  price ("roughly'  because  the payments  are based  on U.S.
average  prices,  not  on  each  producer's  actual  price). But  to  qualify  for  these
payments,  farmers  have  to  hold  acreage  idle. When  target  prices  were introduced
in their present form, in 1973,  they were below market prices.  The .ice
legislation  of  1975  established  a target  price  above  the  market  price,  but  like
the  1973  Act  made  payments  only  on  long  established  base  acreage  so  that  payments
wou.d not create  a direct  production  incentive  (no subsidy  at the margin).
(Actually,  by raising  the incentive  for  production  on a fixed  amount  of land,
the  government encourages farmers to  farm more  intensively--using  more
fertilizers,  more seeds,  etc.) The  Food  and  Agricultural  Act  of  1977,  however,
made the fateful  change  of basing  payments  on current  production,  and  with a
target  level  already  above  the  market  price  for  wheat,  grain  sorghum,  and  barley.
By 1982  target  prices  were above  market  prices  for  all  the  covered  crops. The
target  price  consequently  turned  into  a  production  incentive  price  which  tended
to increase  CCC  stock  buildup  at the  loan  rates. When  loan  rates  are  cut,  such
excess  supplies  depress  world  prices.
3.  Acreage  controls: Payments  made to farmers  for  not  growing  crops  were  a
mainstay  of 1950s  programs  (the  "Soil  Bank")  and  evolved  into  the 'set-aside"
and  voluntary  (paid)  diversion  programs  of the  1960s.  Set-asides  were phased
out in the mid-1970s,  but in 1977  were reinstated  for  wheat, in response  to
accumulating  CCC  stocks.  Set-asides  require farmers to idle a fraction,
typically  10-20  percent,  of  an  average  base  in  order  to  qualify  for  target  prices21
and  CCC  loans. In  1978,  paid  diversion  programs  were reestablished.  Theme  are
essentially  offers  by the  government  to  rent  a farmer's  land,  which  is  then  left
idle. As compared  to set-aside,  this  approach  is  much  preferable  to fprmers.
The  scale  of  acreage  diversion  was  substantially  expanded  under  the  Acreage
Reduction  Programs  (ARP)  of the  1980s,  especially  in 1983-87  when payment-in-
kind (PIK)  programs  used  CCC stocks  quite  generously  to  achieve  the  dual  goals
of reducing  production  and  government-held  stocks  simultaneously.  In 1983  and
again in 1987 and 1988 about 20 percent  of the cropland  base for the main
supported  commodities  was idled  under  ARPs,  a  larger  percentage  than  at  any  time
in the Depression-era  programs  of the 1930s  or the wSoil  Bank"  of the 1950s.
The  world  market  effects  of  ARPs are  the  opposite  of target  prices--indeed  the
two  policy  instruments  could  be  said  to  have  offsetting  effects  so  that  net  world
supplies  would be neither  increased  or decreased  by the  overall  program.  For
example,  in the  wheat  program  in 1987,  the  ARP idled  about  27 percent  of  vl.eat
acreage;  but because  of high  price  incentives  wheat  yields  were higher  on the
remaining  land. It  is  estimated  that  nearly  half  of  the  idle  acreage  effectively
came  back  into  production  through  this  slippage  on  yields.  Similarly,  in  1986,
the  rice  program  required  farmers  to idle  35 percent  of their  rice  acreage  in
order  to  qualify  for  subsidies;  it  then  paid  farmers  more  than  double  the  market
value  of  the  harvest  produced  from  the  remaining  cropland. The  price  effect  of
higher  prices  induced  an increase  in  production  on  non-idled  acreage  of  between
15 to 30 percent,  nearly  offsetting  the  supply  controls  on rice  acreage.
BOX 2.2  THE UNITED STATES ADDICTION TO SUPPLY CONTROL PROGRAMS
In  1934,  Agriculture  Secretary  Henry  Wallace  declared,  "The  present  program
for adjusting  productive  acreage  to market  requirements  is admittedly  but a
temporary  method  of  dealing  with  an emergency."  In  33  of the  last  35  years  the22
U.S.  Agriculture  Department  has  tried  to  balance  crop  supply  and  demand  by  paying
American  farmers  not to grow  on their  land.  Supply  controls  are  the clearest
symbol  of the  contradictory,  self-defeating  nature  of  American  farm  policy.
Set-asides  presume  that  the  United  States  is the Saudi  Arabia  of wheat
and  feedgrains--and  that  the  U.S.  can  cut  back  its  production,  drive  up  prices,
and increase  its  profits. If nobody  else in the  world  had any farmland,  this
policy  might  make sense. But,  in recent  years,  while  the  U.S.  government  has
forced  taxpayers  to  reward  farmers  not  to  farm. Farmland  in  production  in  other
parts  of the  world  has increased  by over  70 million  acres  since  1980--largely
in response  to  high  United  States  price  supports  and set-asides.
Paying farmers to cut back production  stemmed from the Roosevelt's
Administration  1933  decision  to  abandon  the  export  narket  and instead  regulate
farmers  to provide  only  enough  for  domestic  demand. Paid set-asides  were  part
of the  'domestic  allotment"  program--whereby  farmers  were allowed  to grow  on  a
percentage  of their property  according  to how much USDA planners  estimated
national  demand  to be.  Even though  the United  States  is now attempting  to
maximize  experts,  it  has  retained  programs  crafted  with  the  exact  opposite  goal.
Much  of  the  chaos  in  world  agricultural  markets  in  the  1980s  is  the  result
of the  1981  United  States  four-year  farm  bill,  which  set  American  subsidy  levels
far  aLove  world  price  levels.  As  a  result,  farmers  boosted  output  and  the  United
States  was soon  swamped  by  the  largest  grain  surpluses  in  history.  Congress  and
the  Administration  responded  to  the  surpluses  not  by lowering  the  subsidies  but
by creating  new programs  to pay farmers  to reduce  plantings.  In 1988, the
Agriculture  Department  rewarded  farmers  for  not  planting  on 78  million  acres.
Set-asides are a  political response  to what various United States
Administrations  have perceived  as "excess  capacity"--too  many acres  producing
a given crop.  Yet, a 1988 Agriculture  Department  study  concluded,  'Excess
capacity  is  a  much  more serious  problem  for  the  seven  major (subsidized)  crops
(wheat,  corn,  oats,  barley,  sorghum,  cotton,  and  soybeans)  than  for  the  rest  of
United  States  agriculture."  Excess  capacity  is  four  times  greater  for  the  major
subsidized  crops  than  for  the  unsubsidized  crops.
The United States  has had perennial  set-asides  in agriculture  largely
because  Congress  insists  on  perpetually  payi 4ag farmers  more  than  their  crops  are
worth.  Government  first  artificially  raises  the price  and then artificially
lowers  production.  The  higher  Congress  drives  up  the  price,  the  greater  the  need
for  government  controls  on  the  amount  produced.  The  federal  government  has  never
imposed  supply  controls  on the  vast  majority  of  crops  grown  in  the  U.S.  because
farmers  naturally  responded  to temporary  surpluses  by reducing  their  plantings
in the  following  year.
The  supply  control  programs,  by shutting  down  many  farms,  have  devastated
rural  economies. A 1987  Agriculture  Department  study  estimated  that  the 1987
supply  control  program,  which  idled  70  million  acres,  reduced  employment  in  the
U.S. by 300,000  jobs.  The reduced  sales  to farmers  also slashed  farm input
(fertilizer,  seeds,  pesticides,  etc.)  by  $4  billicn. (The  high  cost  of  the  set-
supply  control  programs  are illustrated  in a Purdue  University  study that23
estimated  that  each  additional  farmer  kept  on  the  land  was  costing  taxpayers  and
the  economy  up to $200,000  per  year).
Every  acre  of  government-paid  set-aside  land  is  a  indictment  of  the  failure
of federe.l  planning.  Permanent  set-asides  mean that government  perpetually
attracts  too  much  capital  to  agriculture,  and  then,  instead  of  allowing  a  natural
adjustment  and  the  capital  to flow  out,  perpetually  intervenes  to keep  some  of
that  capital  idle.
While the government is paying farmers not to plant on good land, it has
spent billions creating more farmland and making existing farmland  more
productive.  The  Bureau  of  Reclamation  has  spent  over  $22  billion  since  1905  to
"make  the  desert  bloom"  - continually  building  new  dams  to  make  more farmland  -
even  though  the  new  farmland  costs  taxpayers  far  more than  it is  wotth  and  the
additional  harvests  often  glut  markets  and  depress  farm  income.
Other  commodities
While  the  farm  lobby  insists  that  farmers  in  general  need  assistance,  there
is little  or  no consistency  among  federal  programs  for  different  commodities.
The  tobacco  program  relies  on  a  combination  of  acreage  allotments  and  price
supports.  In order to grow tobacco, a person must have a federal license.  The
permits  to  grow  tobacco  were  distributed  in  the  1930s,  and  current  farmers  must
either inherit, buy,  or rent a license to grow tobacco.  The government has
been widely  ridiculed  for having  'tobacco police"  (Agriculture Department
employees) out measuring each farmer's fields to insure that he does not grow
a hundredth of an acre too much of tobacco.  The government has pegged price
support for tobacco consistently at 50 percent to 100 percent higher than the
world market price.  The costs  of renting  a federal license  has sharply inflated
the  cost of tobacco  production in  the  United States.  Production costs  have also
been  boosted  because  the  tobacco  allotment  system  has  caused  the  fragmentation
of tobacco  planting  and  preventing  the  development  of economies  of  scale  which
have  benefitted  other  crops. Largely  because  of the  tobacco  program, American
tobacco  exports  have  plummeted. And, at the  same  time  that  the  government  has24
spent  billions  in  recent  decades  subsidizing  tobacco  production,  other  branches
of the  federal  government  are  spending  millions  of tax  dollars  in anti-smoking
campaigns.
The peanut  program  combines  a price  support  and a poundage  allotment.
Farmers  must have a license  for each  pound  of peanuts  that they sell  on the
domestic  market.  The  government  has  guaranteed  peanut  farmers  a  price  roughly
50-75  percent  higher  than the  world  market.  In order to isolate  the  peanut
farmers  from lower  world  market  prices,  strict  quotas  have been  imposed. The
Agriculture  Department  has  even  prohibited  the  export  of  certain  types  of  peanut
butter  from  the  United  States  to Canada,  fearing  that  the  peanut  butter  may  be
re-imported  and  undercut  the  government's  efforts  to inflate  peanut  prices.
For the  dairy  price  support  program,  the  main policy  instrument  is  CCC
purchases  of  butter,  cheese,  and  powdered  milk  at support  prices  which  generate
a legislated  minimum  price  for  raw  milk. The  large  stocks  of these  commodities
that  were generated  by the  mid-1980s  support  levels  resulted  in  two  short-term
measures  to reduce  output  as well as automatic  cuts in support  prices  when
projected  CCC  stock  accumulation  exceeds  5  billion  pounds  of  milk  annually.  The
output  reducing  measures  were:  (1)  contracted  reductions  in  output  of 5 to 20
percent  per  participating  farmer  in 1985-86,  with payments  of $335  million  in
FY 1985  and  $630  million  in  FY 1986;  (2)  a contracted  buyout  of dairy  herds  in
1986-87,  with  payments  of $489  million  in FY  1986,  $587  million  in  FY 1987,  and
$296  million  in  FY 1988.  Surplus  stocks  were also  disposed  of using  domestic
free distribution  of cheese and butter to low-income  and elderly people.
(Unfortunately,  free distribution  of butter  led to an almost  pound-for-pound
decrease  in commercial  sales  of  margarine,  which  hurt soybean  farmers,  as soy
oil  is a  primary  ingredient  of  margarine).  Though  the  distribution  program  was25
officially  named  the  Temporary  Emergency  Food  Assistance  Program,  the  program
has  effectively  become  permanent.  When  CCC  stocks  were  used  up in  1989,  Congress
added legislation  for the CCC to buy more cheese  in order to continue  the
program.
The sugar  program  combines  a price  support  and an import  quota.  The
quantity  of imports  is regulated  so as to achieve  a legislated  price  for  U.S.
raw  sugar. As the  demand  for  sugar  has  decreased  because  of  the  development  and
popularization  of sugar substitutes  (both noncaloric,  like aspartame,  and
caloric,  like  high fructose  corn syrup)  it  has  been  necessary  to cut  back the
import  level  regularly.  United  States  sugar  imports  have  declined  from  5  million
tons  in 1975  to about  1  million  tons  annually  in 1988  and  1989.  But the  U.S.
raw  price  has  been  maintained  at  about  18  cents  per  pound. The  costs  are  borne
by sugar  consumers,  (and  poor  producers  in developing  countries)  and  are  in the
billions  of dollars. The  exact  cost  depends  on the  price  that  consumers  would
pay without  the  program,  which is the  world price  of sugar.  This price  has
varied  between  3  cents  and  13  cents  per  poucd  in  1986-89,  so  the  consumer's  cost
can  be made to  vary by a factor  of 3,  between  15 cents  and 5 cents  per  pound,
depending  on  what world  price  is used.  Moreover,  United  States  policy  itself
significantly  affects  the  world  price  (see  Millmoe,  1989).
BOX  2.3:  ONE  HUNDRED  AND  SEVENTY  YEARS  OF SUGAR  SUBSIDIES
The United States government  has been heavily protecting  or directly
subsidizing  the  sugar  industry  since  1816. For  almost  the  entire  history  of  the
United States,  American  sugar prices  have been held at double,  triple,  or
quadruple  world  sugar  prices.
Since  1980,  the  sugar  program  has  cost  consumers  and  taxpayers  roughly  two
million  dollars  for  each  American  sugar  grower. There  are  only  11,000  sugar  beet
and sugar cane farmers in the United States, and production  is extremely
concentrated.  A USDA study  estimated  that  one  corporation  was receiving  over26
$100  million  in  benefits  irom  the  program,  and  several  others  were  receiving  over
$50  million  each.
Congressmen  defend  the sugar  program as protecting  Americans  against
sharply fluctuating international sugar prices.  The sugar program, like other
American farm  programs, provides  a price FLOOR  but no price CEILING.  Thus,  USDA
prevents prices from falling but allows prices to rise as high as the moon:
price supports  are always a "heads,  farmers  win; tails, taxpayers and consumers
lose" proposition.
The sugar  program is  a great  inflationary  success:  sugar  sold for  22  cents
a pound in the  United States  when the  world sugar price  was only four and a  half
cents a pound.  (World  sugar  prices are  now about thirteen  cents a pound).  Each
1 cent increase in the price of sugar adds between $250 and $300 million to
consumers' food  bills.  A May, 1988  Commerce Department study  estimated that the
sugar program  was costing  American consumers  more than $3  billion a year.  This
works out to over $60 a year for the average United States family of four.
Like most farm  programs, the sugar programs  costs consumers and taxpayers
far  more than  it benefits  farmers. The  Agriculture  Department  estimates  that
total  sugar  producer  income  was  only  about  $300  million.  Thus,  sugar
protectionism costs consumers $10 to provide $1 in income to sugar growers.
A few thousand sugar growers have become the tail that wags the dog of
American foreign policy.  Early in 1982, Reagan announced the Caribbean Basin
Initiative to provide United States aid to Latin America.  But, a few weeks
later, the USDA slashed the amount of sugar Latin American could sell to the
United States in order to protect the high price received  by American growers.
Sugar  was Latin  America's  third-largest  export  in the early  1980s,  and sugar
revenues have evaporated.  The State Department estimated that the reductions
in sugar import quotas costs the developing country allies $800  million a year.
By reducing  Latin  America's  dollar  revenue  from  sugar  sales,  the  sugar  program
has also  hurt commercial  banks awaiting repayment  of loans  from sugar  exporting
governments.
High  prices have  lead to nosediving  sugar  consumption.  The average
American consumes one-third less sugar now than he did in 1971.  Lower priced
corn syrup and low-calorie substitutes are rapidly driving sugar out of the
sweetener market.  Coke and Pepsi no longer use sugar in the-'r  soft drinks in
the U.S.  The government can drive up the price, but it cen't force people to
use sugar.
Congress' generosity to sugar producers  is victimizing other American
farmers  as well as American  industries. Brazil  retaliated  against  the  United
States  for  cutting  its  sugar  quota  by reducing  its  purchases  of  American  grain.
In  the  Dominican  Republic, former  sugar  growers  are  now producing  wheat and  corn,
thereby providing  more competition  for American farmers.  American candy
producers  are  losing  market  share  to foreign  competition-partly  because  foreign
companies  can  buy  their  sugar  at much lower  prices. Since  1982,  dextrose  and
confectionery coating imports have risen teafold and chocolate imports are up
fivefold.27
Sugar  protectionism  is  disrupting  American  commerce. In  the  early  1980s,
when United States  sugar prices  were seven times  higher than world prices,
"entrepreneurs  were  importing  high-sugar  content  products,  such  as  iced-tea  mix,
and then sifting  their  sugar  content  from  them  selling  the sugar  at the  high
domestic  price,"  according  to the 1986  Economic  Report  of the President. In
order  to protect  the  domestic  sugar  program,  the  Reagan  Administration  in 1985
banned  imports  of  all  products  containing  any  sugar  - thereby  nullifying  hundreds
of private  contracts.
The  sugar  program  has  destroyed  far  more  jobs  than  it  has  saved.  American
had an efficient  sugar  refining  industry  with an excellent  location  near the
Caribbean.  But,  thanks  to  the  forced  reductions  of  in  imported  sugar,  since  1981
ten  sugar  refineries  have  closed  down  and  thousands  of  non-farm  jobs  have  been
lost.
The  sugar  program,  like  most farm  commodity  programs,  has  done  nothing  to
encourage  farmers  to adjust  to  market  realities. High federal  support  prices
have  led  to  a  boom  in  domestic  sugar  production--up  23  percent  since  1982. Yet,
most  American  sugar  producers  remain  hopelessly  uncompetitive  with Caribbean,
Filipino,  and  Australian  and  New  Zealand  sugar  farmers.  This  is  a classic  case
of government  generosity  encouraging  wasteful  behavior  in the  private  sector.
Marketing orders are another important  farm program.  For  raisins,
California-Arizona  lemons  and  oranges, almonds,  filberts,  and spearmint  oil,
the  Agriculture  Department  dictates  the  percentage  of each  farmer's  harvest  he
will be allowed to sell.  The Agriculture Department justifies these controls
by claiming that they maximize returns to farmers.  The programs were begun in
the 1930s and 1940s, and were designed to help farmers overcome the effects of
temporary  gluts.  But,  the  programs became  institutionalized, and  are now
administered  with the goal of keeping  prices permanently higher than they  would
be without intervention.  As a result, each year millions of pounds of fresh
oranges  and lemons  and almonds  are fed to cattle,  rather  than being  sold to
humans.  Many  regulated farmers have been driven into bankruptcy,  largely
because  they  could  not sell  all  of their  harvest.
Other  programs,  for  example,  the  Wool  Act and  the  Meat Import  Act, are
quite  different in structure  and  complicate the  picture  considerably.  Moreover,28
of the  roughly  400  different  farm  products  produced  in  the  United  States,  fewer
than  20  are  subsidized  or  directly  controlled  by  the  federal  government.  Whether
a  crop  is  subsidized  or  not  depends  largely  on  political  accidents,  or the  clout
of  various  farm  lobbies  at the  time  of the  1930s.
Costs  and  Consequences  of  U.S.  Policies,  1984-89
The consequences  of policies  can be approximated  by comparing  internal
prices  with  world trading  (border)  prices,  but this  is  not a good  measure  for
the United  States  because  it is large  enough  to influence  world prices  and
because the production  control programs involve social costs that price
comparisons  cannot  capture. Preliminary  results  are  available  for  a series  of
studies  by the  U.S.  Department  of  Agriculture's  Economic  Research  Service  that
estimate  the  supply-demand  situation  that  would  have existed  in 1984-89  in  the
absence  of CCC purchases,  acreage  diversion,  and deficiency  payments.  For
details,  see  Lin  and  Gardner  (1989).
Table  1 shows  estimated  output  effects  of the  United  States  unilaterally
removing  its  target  price,  loan  rate,  acreage  control  programs  and sugar  quota
under  1987  conditions.  For  the  grains,  soybeans,  cotton,  and  tobacco  output  is
greater  with no programs. The main reason  is that acreage  controls  in 1987
outweighed  the  incentives  for increased  production  caused by target-price
protection.  Milk,  sugar,  and  peanut  output  is  less  with  no program. For  these
commodities  the  production  incentives  of support  prices  dominate. Meat animal
production  is largely  unaffected.  An overall  index  of output,  constructed  by
weighing  each  commodity's  production  by its  share  of  the  value  of the  total,  is
3.7  percent  higher  in  the  no-program  scenario.  This  implies  that  on  an  overall
basis  U.S. policy  is world-price  increasing,  not decreasing  as is sometimes
asserted.29
TABLE 1:  Effects of eliminating farm commodity programs on production:
1987
Production  1  Change due
Production  with no  to ending
Commodity  Unit  with program  program  programm
Wheat  mil. bu.  2,108  2,570  +21.9
Corn  do.  7,064  7,350  +4.0
Soybeans  do.  2,008  2,087  +3.9
Cotton  mil. bale  14.8  16.1  +8.8
Rice  mil. cwt.  129.6  155.0  +19.6
Tobacco  bil. lbs.  1.2  2.02  +68.3
Sugar  1,000 tons  7,185  6,573  -9.5
Peanuts  mil. lbs.  3,619  2,618  -27.7
Potatoes  mil. cwt.  385.5  389.5  +1.0
Dairy  bil. lbs.  140.3  134.2  -4.5
Beef  do.  23.4  23.4  0.0
Pork  do.  15.6  15.7  +0.6
Broilers  do.  16.1  16.0  -0.6
Source:  Gardner, 1989.
With  respect to prices the commodity programs increase producer prices
for all commodities, and generally increase prices paid by  consumers, also.
However, in 1986-87 consumer prices for the grains were reduced as loan rates
were cut and  CCC stocks  disbursed.  Because  the lower  prices in  1986-87  were only30
made  possible  by stock  accumulation  before  1986,  it  is  misleading  to  look  at  1987
effects  in  isolation.  Table  2  shows  estimates  of  gains  and  losses  for  different
interest  groups  using  1985-87  averages. Overall,  according  to  these  estimates,
producers  gain  $12.8  billion  annually  at the  cost  of $17.8  billion  to  domestic
consumers  and taxpayers. Other  estimates  of consumer  losses  range  to $23.6
billion  per  year (OECD).
BOX  2.4: THE  WEALTH  OF AMERICAN  FARMERS
Federal farm policy is founded  upon two delusions:  that  farmers  are
comparatively  needy,  and  that  the  number  of  farmers  is  decreasing.  In  reality,
the average  full-time  farmer  is a millionaire  and the  number  of full-time
farmers  has  significantly  increased  since  1980.  The  vast  majority  of the  "farm
crisis" stems  simply from  counting  part-time  farmers  as full-time  farmers.
Farm  policy  in  the  United  States  has  been  driven  by a  widespread  impression
that  America  has lost  hundreds of thousands  of farmers  in the 1980s--thereby
supposedly  proving the need for more aid to agriculture.  Agriculture
Department  statistics  reveal  that the total number of farmers  went from
2,440,000  in 1980 to 2,197,000  in 1988 - an apparent  decrease  of 243,000
farmers.
But, this  decrease  is a statistical  illusion--caused  by the government's
antiquated,  irrelevant  definition  of farmer. According  to  USDA,  anyone  who
sells  more  than  $1000  in  agricultural  commodities  is  a farmer. But,  Agriculture
Department  statistics  imply  that anyone  who sells  one  horse  for  over $1000  or
250  bushels  of  wheat  a year  is  a bona  fide  farmer.
According  to  the  official  USDA  statistics,  most of the  1980s  decrease  in
the  number  of farmers  occurred  in the  farmers  selling  less  than  $10,000  a  year.
These  are  gentlemen  farmers,  hobby  farmers,  and  tax  farmers. The  vast  majority
of so-called farmers  receive  the  vast  majority  of their  income  from  off-farm
work.  In the  1987  Census  of  Agriculture,  most farmers  in this  classification
denied  that  their  primary  occupation  was farming.
Many agricultural  economists  agree  that  the  viable  size  of a farm  now is
gross  sales  of over $100,000.  In 1980,  there  were 271,000  farmers  with sales
above  $100,000;  by 1988,  there  were 323,000  farmers  in this  class--an  increase
of  almost  twenty percent.  These  farmers  perennially  collect  between  eighty  and
ninety  percent  of all  farm  income.
Some  farm  aid  advocates  count  farmers  in  the  $40,000-99,999  sales  class  as
full-time  farmers.  But,  as  Emanuel  Melichar,  former  chief  agricultural  economi3t
for  the  Federal  Reserve,  observed  in  1984,  "on  many  of  these  farms,  the  operators
either  are  underemployed  during  much  of  the  year  or  have  a  relatively  inefficient31
operation.  H.O. Carter  of the  University  of California  at Davis  observed,  'As
a group,  these  smaller  farmers  are  declining  in  numbers  because  they are not
large  enough  to  compete  with  their  larger,  more  efficient  neighbors." According
to  USDA's  yield  and labor  estimates,  a person  can raise  $40,000  worth  of corn
in  only seven  weeks.
The  Agriculture  Department  reported  that,  for  1988,  the  average  farm  family
had  an  income  of $21,350.  Yet,  this  number  was  calculated  by simply  by  dividing
the  total  number  of full - and part-time  farmers  with total  farm income. In
reality,  the  average  full-time  farmer  in  1988  reaped  an  income  of $168,000.  (The
same  year,  the  average  United  States family  income  was $38,740).  Even  the  class
of $40,000-99,999  farmers  had  an  income  much  higher  than  the  national  average:
$39,931  (most  of this  came  from  off-farm  earnings).
The financial  gap  between  farmers  and  non-farmers  becomes  even  more stark
when  considering  net  worth. The  Census  Bureau  concluded  in  1986  that  the  average
net  worth  of  American  households  was  $78,734.  (About  half  of  American  households
were  worth  less  than  $32,677). In contrast,  the  average  full  time  farmer  is  a
millionaire,  with a  net  worth  of $1,016,000  as  of  December  31,  1988.  (This  net
worth figure  is after  subtracting  debts). The  average  full-time  farmer  has a
net  worth  almost  13  times  greater  than  that  of  the  average  American  family,  and
a net worth over 30 times  greater  than half the families  of America.  Even
farmers  in  the  part-time,  $40,000-99,999  sales  class  have  a  net  worth  of  $426,487
- over  five  times  greater  than  the  average  American  family.
The  concentration  of  wealth  among  a few  hundred  thousand  farmers  is  leading
to a concentration  of land ownership.  Former  USDA Assistant  Secretary  Don
Paarlberg  notes, 'We are drifting  toward  a  structure  of agriculture  which
approaches..  a wealthy  hereditary  landowning  class,  with new entrants  almost
ruled  out  unless  they  are  well-to-do.'  The  National  Agricultural  Forum  reported
in 1984  that 'eight  percent  of the  households  in  America  own  the  vast  majority
of the  land...  63 percent  of  United  States  households  own  no land."
The  magnitude  of  the  increase  in  domestic  prices  from  the  farm  program  can
be estimated  by the tariff  equivalents  of current  quotas.  A United States
International  Trade  Commission  study  (1990)  concluded  that,  for  1986,  the  sugar
quota  was the  equivalent  of a  233  percent  tariff  on sugar,  the  butter  quota  was
the  equivalent  of a  190  percent  tariff,  the  cheddar  cheese  quota  was equivalent
to a  132 percent tariff, the  'Americen-type  processed  cheese' quota was
equivalent  to a 172  percent  tariff,  the  quota  on nonfat  dry  milk had  the same
effect  as a  142  percent  tariff,  and  the  peanut  quota  was  equivalent  to  a tariff32
of up to 90 percent  on peanut  imports.  If some politician  openly  proposed
imposing  such  high  tariffs  (taxes)  on  major  food  items,  he  would  be  barraged  by
criticism  in  the  nation's  media. But,  because  few  Americans  understand  how  farm
policy  operates,  extremely  high  levels  of protection  and  subsidy  have  continued
unchallenged  for  d zades.
Many  farm  products  that  are  not  directly  subsidized  or  supported  by  quotas
are  protected  by  high  tariffs.  The  tariff  on  orange  juice  is  40  percent;  though
Canada  has  no  orange  groves,  orange  juice  is  much  cheaper  in  Ontario  than  in  New
England. Yogurt  and ice cream  are  hit  with 20 percent  tariffs,  while frozen
chicken  carries  a 28.6  percent  tariff. Fresh  cabbage,  asparagus  and broccoli
must pay a 25 percent  tariff,  carrots  are  hit with 17.5  percent  tariff,  and
cantaloupes  pay  a 35  percent  tariff.
The  losses  to people  outside  the  United  States  due  to  United  States  farm
programs  are estimated  to be $1.0 billion.  This loss occurs because the
commodities  considered,  except  for  sugar,  are  net  exports  of the  United  States.
Therefore,  when United  States  farm  programs  increase  commodity  prices  in  world
markets,  foreign  sellers  gain  but foreign  buyers  lose  more.
The difference  between  the $12.8  billion  producer  gain and $18.8  cost
(including  foreign  losses)  caused  by the  United  States  farm programs  is a $6
billion  worldwide  deadweight  loss  of  these  programs.  This  loss  measures  the  real
income  given  up in order  to undertake  United  States  agricultural  protection.
Apart  from  uncertainties  in  elasticities  and  other  parameters  necessary  to make
these  estimates,  several  reasons  have  been  put  forth  why the  $6  billion  dollar
figure  is  incomplete  or misleading.
First,  the administrative  costs of the programs  are omitted.  It is
difficult  to separate  out  the  United  States  Department  of  Agriculture  and  other33
agencies'  budgets  that  constitute  these  costs,  but they include  at  least  the
payroll  of the  Agricultural  Stabilization  and Conservation  Service,  vhich is
about  $0.5  billion  annually.
TABLE  2:  Annual  average  gains  and  losses  from  farm  commodity  programs:
1984-87  crop  years
Buyers  Net
domestic
Commodity  Producers Domestic Foreign  Total  Taxpayers  effect
------------------ billion  dollars----------------------
Wheat  3.2  -0.4  -0.4  -0.8  -3.6  -0.7
Corn  4.2  -0.4  -0.1  -0.5  -6.7  -2.9
Soybeans  0.41  -0.48  -0.30  -0.78  --  -0.07
Cotton  1.18  -0.20  -0.08  -0.28  -1.02  -0.04
Rice  0.43  0.02  0.02  0.04  -0.76  -0.29
Tobacco  0. 36a  -0.21  -0.11  -0.32  -0.02  0.14
Sugar  0.61  -0.78  n.a.  n.a.  --  -0.17
Peanuts  0.77b  -0.41  n.a.  n.a.  --  0.36
Potatoes  0.12  -0.12  0  -0.12  --  -0.01
Dairy  1.44  -0.99  0  -0.99  -1.67  -1.22
All  program
commodities  12.8  -4.0  -1.0  -5.0  -13.8  -5.0
Source: Gardner,  1989.
al Includes  gains  to  quota  owners  of $0.45  billion  and  losses  to producers  of
$0.09  billion. Overall  domestic  impact  is  positive  because  reduction  of
supply  exploits  the  U.S.  position  as a quasi-monopolist  in  world  markets  by
raising  world  prices.
b/ Includes  gains  to producers  of $0.34  billion  and  gains  to quota  owners  of
$0.43  billion.34
Second,  farmers  expend  some  effort  trying  to  comply  at  minimal  cost  with
program  provisions  or to  make  themselves  eligible  for  payments.  For  decades,  it
has been  a common  complaint  that  farmers  have  become  primarily  concerned  with
'farming  the  government.'  For  example,  some  intricate  contracting  arrangements
have  been  undertaken  so that  farmers  can  obtain  two, three,  or even ten  times
the  1985  Act's  ostensible  limitation  of  $50,000  per  farm  in  deficiency  payments.
The  costs  of this  maneuvering  are part  of the deadweight  losses  from  current
programs.  However, no  quantification  of  them is available.  Third, an
agricultural information  and  influence industry has  ariser centered in
Washington,  D.C.,  in  which  each  commodity  group  has  to  hire  lobbyists  and  expend
its  own  time  in  obtaining  the  best  political  results  possible  for  itself. Many
millions  of dollars  are spent  in this  way, but  again  the  data  for  even  a rough
estimate  are  not  available.
Fourth,  there  are  long-run  resource  allocation  effects  of programs  which
may  be important  sources  of  economic  mischief. Price  supports,  especially  when
combined  with  disaster  programs  that  constitute  free  output  insurance  and  credit
programs  which  approximate  free  insurance  against  bankruptcy,  provide  a safety
net sufficient  to prevent  people  who aren't  managerially  or temperamentally
suited  to farming  from  moving  to an occupation  that  fits  them  better. In the
long  term  this  is  no favor  either  to  the  particular  farmers  in  trouble  or  to  the
health  of the  farm  sector.
Farm  programs  have  done  many things  to reduce  farmers'  efficiency. One
recent  study  estimated  that  the  requirement  that  farmers  idle  25  percent  of  their
farm  adds  30-40  cents  a bushel  to the  cost  of  production  of  corn.  (Some  of  the
most  efficient  farmers  can  produce  corn  for  about  $1.25  a  bushel).  The  stringent
rules  required  to  qualify  for  subsidies  also  often  effectively  prohibit  a  farmer35
from  rotating his  crops. This  can  add  another  30 to 40  cents  a  bushel  to the
cost  of production,  and also  results  in farmers  using  much  more pesticide  and
fertilizer  to  compensate  for  the  adverse  effects  of  monoculture. Farm  programs
also  drive  up the  price  of farmland,  thereby  increasing  farmers'  debt  load  and
increasing  their  vulnerability  to rising  interest  rates. In order  to qualify
for  federal  subsidies,  an  acre  of land  must  have  a  history  of being  planted  to
subsidized  crops  for  at least  three  years. Two  acres  of  practically  identical
land  can  differ  in  value  by 30  percent  or 40  percent  depending  on  whether  crops
planted  on  the  land  are  currently  eligible  for  federal  subsidy.  (Unfortunately,
a  prevailing  reaction  to  the  government-induced  rise  in  farmland  value  has  been
an increase  in demand  for  government  subsidized  credit  to buy farmland,  thus
leading  to  a spiral  of  higher  land  values  and  higher  government  spending).
Finally,  government  spending  on  farm  programs  increases  the  budget  defict,
raising  real interest  rates  on farmers's  loans.  This not only increases  the
costs  of  production  though  making  borrowing  for  seeds  and  fertilizer  more  costly
but  makes  it  more  difficult  for  efficient  farmers  to  acquire  more  land  or  others
to purchase  land  to start  a farm.
These  are  examples  of the  unintended  consequences  of  dozens  of  conflicting
government  programs  designed  to  benefit  farmers.  Presumably  no one  in  Congress
or in  the  Agriculture  Department  desires  to  inflate  farmers'  cost  of  production;
yet, the  programs  have  numerous  effects  that  sharply  reduce  American  farmers'
competitiveness.  And,  because  changing  program  rules  to eliminate  the  adverse
effects  would reduce  some farmers'  subsidies,  there  seems  to be a political
paralysis  on fixing  the  problem.
More  generally,  the  programs  encourage  undue  risk-taking  in  less  productive
ventures  and  discourage  management  approaches  that  would  make farmers  and the36
farm  sector  more resilient  and  competitive  in  world commodity  markets. These
losses  are  also  not  quantifiable  but  may  well  be the  most  important  of all.
BOX  2.5: AMERICAN'S  DAIRY  QUAGMIRE
Since 1980, federal  dairy policy  has cost the average  American  family
enough  to  buy  its  own  dairy  cow. Annual  subsidies  for  each  dairy  cow  in  the  U.S.
exceed the per capita income  of half the population  of the world.  While
productivity  in the American  dairy industry  is soaring,  the United States
Congress  is  preventing  consumers  from  benefiting  from  lower  dairy  prices.
The  United  States  has  been  awash  with surplus  dai.,  products  since  1979:
The government  bought  the  equivalent  of almost  nine billion  pounds  of milk in
1988,  and  expects  to buy over 8 billion  pounds  this year.  The federal  dairy
price  support  program  obliges  the  government  to buy unlimited  amounts  of milk
at a set price.  The federal  program  sets a price flow in the marketplace,
thereby  guaranteeing  that dairy prices  will not fall below the level that
Congress  decrees.
Congress  has twice  sought  to solve  the  dairy surplus  problem  by paying
farmers  to  cut  back  production,  yet  each  time  Congress  maintained  price  support
levels  far above  market-clearing  levels.  In 1983-84,  Congress  paid farmers
almost  a billion  dollars  to reduce  their  production;  no lasting  decrease  in
production  occurred. In 1986-87,  Congress  paid  dairymen  over  $1.3  billion  to
slaughter  over  a  million  cows. A hundred  and  forty-four  dairy  owners  got  over
a  million  dollars  a piece  to take  a five-year  vacation  from  dairying. Yet,  as
the  General  Accounting  Office  noted, 'Total  milk production  did not decrease
because  nonparticipating  farmers  increased  their  production  during  the  program
period."
Retail  milk  prices  are  sharply  inflated  by  byzantine  regulations  that  have
prohibited  free  trade  in  milk among  the  different  states  of the  United  States.
The federal  government  has  over  1000  pages  of restrictive  rules  on  how  milk is
allowed  to be sold  and  employs  over  600  federal  employees  simply  to administer
the programs.  The  regulations  were begun in the 1930s,  when  roads and
refrigerated  technology  were  comparatively  backward,  and  have  been  retained  half
a centucy  despite  vast increases  in technology  and  transportation  that should
have  made su:h  autarchic  policies  a laughingstock.  The  Agriculture  Departnient
even prohibits  businesses  from drying  out milk in one area, shipping  it to
another  area,  and  reconstituting  it  as fresh  milk.
Dairy  is  one  of  the  United  States's  most  protected  industries,  with strict
quotas  limiting  dairy  imports  to  roughly  2  percent  of  domestic  consumption.  For
most of the  1980s,  American  cheese  prices  were double  world  market  prices  and
nonfat  dry  milk and  butter  prices  were  three  times  the  world  price. The  dairy
lobby  is a leading  opponent  to  GATT reform.37
Many American  dairymen  are hopelessly  uncompetitive  by international
standards:  Australian  and  New  Zealand  farmers  can  produce  milk  for  less  than  half
the  cost  of  the  average  American  farmer. But,  the  dairy  program,  by  encouraging
dairy  production  in the areas  of the  United  States  with tne highest  cost of
production,  has  made  American  dairymen  appear  much less  competitive  than  they
may  actually  be.  The  dairy  lcbby  is  extremely  strong  in  the  United  States  and
is  one  of the  most  vocal  opponents  to  GATT  agricultural  reform.
The  array  of  handouts  and  protection  have  not  prevented  a decline  in the
number  of  American  dairy  producers  from  600,000  in 1950  to  about  130,000  today.
The  Congressional  Office  of  Technology  Assessment  estimates  that  milk  output  per
cow  could  double  and  that  5000  large  dairy  farms  could  supply  the  nation's  milk
needs  by the  year  2000.
The cost  of dairy  production  in the  U.S. fell 4 percent  in 1987  alone,
and  milk  output  per  cow  jumped  3  percent  in 1988. Computerized  feeding  methods
can  boost  milk  yields  another  5  percent  without  increasing  a herd's  total  feed
requirement.  Artificial  insemination,  embryo  transfers,  and  cloning  are  helping
to boost  average  dairy  cow productivity  by a steady  two-three-four  percent  a
year. And  dairy  production  could  explode  in  the  next few  years  after  the  Food
and  Drug  Administration  approves  bovine  growth  hormones  (BGH)  that  can  boost  milk
output  by up to 30 percent  per  cow.
Several  state  legislature  have  already  proposed  prohibiting  BGH. Instead
of seeing  a lower  cost  of productivity  and  the  resulting  lower  prices  as large
benefits  to  low-income  citizens  who  cannot  afford  sufficient  calcium  and  protein,
politicians  at both the  state  and federal  level  are rushing  to attempt  to ban
the  new  hormone. This  is indicative  of how  perpetual  protection  encourages  a
hostility  to innovation  in  the  protected  industry.
The dairy program has cost con.umers and taxpayers far more than it has
benefited dairymen.  In 1985 the dairy program cost taxpayers and consumers
roughly  $8 billion  while dairy profits  amounted to $3.6  billion.  In 1986,  dairy
profits were $5 billion; subsidies cost the public around $8 billion.  Thus,
consumers  and taxpayers  had to pay  over $1.50  for each dollar  of income realized
by dairymen.
Nutrition surveys  have found that calcium is the most deficient nutrient
among low-income Americans' diets; a major reason for the calcium shortages is
the relatively  high cost of milk.  A6riculture Department surveys show that the
average American dairymen is worth over half a million dollars.  Yet, despite
the  disparity  between  low-income  consumers  and relatively  wealthy farmers,  United
State?s  public policy continues sacrificing poor consumers to rich farmers.38
II.  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY'S  COMMON  AGRICULTURAL  POLICY
The  European  Community's  Common  Agricultural  Policy  or  CAP  shares  many  of
the  characceristics  of United  States  farm  policy:  high costs,  inefficiencies,
and  trade  distortions.  But  it  also  has  its  unique  characteristics  and  evolution.
Nevertheless,  it is  trapped  in  many  of the  same  political  rigidities  as  United
States  farm  policy.
The  Evolution  of  EC Policy
The  Common  Agricultural  Policy  was  an  essential  component  of  the  political
process  which  formed  the  European  Community.  At the  time  the  European  Community
was being founded,  most Europeans  still  had stazk  memories  of hunger  or food
rationing  during  World  War II and the  difficult  post-war  years.  The  CAP  was
bound  to  be  somewhat  protectionist,  for  every  member  state  protected  agriculture
to  one  degree  or another,  but  right  from  the  start  it  was  prone  to  excess. The
French  government  desperately  wanted  an  outlet  for  French  cereal  production  while
the  German  government  felt  it  necessary  to  defend  the  incomes  of  its  own  farmers.
The compromise  was to adopt  high German  prices  and to ensure  French  sales  in
Germany. Once  cereals  were  protected  other  sectors  had  to  be similarly  treated
for  the  sake  of equity,  and  the result  was increased  protection  across  nearly
all  parts  of agriculture.
There  was sharp  debate  about  the  direction  CAP  would take in the  early
years.  A 1958 resolution  of EC members  declared  that  the CAP "should  render
possible  the  application  of  a  price  policy  which  will  avoid  overproduction  while
enabling  goods  to remain  or to  become  competitive."39
At first  the  EC was slightly  embarrassed  by the degree  of agricultural
protectionism,  and  during  the  Kennedy  Round--the  Round  of  GATT  talks  started  in
1963  primarily  to  address  United  States  fears  that  the  creation  of the  EC  would
curtail  their  European  sales--the  EC  offered  to  bind  the  degree  of support--the
"mouton  de soutien". The  United  States  refused  this  offer,  believing  that  the
bound  levels  of  protection  were  too  high,  but  the  CAP  has  never  been  negotiable
since. Even  now in  the  Uruguay  Round  the  EC  continues  to  argue  that  the  CAP is
non-negotiable,  and  has  become  increasingly  protectionist.
The  CAP  - Methods  and  Levels  of Support
The  basic  instrument  of agricultural  protection  in  the  EC is  the  variable
import  levy. Roughly  speaking  the  variable  levy  defines  an internal  price  for
each  product  and  then taxes  imports  by whatever  amount  is  necessary  to ensure
that they  cannot  undercut  it.  The  variable  levy  is calculated  daily  from  the
lowest  price of imports  to the  Community  that day.  It is obvious  that the
administration  of  variable  levies  is  a  significant  and  expensive  task  (in  fact,
they  are  considerably  more  complex  than  described  above),  so they  are  used  only
for  the major items.  For less important  products,  or where defining  import
prices  would  be excessively  complex--perhaps  because  a  wide range  of qualities
was  available  (e.g.  processed  foods)  or  because  of significant  geographic  price
dispersion  (e.g.  fresh  fruit)--the  EC  uses import  tariffs  and  minimum  prices  to
restrict  imports.  There  are  also  import  quotas  or "voluntary"  export  restraints
on certain  products  - e.g.  beef and  cassava  respectively.  Finally,  virtually
all imports  of agricultural  products  are subject  to license. Although  these
licenses  must  be  granted  freely  and  quickly,  they  are  indicative  of  the  extremely
close  watch  that  the  European  Commission  keeps  on  agricultural  trade.40
The import  restrictions  detailed  above  are supplemented  by two further
groups  of  policies. For  most  commodities,  including  all  the  major  ones,  the  EC
stands  ready,  through  the  various  national  authorities,  to  buy  local  product  at
pre-announced  prices. These  prices,  of  course,  are  intimately  related  to  those
defining  the  variable  levies,  and  the  buying  in  ensures  that  European  production
cannot  drive  prices  below  the  prescribed  levels. These "intervention  prices"
are  the  basic  levers  of  the  agricultural  policy,  and  are  subject  to  considerable
political  debate  during  the  annual  price  fixing  round. As noted  above,  common
financing  results  in every member pressing for high prices for its major
products;  even Britain,  the staunchest  critic  of the CAP, fights  its corner
vigorously  and has usually  been persuaded  to agree to general price rises
provided  its own products  are supported  and that its share  of the  budgetary
burden  is  mitigated.
Intervention  buying  is also the  origin  of the famous  EC mountains  and
lakes  of agricultural  produce. Once  bought  in the  EC must  hold--or  strictly,
pay  others  to hold--the  goods  until  they  are  sold. At the  high  prices  defined
by the  policy  it is  often  not  possible  to sell  the  full  crop  to consumers,  so
the  excess  is  kept  until  it is  exported,  Jenatured  or destroyed.
Export subsidies--export  restitutions  in Euro-speak--are  the  second
supplementary  policy.  When the CAP was initiated.  the EC was either  self-
sufficient  in,  or a net importer  of,  most agricultural  products. Thus  market
prices  could  be  controlled  by  import  policy  and,  incidentally,  net  revenue  earned
for  the  Community's  coffers. (Agricultural  levies  accrue  to Brussels,  not the
individual  states.)  Intervention  prices were set so high, however,  that
production  grew  and  eventually  outstripped  demand.  For  example,  self-sufficiency
(the  ratio  of output  to consumption)  rose  between  1960-64  and  1985  for  cereals41
from  84  percent  to  127  percent;  butter  from  99  percent  to  113  percent;  wine  from
94  percent  to 112  percent;  beef  from  97  percent  to 108  percent.
The excesses  above  100  percent  have either  to be destroyed,  made unfit
for  human consumption,  or sold  abroad.  The last can only be done at world
prices,  and the  difference  between  world  prices  and  what farmers  receive  (and
hence  spend  on production)  must be met by subsidies. The result  is that as
output  grows  it becomes  increasingly  expensive  to maintain  internal  prices  at
high levels,  for  increasing  amounts  of output  have  to  be subsidized  for  dumping
abroad. The  subsidies  also increase  as  world  prices  fall,  so the  more the  EC
dumps  the  more  expensive  each  unit  of  dumping  becomes.
Aided  by  these  generous  export  subsidies,  as  well  as  by  the  general  support
for agricultural  output,  the EC has greatly  increased  its shares  of world
markets. For  example,  between  1970-71  and  1982-83  it  increased  its  market  share
from  8.1  percent  to 17.1  percent  in  wheat;  22.9  percent  to 50.3  percent  in  non-
fat  dairy  products,  and  2.9  to 13.9  percent  (1981-82)  in beef  and  veal.
Overall,  the  EC  pattern  of  trade  has  reversed  dramatically  since  the  outset
of the  CAP.  The share  of  agricultural  imports  in total  EC imports  has fallen
by a third and the EC share  of OECD agricultural  imports  has fallen  by 10
percent;  on the  other  hand,  policy  has  maintained  the  share  of agriculture  in
total  EC exports  and  significantly  increased  the  EC share  of OECD  agricultural
exports. Most  OECD  countries  have  increased  their  support  for  agriculture  over
this  period,  so relative  to  world  trade,  the  changes  in  EC  trade  have  been  even
more  marked. For  example,  the  EC share  of the  value  of  world  agricultural  and
food  imports  fell  from  45  percent  in  1967  to  41  percent  in  1986,  while  her  share
of exports  rose from 22Z to 38Z (GATT,  1988).  As the EC worries  about its
competitiveness  in  high  technology  products  it  is  paradoxical  that  the  principal42
effect  of its  principal  policy  is to promote  net exports  of the  oldest  sector
of all.  Agricultural  subsidies  divert resources,  including  highly skilled
scientists,  into  agriculture  as  well  as  appreciating  European  exchange  rates  to
the  detriment  of  hi-tech  exporters.
BOX  2.6:  THE  OBJECTIVES  OF THE  CAP
The  common  Agricultural  Policy  (CAP)  has  several  explicit  objectives  (OECD
1987):
to  increase  agricultural  productivity  and  competitiveness,  and  thus
to  ensure  a fair  standard  of  living  for  the  agricultural  community,
to support  family  farms,
to stabilize  markets,
to ensure  the  availability  of supplies,  and
to ensure  that  supplies  reach  consumers  at reasonable  prices.
European  agriculture  certainly  left  plenty  of room  for  improvement  at  the
outset  of  the  CAP  in  1987,  and  it  is  difficult  to  disentangle  the  effects  of  poor
policy  from  the  effects  of adverse  economic  circumstances.  Nevertheless  it is
hard to see  the  CAP  as a success  even  in its  own  terms.
Agricultural  productivity  and incomes  have fallen  relative  to those in
other  sectors  in  almost  every  year:  in  some  countries  (e.g.  the  UK--see  figure
1) real  farm  incomes  fell  absolutely,  while  across  the  EC,  real  value-added  per
worker did not rise between 1975 and 1986 (IMF, 1988, T32).  Even at the EC's
inflated  prices  the  average  EC agricultural  worker  produced  just  over  half  the
value  of output  produced  by other  workers  in 1968'  (OECD,  1987,  T 5.11);  and in
several  EC countries  he needed  well above  average  amounts  of capital  to  do so.
Agricultural  employment  and communities  have declined  in size significantly
during  the  CAP  and small  family  farms  have received  much less  support  than  the
major  producers. In 1984  the largest  quarter  of farms  received  an average  of
approximately  10,000  ECU  each  in  price  support  while  the  remaining  three  quarters
averaged  just over 1,000  each (Bureau  of Agricultural  Economics). The EC's
internal  prices for  most agricultural  products  have been stable,  but at the
expense  of greatly  increasing  price instability  in  world markets  and  without
material  effect  on  the  stability  of  agricultural  families'  incomes  (EEC,  1986).
Food  supplies  have generally  been  kept  available  to  EC consumers  too,  although
there have been occasional  shortages (e.g. sugar in 1974), but domestic
availability  has sometimes  resulted  in  unavailability  elsewhere,  for  example,43
when food  aid  has been  cut  back.  Finally,  prices  to consumers  have certainly
not  been  reasonable.  On any  definition,  a  policy  amounting  to  a 50  percent  tax
on purchases  of food  is  not reasonable.
The  Domestic  Costs  and  Consequences  of the  CAP
Self-sufficiency  and  booming  expsrts  are  not,  of themselves,  necessarily
a bad thing;  indeed,  if they  were based  on genuine  comparative  advantage  they
would  be a  matter  of  congratulation.  But  they  are  not. They  have  been  achieved
only  at the  expense  of  huge  production  subsidies,  whose  cost,  in  turn,  has  been
borne  by taxpayers  and  consumers. Consider  the  tax-payers  first.
The CAP's intervention  purchasing  policy  has obvious  implications  for
public  expenditure.  The intention  of the  policy  is  to transfer  resources  from
the  general  taxpayer  to the  farmer  by paying  the  latter  more for  agricultural
produce  than  it is  worth  in  the  open  market. As farmers  responded  over  time  to
the high prices  they  were offered  and increased  their  production,  government
receipts  from import levies fell while outlays for intervention  purchases
increased--the  latter  by over  400  percent  between  1973  and  1986. As a result,
the price  support  element  of the  CAP now absorbs  around  67Z  of the entire  EC
budget,  or nearly  0.7  percent  of EC GDP.  This  official  largess  is not  evenly
distributed.  It  not only transfers  income  between  sectors  of each  economy  but
also  between  member  countries,  and  not  according  to  any recognizable  criterion
of economic need.  As Mrs.  Thatcher occasionally notes,  in the absence  of
countervailing  adjustments,  the  largest  proportionate  burden  of the  CAP falls
on one of the Comamunity's  poorer members.
High  agricultural  spending  raises  obvious  issues  of  equity  (why  are  farmers
supported  but not shop-keepers?),  but it  also raises  more fundamental  issues,44
especially  in the context of EC aspirations  towards greater integration.
Agricultural  expenditure  is  not easily  controllable  - in  the  short  run  because
it  is  determined  by  levels  of  output,  exports  and  world  prices,  and  in  the  long-
rui 4 by the apparent  ability  of the  farm lobbies  to prevent  significant  price
reductions.  Thus the  agricultural  share  of 67 percent  in the  total  EC budget
undermines  any  hope  that  the  EC authorities  would  be able  to  influence  the  EC's
fiscal  stance  and greatly  reduces  their  ability  to affect  the  management  and
development  of the  European  economy  in  general. It rules  out  fiscal  transfers
of the  kind necessary  to  underpin  the  creation  of a monetary  union--transfers
to  restore  purchasing  power  in  areas  of  incipient  deficit--and  also  any  transfers
that may be desirable  to redress  any inequities  arising  from the process  of
completing  the  European  internal  market. It also  casts  serious  doubt  on the  EC
authorities'  ability  to  handle  any  seigniorage  arising  from the  creation  of a
single  European  Currency  and Central  Bank.  The central  authorities  of the
European  Community  currently  devote  two-thirds  of  their  budget  to  supporting  less
than 4 percent  of their overall  economic  activity,  do so in a manifestly
inefficient  and  inequitable  fashion,  and seem politically  hamstrung from
addressing  that fact.  Such institutions  can hardly expect to have the
credibility  to institute  a  dramatic  movernent  towards  economic  and  monetary  union
or to be a major force  within any such urion that emerged.  In short,  the
agricultural  leviathan  threatens  ultimately  to  undermine  the  EC's  bold attempt
to complete  its  integration  in 1992  and  beyond.
The  Commission  has  shown  some  awareness  of these  political  difficulties,
for  in the  1988  Budget--which  was  agreed  under  the  pressure  of deep  crisis--it
persuaded  the Council  to slash  agricultural  spending  - to 62 percent  of the
budget  by 1992. Further  evidence  of the  inability  of  Community  institutions  to45
grasp  the  agricultural  nettle  occurred  in  1989. Favorable  movements  in  commodity
prices  and exchange  rates  reduced  the  costs  of export  restitutions  below the
amount  budgeted,  but  instead  of  saving  or  redirecting  the  money,  the  Agriculture
Commissioner  was  immediately  allowed to  start  talking about  increasing
expenditure  elsewhere.
Community  expenditure  on agriculture  is excessive;  but it is more than
matched  by agricultural  expenditure  by  the  member  states. Even  excluding  social
security  payments,  expenditure  by  national  authorities  nearly  doubled  the  amount
spent by  the EAGGF in 1980; including social security  payments to farm
communities,  they  more  than  trebled  it.  Some  of  the  national  expenditure  is  on
inspection  and  quality  controls,  but  most  is  for  structural  reform,  agricultural
development,  market  support  and  natural  disaster  relief. The  last  might  appear
a perfectly  reasonable  item  of expenditure,  but few  other  sectors  receive  such
support  and  private  markets  would  be  quite  capable  of  providing  insurance  of  this
kind if  only  farmers  would  pay  for  it.
For  consumers  the  cost  of the  CAP  is related  directly  to the  extent  that
it raises  prices. The  CAP  has the  effects  of imposing  taxes  on consumers  and
giving  the  revenue  to  the  farmers. The  tax  is  implicit,  however,  and  therefore
politically  much more innocuous  than  explicit  taxes.  For example,  in the  UK
general election  campaign  of 1987 the Prime Minister  publicly  rejected  EC
suggestions  that  the  UK should  impose  a 4  percent  value  added  tax  on  food  in  the
process  of EC fiscal  harmonization;  yet  no word  was raised  about  the  CAP  which
imposes  implicit  taxes  of ten  times  that  levell
Table  3  shows  the  implicit  tax  on  consumers  of  agricultural  products--both
personal  and corporate. The  figures  show  the  extent  to  which the  whole range
of  policies  raises  consumer  prices  relative  to  those  that  would  apply  if  the  same46
quantities  were consumed in the absence of policy.  They measure the  percentage
of actual consumer expenditure not devoted to buying the good in question but
used to support domestic agriculture.  Taxes of 50 percent are quite common--
far in excess of those imposed on guods like cars and consumer durables or
services. The United States  International  Trace Commission  estimated the tariff
equivalents of E.C. nontariff barriers and concluded that, for 1986,the tariff
equivalents were 212 percent for butter, 275 percent for cheddar cheese, 471
percent for nonfat dry milk, 188 percent for sugar, and 96 percent for wheat.
(United  States International  Trade Commission, 1990).  In 1983 the CAP cost the
average family of four ECU 800 per year (Winters, 1989).  Moreover, since poor
families  spend a  higher proportion of  their incomes  on food  than richer families
the agricultural consumer tax falls disproportionately on the poor.
TABLE 3:  Consumer Tax and Producer Subsidy Equivalents
1986-88, EC(12)
Consumer Tax Equivalent(a)  Producer Subsidy Equivalent(a)
1986  198/(P)  1988(E)  1986  1987(P)  1988(E)
Total  52  51  42  52  51  46
Livestock  47  46  44  46  45  48
Crops  64  64  39  67  66  40
Wheat  57  60  31  63  66  36
Sugar  153  161  150  76  80  71
Milk  68  64  56  75  72  66
Beef  48  43  52  53  49  59
Source:  OECD (1989)
(P)  Provisional  (E)  Estimate
(a) as a percentage of actual expenditure on consumption on production47
The  purpose  of the  CAP is to transfer  income  to farmers,  and  as a first
step to assessing  its  effectiveness  we may consider  the so-called  producers
subsidy  equivalent--the  percentage  subsidy  to farmers  that  would  have  the  same
effect  on  their  incomes  as  does  actual  policy. These  PSEs  can  be  as  high  as  75Z
(for  rice)  and  average  40  percent  over  all  commodities.
Increasing  the prices  that consumers  have to pay for food and taxing
industry  to subsidize  farmers  obviously  affects  income  distribution  within  the
EC economy.  It also,  however,  affects  economic  efficiency,  as individuals
respond  to the  economic  signals  contained  in the  distorted  prices. Consumers,
for  example,  switch  their  consumption  away  from  food  towards  other  goods:  to  gain
an  ECU's  worth  of  utility  costs  (l+t)  ECU  spent  on food  but  only  1  ECU  spent  on
other  goods,  where  t  is the  implicit  tax  on agriculture.  Thus  because  they  are
deceived  into  consuming  less  food  and  more  of  other  goods  than  they  would  if  they
could  buy  both  food  and  other  goods  at  prices  reflecting  their  "true"  cost,  the
benefit  that  consumers  obtain  from  their  incomes  is reduced. True  cost  in  this
case is  the  world  price,  which  reflects  the  costs  of the  marginal  unit  of food
produced  by  the  world's  most  efficient  producer,  not  the  inflated  costs  necessary
to produce  the  goods  in Europe. For producers  the  opposite  case  applies. In
agriculture  1 ECU's  worth of inputs  yields (1+s)  ECU of private returns  in
agriculture,  where  s  is  the  subsidy,  but  only  1  ECU  in  other  sectors.  Resources
are therefore  diverted  into agriculture  until returns between sectors  are
equalized,  which can only  happen  when inefficiency  or increased  agricultural
input prices have absorbed the subsidy into private costs.  Relative  to
production  at  undistorted  prices  agriculture  is  over-expanded  in  Europe  and  has
marginal  costs  in  excess  of the  true  value  of its  output  (the  world  price).48
These  efficiency  losses  mean that of each  ECU taken  from  consumers  and
taxpayers  only  a fraction  gets  through  to farmers  as increased  inco:;cs.l  The
remainder  is dissipated  in economic  losses  due to inefficient  production  and
distorted  consumption  patterns.  The  cost  to  consumers  and  taxpayers  of  providing
an ECU to farmers  is known as the transfer  ratio.  Estimates  of EC transfer
ratios  vary,  but  most  lie  between  about  1.2  and  1.8;  that  means  that  between  20X
and  80 percent  of the  transfer  received  by farmers  is absorbed  by the  process
of transfers  (Winters,  1989).  Agricultural  policy  is an inefficient  way of
redistributing  income. Estimates  of  the  economic  costs  of the  CAP  suggests  that
the CAP wastes (i.e.,  imposes  costs  on consumers  and taxpayers  in excess  of
benefits  to farmers)  a staggering  ECU 24  billion  per  year  at 1980  prices.
In  fact  the  benefits  imputed  to  farmers  in  estimates  of  benefits/costs  of
the  CAP  are  no such  thing. They  accrue  to the  production  sector  as a  whole  and
are  mostly  dissipated  in increases  in land  rents  and  input  prices. Ever  since
David  Ricardo  wrote  in  the  early  nineteenth  century  economists  have  known  of  this
possibility,  and  a good  example  of it occurred  when the  UK joined  the  EC.  UK
accession  to the EC raised  her average levels  of agricultural  protection
significantly  and  was  accompanied  by  a doubling  in  land  prices. One  might  also
note  how strongly  the  suppliers  of agricultural  inputs  lobby  for  agricultural
protection,  which  suggests  that  they  too  understand  the  proposition.
The reason that farmers--still  less farm workers--receive  so little
benefit  from  agricultural  support  is that  they  are in  elastic  supply. If the
returns  to farming  increase,  the  number  of farmers  increases,  or (in  the  E.C.)
1  Depending  on how each program  is administered,  the losses  may be
mainly  to  consumers  (the  consumer  tax  equivalent  is  much  higher  than
the  producer  subsidy  equivalent  for  sugar),  mainly  to  taxpayers,  or
some  combination.49
does  not  fall  as  rapidly  as it  otherwise  would. The  amount  of land,  on  the  other
hand,  can  hardly  increase  at all,  and  since  farmers  need  land  to grow  the  crops
to earn  the  subsidies,  they  compete  for  it  and  drive  its  price  up until  all  or
nearly  all  their  extra  earnings  from  higher  subsidies  are  absorbed  by  higher  land
costs. Thus  the  EC's  agricultural  policy  combines  a consumer  tax--which  falls
disproportionately  on the  poor--and  a capital  transfer  to land-owners,  who are
predominantly  rich.
A further  consequence  of  promoting  agriculture  above  other  sectors  is  to
reduce  output,  employment  and  net  exports  of other  goods. General  equilibrium
analyses  of the CAP quantify  these consequences:  for example,  OECD (1989b)
estimates  that  the  CAP  reduces  manufacturing  and  services  output  by 2.1  percent
and  net exports  by about  17 percent  of gross  exports. Moreover,  if  wages  are
not perfectly  flexible  in the EC--and they are probably  not--the  penalties
imposed  on other sectors for the sake of agriculture  show up as reduced
employment,  possibly  by as  much as 1.5  percent  of the  total.
A  1988 OECD study  estimated  the  effects  of the  abolition  of the  CAP on
the West German  economy,  the largest  national  economy  of the EC.  The OECD
concluded  that,  without  CAP,  agricultural  output  would  drop  by five  and  three-
quarters  percent,  agricultural  employment  by eleven  and a half percent,  and
agricultural  exports  by  eighty-six  and  a  half  percent  from  the  levels  they  would
otherwise  have attained. On the  other  hand, lower  agricultural  prices  reduce
nominal  wages  by a little  more than  one and  a half percent.  'Owing  to lower
labor  costs  and  cheaper  agricultural  inputs,  the  competitiveness  of industry  and
the traded  services  sector  improves;  output  and employment  in these  sectors
therefore  increase  significantly....  Reflecting  higher  aggregate  domestic  demand
and lower  production  costs,  output  and employment  in the nontraded  services50
sector  increase  by three and a half percent and five and a half percent,
respectively.  The  consumer  price  level  declines  by  about  one  and  three-quarters
percent  owing  to lower  agricultural  prices. Aggregate  employment  increases  by
five  and  a  half  percent  as the  other  sectors  provide  more jobs  than  are  lost  in
agriculture.  Real  income  and  domestic  demand,  therefore,  increase  by  about  three
and  a  half  percent."  (IMF,  p.11).
A 1988 study  by the Kiel Institute  of World Economics  estimated  that
abolishing  the  CAP  would  boost  employment  by  850,000  workers--roughly  4  percent.
This would  have lowered  Germany's  unemployment  rate in 1987 from about  nine
percent  to  five  percent. The  Kiel  study  concluded,  'the  policy  intended  to  help
farmers in  fact constitutes  a  taxation of  Germany's growth and  export
industries."  The  Kiel study  also  notes,  'Currently,  total  public  subsidies  to
agriculture  amount  to  well  over  DM20  billion,  equivalent  to  aboux.  70  percent  of
this  sector's  gross  value  added  at domestic  prices." This  makes  it clear  that
subsidies  are costing  German  taxpayers  and consumers  far  more than they are
benefitting  German farmers,  since profit percentages  are far less than 70
percent. (Dick,  et.  al.,  1988).
The  Foreign  Costs  and  Consequences  of the  CAP
The  costs  of the  CAP fall  primarily  on the  EC  member  states  themselveL,
but  some  spill  over  onto  the  world  economy. They  do so  through  three  principal
mechanisms:  the level  of world prices,  the variability  of world prices,  and
preferential  trade  arrangements.51
The CAP taxes  EC consumption  and subsidizes  EC production  so that for
nearly  all  products  it increases  the  EC's  net supply  to  world  markets. 2 This
depresses  world prices and does so quite independently  of whether the CAP
increases  EC exports  or reduces  imports  by an equivalent  amount. There  is no
sense in which  taxing imports is  less disruptive  of world markets than
subsidizing  exports.
Countries  which  really  must  rely  on  world  markets  for  their  food  supplies
could  in theory  benefit  from  the  price-depressing  effect  of the CAP,  but  many
do not realize  these  benefits.  Instead,  governments  come under pressure  to
protect  domestic  producers  from  the  cheap  "dumped"  commodities,  and  often  respond
by restricting  imports that wou'.d  have otherwise  been beneficial.  Other
countrips  export  the  goods  whose  prices  the  CAP  reduces  and  thus  suffer  a terms
ol trade  reduction,  and  many  of the  world's  current  food  importers  would  switch
to exporting  and be better  off for it at the prices  that  would rule in the
absence  of the  CAP.
A more critical  effect  of the  CAP on developing  countries  concerns  the
stability  of  world  market  prices. The  CAP  insulates  EC  producers  and  consumers
from external  shocks  and thus increases  the effects  of the latter  on world
prices. Estimates  suggest  that  the  operation  of the  CAP  doubles  the  variability
of  world dairy  prices,  raises  that  of  wheat  and  beef prices  by 50 percent  and
that  of  sugar  by  25  percent  (Winters,  1989).  To  mitigate  such  shocks,  developing
country  governments  are  led  to intervene  in  their  economies  to  a degree  well in
excess  of  their  ability  to  do  so  effectively.  The  result  is  disruption  of their
2  There  are  exceptions  arising  from  particular  cross-commodity  effects:
for example,  the taxes on grains increase  EC demand for grain
substitutes  such  as  cassava.52
economic  inefficiency  and  a  tendency  to  shift  activity  away  from  agriculture  into
industry.
The  resource  shift  out  of  agriculture  induced  by increased  variability  is
exacerbated  by the  change  in  the  nature  of the  price  variability  that  the  CAP
induces. Under free trade  prices  vary,  but in response  to weather,  natural
disaster  and taste  changes,  all of which are random  and largely  reversible.
These  fluctuations  amount  to "risk"  in  the  technical  sense. "Risk"  is  sometimes
insurable  and  is  always  open  to  the  mitigation  of  the  law  of  large  numbers--over
a reasonable  number  of  years  it  evens  out. The  CAP,  on the  other  hand,  produces
uncertainty--fluctuations  that  are  inherently unpredictable even  in  a
probabilistic  sense. The  CAP's  major  decisions  are  political  and  long-lasting;
thus  rather  than  studying  weather  patterns,  developing  country  economic  managers
must try  to  predict  political  pressures,  and  with  the  knowledge  that  a mistake
could  cause  not  two  years  of  low  incomes  but  a  decade  of  misery  if,  for  example,
the  EC  decided  to  reduce  its  imports  of  a  good  after  new  processing  capacity  had
been  introduced.
Some developing  countries  experience  direct  effects from the CAP by
basically  becoming  part  of it.  They  do  not  necessarily  gain  from  it,  however.
The  Lome  Convention  accords  African,  Caribbean  and  Pacific  countries  preferential
access  to  the  EC  market,  but  has  hardly  any  impact  on  agricultural  trade  because
most  temperate  products  are  either  excluded  from  it  or  are  subject  to  extremely
small  margirs  of  preference.  The  General  System  of  Preferences  extends  certain
preferences  to  other  developing  countries,  but  not  on  goods  subject  to  variable
levies  (i.e.  the  main  ones  in  agriculture).  More  direct  preferences  are  granted
on  beef,  sugar,  bananas  and  rum,  for  which  quotas  of  duty-free  access  are  granted
to  particular  former  colonies  while  other  suppliers  are  kept  out. Sales  of the53
permitted imports  command  high prices inside  the EC and offer significant
transfers  of income  to  the  lucky  exporters.  They  also  have  caused  a  tremendous
expansion  in  production  in  these  countries,  in  some  cases  at  the  expense  of  other
goals. 'he  banana  boom in the  Caribbean  has discouraged  diversification  in a
classic  "Dutch  diseaLeW  syndrome,  and has led  producers  to plant on fragile
slopes,  threatening  serious  damage  to  the  fisheries  and  tourist  industries  from
the  consequent  erosion  and  run-off.  Moreover,  these  preferences  also  drive  down
world  prices  because  they  serve  either  to increase  the  EC's  surpluses  (beef  and
sugar)  or to reduce  its imports  from  elsewhere. This fall  in the  world  price
is  the  only  effect  felt  by  most  developing  countries  - i.e.  those  with  only  small
or zero  quotas;  moreover,  it  may outweigh  the  transfer  effect  in total  if,  by
buying  from  inefficient  suppliers,  the  EC  policy  increases  developing  countries'
total  output  rather  than  merely  redirecting  it.  The benefits  of these  quota
policies  fall  very  unevenly  and  bear  no  relation  to  recipients  needs  for  foreign
aid.
III.  JAPANESE  AGRICULTURE  SUBSIDIES  AND INTERNATIONAL  TRADE
The  Organization  for  Economic  Development,  in  a 1987  comprehensive  study
of agricultural  subsidies  (producer  subsidy  equivalent)  showed  that  Japan  has
the  highest  agricultural  protection  in the  world.  The  price  of rice  in  Japan
is  six  times  the  world  price  while  the  price  of  beef  is  up to  ten  times  the  world
price. Farmers  are  paid  four  or five  times  the  world  price  for  producing  wheat
and  soybeans,  and  four  times  the  world  price  for  silk.
Japan's  agricultural  protectionism  began  with  the  Russo-Japanese  war,  when
Japan  imposed  a 15 percent  tariff  on rice to help finance  the  war.  In 1918,54
there  were  major riots  in Tokyo  over  rice  shortages. In 1942,  as part  of the
war  effort,  the  government  sharply  increased  subsidies  for  rice  production.  As
with Europe,  the  severe  hunger  experienced  in Japan  during  and  after  World  War
II  ma"' the  public  receptive  to subsidizing  farmers  in  order  to secure  adequate
food  supplies.  The  government  has  committed  itself  to  an  official  policy  of  rice
self-sufficiency.
Japan's  agricultural  trade  barriers  are legendary.  Ri'e imports  are
strictly  prohibited:  people  have  been  arrested  at  Tokyo  Airport  for  attempting
to smuggle  five  pounds  of rice  into  Japan. Japan  has quotas  on  milk,  cheese,
cereal  flours,  starch,  meat preparations,  sweeteners,  fruit  juices,  and even
tomato sauces.  All food importers  must be licensed  and the Ministry of
Agriculture,  Forestries  and  Fisheries  is  notorious  for  "jawboning"  licensees  to
limit  their  imports,  as  Bela  Balassa  (1987)  pointed  out.
Rice  is  the  foundation  of  Japanese  farm  policies.  While  world  rice  prices
have fallen  sharply  in recent  decades,  the Japanese  government  has awarded
farmers  higher  rice  prices  almost  every  year since  1942.  (Only  very recently
have  rice  prices  fallen  slightly.)  Since  rice  is  the  primary  food  item  in  Japan,
higher  rice  prices  pull  up the  prices  of other  food  items.
Japanese  policy  has  sought  to  preserve  almost  all  farmland  in  the  nation.
Special  tax  advantages  and  subsidies  have  driven  the  value  of  rice  land  to  over
$90,000  per  hectare--over  50 times  the  value  of good  American  farmland. High
farm  subsidies  have,  by  making  it  very  difficult  to  buy  land,  contributed  to a
severe  housing  shortage  in  Japan:  the  average  Japanese  citizen  has less  than
half  as  much  housing  space  as  the  average  American.
Japanese  government  policies  have created  perhaps  the least  efficient
farmers  in  the  industrial  world. It  would  take  over  150  average  Japanese  farms55
to equal  the size  of one  average  American  farm. Because  Japanese  farms  are  so
small,  farmers  lack the economies  of scale  of their  competitors  and cost of
production  for  major  crops  is far  higher  in  Japan  than  elsewhere.  Comparing  the
ratio of labor productivity  between agriculture  and overall  average labor
productivity  in  the  economy  shows  profoundly  different  results  for  the  U.S.  and
Japan. In 1955,  labor  productivity  in  United  States  agriculture  was only  51.7
percent  of the  productivity  of the  entire  economy. But,  by 1980,  agricultural
labor  productivity  was 20 percent  higher  than  that  of the  general  economy. In
Japan,  in  contrast,  agricultural  labor  productivity  was  23.3  percent  of general
productivity  in 1955  and  fell  to 18.2  percent  by 1980.
Yet, despite  this abysmal  productivity,  Japanese  farmers  enjoy  higher
income  than  non-farmers,  thanks  to  government  subsidies.  Only  fourteen  percent
of  Japanese  farmers  are  full-time: the  other  eighty-six  percent  have  jobs  off-
the-farm. This  partly  explains  the  low  productivity,  since  part-time  workers
lack  the  time  or  devotion  to  farming  that  full-time  farmers  have. The  government
is  determined  to  maintain  parity  of  income  between  farmers  and  non  farmers--and
as farmers  become  increasingly  less  efficient,  the  government  has  had to  drive
up food  prices  higher  and  higher  in  order  to  provide  them  with a good  income.
Farm subsidies  impose  a brutal  cost on Japanese  consumers.  Japanese
consumers  spend  32  percent  of their  income  on food,  while  Americans  spend  only
13-14  percent  of their  income  on food.  A 1987 study  by Anderson  and Tyers
concluded  that the  per capita  costs  of Japanese  farm  policies  are four times
higher  than the  European  Community's  farm subsidies.  The average  Japanese
citizen  consumes  only six  kilos  of beef  a year.  The  U.S.  International  Trade
Commission  estimated  the  tariff  equivalents  of  Japanese  non-tariff  barriers  on
farm  imports  as 595  percent  on butter  in 1986,  344  percent  on  nonfat  dry  milk,56
542 percent on butter, and 733 percent on rice. (U.S.  International  Trade
Commission  1990).
In 1961,  the Japanese  Diet passed  the  Agricultural  Basic  Law, which
enunciated  a clear  goal of achieving  income  parity  between  farmers  and non-
farmers.  As  Hillman  and  Rothenberg  (1986)  note,  "Since  1975,  average  (Japanese]
farm  household  income  per  capita  has  been  higher  than  urban  household  income  per
capita  by  as  much  as 15  percent." As Fitchett  noted  in  a  1988  World  Bank  study
noted,  'During  1984-6,  average  farm  household  incomes  exceeded  average  blue-
collar  household  incomes  by 30 percent". The  difference  between  farmers  and
non-farmers'  financial  condition  is  even  more stark  when  considering  net  worth.
Since  farmland  prices  are  so  high  in  Japan.--farmers'  average  net  worth  is  many
times  greater  than  the  net  worth  of non-farmers. A recent  study  by economist
D. P.  Vincent,  of  the  Center  for  International  Economics  in  Australia  estimated
that  Japanese  agricultural  policy  results  in  a  reduction  in  the  average  real  wage
level  by 2.5 percent--equivalent  to about 101,000  yen per worker in 1984.
Vincent  concluded,  "A  particularly  important  consequence  of  Japanese  agricultural
protection  is  to  reallocate  significantly  a  diminished  aggregate  income  away  from
Japanese  wage earners  and towards  the  owners  of rural  land.  The rental  price
of rural  land  is raised  by about  68  percent."
Most of Japan's  overt protectionism  is now agricultural,  and is the
lightning  rod  for  catching  the  world's  frustrations  with Japan's  mercantilist
export-at-any-cost  policies.  While Japan insists on its right to export
unlimited  amounts  of products  to the  world,  it refuses  to  buy  other  countries'
products  even  when  foreign  nations  have  a  clear  comparative  advantage.  Japanese
farm  lobbies  have  worked  hard  to  stir  up  hostility  to  and  distrust  of foreigners
in  order  to  persuade  the  public  of  the  need  to  perpetuate  farm  subsidies.  Heavy-57
handed  (and  often  hypocritical)  pressure  from  the  United  States  for  farm  trade
reform  has  helped  divide  the  two  nations.
Japanese  farm  policies  clearly  distort  world  agricultural  trade,  but it
is  unclear  exactly  who  would  be  the  beneficiary  of  Japanese  trade  liberalization.
U.S. cattlemen  are  anxious  for  the lifting  of Japanese  beef quotas--but,  free
beef  imports  would  slash  Japanese  farmers'  purchases  of  American  feedgrains,  and
Australian  and  Canadian  cattlemen  could  reap  much of the  increased  beef sales.
When  Japan  was  considering  abandoning  its  quotas  on citrus  imports,  the  largest
American  export  company--Sunkist--publicly  opposed  trade  liberalization  because
it  was concerned  about  being  forced  to face  new competitors. If Japan  opened
up its rice  market,  it is likely  that Thai farmers  would reap the  benefits,
since they are  lower-cost  producers than American farmers.  Hillman and
Rothenberg  (1986)  estimated  that Japanese  trade barriers  were costing  Thai
farmers  alone  $270  million  per  year.
It is likely  that  agricultural  liberalization  would  do little  to reduce
Japan's  trade  surplus,  though  the  removal  of such  flagrant  protectionism  might
ease some  foreign  countries'  hostility  towards  Japan.58
CHAPTER  3
GOVERNMENT  INTERVENTION IN  AGRICULTURE IN  DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
In  many  developing  countries  there  is  little  recognition  of  the  notion  that
farmers'  rights  to the  fruits  of their  labor  are  no less  important  than  those
of consumers. In the  absence  of such  notions  of inherent  economic  rights,  the
deck is stacked  against  agriculture,  especially  with respect  to food  pricing
policies  and exchange  rate policies,  since producers  (even if numerically
superior  to  urban  interests)  are  poorly  organized  and  usually  lose  battles  with
politically  volatile  consumers  in the  cities. Policies  are analyzed  in terms
of  whether  they  meet  certain  objectives  (income  distribution,  self-sufficiency,
exports,  etc.),  rather  than in terms  of whether they erode or preserve  the
individual's  ability  to make economic  choices. This  disregard  of the  concept
of  economic  rights  was  so  deeply  rooted  that  governments  in  some  countries,  (for
example,  in the  socialist  economies  of  Africa)  viewed  almost  any  unconstrained
trade  between  individuals  as likely  to be against  the public  interest.  In
Ethiopia  and  Tanzania,  traders  who  attempted  to  buy  grain  in  one  region  and  sell
it  in  another  were  harassed  and  even  thrown  in  jail,  with  the  result  that  serious
shortages  in some  parts  of the  country  co-existed  with surpluses  in  others.
The  pervasive rejection of  farmers'--and  for  that  matter, other
individuals'--inherent  economic  rights,  led  naturally  to  a  profound  distrust  of
market  mechanisms. Thus,  nearly  every  perceived  problem--be  it inequality  of
income  distribution,  high  margins in processing  or distributing  agricultural
products,  or low levels  of food self-sufficiency--prompted  a new government59
intervention.  Basic  development  strategies  called  for  industrialization,  usually
to  be  accomplished  by  overvaluation  of  exchange  rates  and  restrictions  on  imports
of  manufactured  items.3 But  this  hurt  farmers,  reduced  agricultural  exports  and
increased  food  imports.  Offsetting  measures  became  necessary,  such  as  subsidized
fertilizer,  credit,  and  irrigation.  But  these  were costly  and  their  financing
required  higher  taxes  and  increased  external  borrowing,  further  overvaluing  the
exchange  rate.  Price  controls  instituted  to help urban  consumers  reduced  or
eliminated  profits  of farmers  drove  private traders  out of the market; the
solution  was to give legal  monopolies  to marketing  agencies.  Prices that
differed across time or  regions of the  country were  taken to  indicate
inefficient,  speculative,  or exploitative  private trading activities;  the
solutions  were  regulation  of  trade  (margin  controls,  banning  of  trade  by  certain
ethnic  groups,  regulations  governing  the  movement  or  storage  of  commodities)  and,
again,  parastatal  monopolies.  Over  the  years,  these policies  have  created  the
attitude  that all characteristics  of the economy  are the responsibility  of
government. The cycle  is perpetuated;  intervention  begets  pressure  for  more
intervention.4
In most developing  countries,  government  interventions  have profoundly
disrupted  the  agriculture  sector  by directly  and  indirectly  taxing  farmers  and
subsidizing  consumers. Prices  received  by  producers  and  paid  by consumers  are
usually set by administrative  decree to meet political  objectives.  Low
politically-decreed  prices  to producers  and consumers  have tended  to sharply
In fact,  these  macroeconomic  distortions  have  imposed  greater  costs  on
the  agricultural  sector  than  has  direct  taxation. See  Krueger,  Schiff,
and  Valdes  (1988).
One  developing  region  that  is  an  exception  to this  stereotypical
scenario  of policy  development  is  East  Asia.60
reduce  farmers'  incentive  for  production  while  increasing  consumption  of  urban
dwellers.  By  lowering  farmers'  prices  while  subsidizing  and  controlling  consumer
prices,  many developing  country  government  have  had to rely  on imported  foods,
dumped  by industrial  countries  as a result  of their  farm  policies. In severe
cases  when foreign  exchange  is  scarce  or domestic  production  is  unusually  low,
this policy  has resulted  in severe  food shortages. As a consequence,  many
farmers  have  abandoned  their  farms  to  migrate  to  cities,  many finding  even  more
severe  poverty.  Though  agricultural  producer  prices  are generally  suppressed
in  developing  countries,  the  actual  effects  of  government  policies  varies  widely
among  developing  nations. But,  whatever  the  goals  of policy,  the  policy  tools
used--especially  government  (parastatal)  price  controls  enterprises,  and  trade
quotas--greatly  increase  the  cost  of reaching  the  objectives.
Governments  have attempted to offset the anti-agricultural  bias by
subsidies  to fertilizer  and credit  and public investment  in infrastructure
(especially  irrigation).  The  input  subsidies  inevitably  go primarily  to large
farmers  and  have  encouraged  environmental  degradation  and  discouraged  employment
of  rural  labor.  Governments  have  aided  agricultural  development  with  investments
in rural  infrastructure;  unfortunately,  such investments  have been radically
reduced  in  the 1980s  as  many  nations  struggle  with  the  debt crisis. The  r,et
effect on  production  of  the combination  of  suppressing  crop prices and
subsidizing  farm inputs  is generally  to depress  farmers'  profits.  And the
conflict  of policies  results  in a large  waste of resources  and nations  with
impoverished  farmers  and  hungry  consumers.61
1.  PARASTATAL  MARKETING  ORGANIZATIONS
Parastatal  enterprises,  usually  organized  as  government-owned
corporations, 5 afflict  agricultural  sectors  throughout  the developing  world.
They  operate  in (and  often  monopolize)  markets  for  agricultural  inputs,  outputs,
services  and  trade. While  most  were  originally  organized  to  perform  a  marketing
function,  a  number  have  evolved  to the  point  where  they  control  all  aspects  of
production,  from  determining  which  varieties  must  be  planted  (the  Zimbabwe  cotton
board)  to distributing  seeds  and other inputs,  to directing  the harvest (the
Cyprus  potato  board).  (See,  e.g.,  Abbott,  1987.) They  are  most pervasive  in
Africa and  the history of their genesis there is instructive (Lele and
Christiansen,  1988). The  early  marketing  boards  were put  in  place  by colonial
governments  as convenient  ways of using the coercive  powers  of the state to
regulate  small  African  growers,  thereby  protecting  large  European  farmers  against
competition. After independence,  the boards  were retained  and expanded  by
governments  who  wanted  to control  all  aspects  of  production  and  marketing,  and
especially  to discriminate  against  certain  ethnic  groups  that  were active  in
trading  (e.g.,  those  of Indian  extraction  in  East Africa 6 and of Lebanese  in
Senegal). New  boards  proliferated;  in  Tanzania  in the  mid-1970s,  for  example,
there were ten parastatals  handling production,  processing,  transport  and
marketing  of 42  crops. These  boards  often  displaced  private  traders  that,  when
the  comparison  has  been  studied,  were  more  efficient.  This  has  been  documented,
5  In a few  countries  in  Africa  (e.g.,  Tanzania,  Cameroon,  Senegal),
producer  cooperatives  have  also  operated  as parastatals  when the
governments  began  to  appoint  managers  and  appreve  budgets.
6  Malawi  went  even further,  and  legally  forbade  Asians  from  living  in
small  towns  or rural  areas  (Lele  and  Meyers,  1987).62
for example  in Kenya,  Indonesia,  Senegal,  Sri  Lanka,  and Tanzania (Lele  and
Christiansen,  1988;  World  Bank,  1986;  Bryceson,  1985). This explosion  in the
role  of parastatals  was encouraged  by the  neutral  or even supportive  attitude
of  the  donor  community.  The  countries  that  received  th.e  most  foreign  assistance
(e.g.,  Senegal,  Tanzania)  were those  in  which  they  multiplied  the  fastest.
While  parastatals  in other  regions  do  not share  the  African  parastatals'
colonial  origin,  they  were  all  conceived  as  ways  of  exercising  government  control
over  agricultural  production  and  marketing  decisions  through  pricing  policy  and
direct  intervention.  The  vast  majority  also  share  a  common  outcome;  they  create
tremendous  distortions  in incentives,  operate  inefficiently,  and  drain  national
treasuries. Table  3-1 shows  how onerous  is the  burden  of some  parastatals  in
the  1980s. Column  (a)  shows  the  size  of  government  transfers  to the  parastatal
in relation  to the  size  of the  budget,  indicating  how  much they reduce  public
resources  available  for other purposes.  Column (b) shows transfers  plus
borrowing,  in relation  to national  production,  indicating  the  magnitude  of the
burden  on the economy  as a whole.  By either  measure,  the parastatals  have
imposed  very  large  costs. The  reasons  behind  this  outcome  can  be found  in  both
the  pricing  policies  followed  and  problems  in their  design  and  management.
Prici
Prices  of important  agricultural  products  in developing  countries  are
almost  always set in the political  arena,  either  by the parastatals  or by
legislation.  The usual policy is to set prices low relative to  their63
international  levels,7  and  at  uniform  levels  throughout  the  coun.try  and
throughout the year.
It has long been recognized that agriculture in most developing nations
is  heavily taxed,  though the  patterns  of  policies  by  which this is  done  have only
recently  been  systematically  compared  across  countries.  A  study  of  18
representative countries found that the domestic prices of export crops  were in
almost all cases kept below international prices  (converted at the official
exchange rate), by an average of 11 percent (Krueger, Schiff, Valdes, 1988).
Imported food crops were a different  matter; most countries kept domestic
Table 3-1:  Selected Agricultural Marketing Parrstatal Losses
Loss/Subsidy as percentage of
Country  Parastatal  Period  (a)  Govt.  Cur.  Exp. (b)  GNP  or  GDP
China  Grains  1988  10.5  2.0
India  Grains  1984-85  4.6  0.5
Gambia  Groundnuts  1982-87  10.8 (26.6)  2.8 (14.4)
Kenya  Grains  1985  3.7  0.7
Malawi  Crops/inputs  1983-87  2.6 (2.8)  -4.3 (35.8)
Mali  Grains  1982-85  8.8 (10.4)  1.3 (1.5)
Mexico  Milk, Grains, Oilseeds  1982-85  3.5 (5.2)
Niger  Grains  1982-85  0.3 (0.3)  0.2 (0.3)
Senegal  Groundnuts  1982-86  1.5 (3.8)  0.6 (0.6)
Tanzania  All crops  1980-81  12.4  1.7
Zambia  Maize, Fertil., Cotton  1980-86  4.0  (11.6)  3.2  (7.2)
Zimbabwe  All crops  1983-87  5.6 (6.4)  4.6 (5.3)
Sources:  Swanson and Wolde-Semait, 1989 (Gambia,  Malawi, Mali, Niger, Senegal,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe); Lele and Christiansen, 1988 (Kenya); World Bank, 1983
(Tanzania);  World Bank, 1986, p. 89 (India);  World Bank, 1989, p. 17 (Mexico);
World Bank, 1990, p. 4 and 17 (China).
ai  Figure in "Loss/Subsidy"  column (a)  refers to  median government transfer to
parastatal for  years indicated.  Figure in  parenthesis is the  highest figure
for those years.  Figure in column (b) refers to  median government transfer
7  In many cases, stabilization  policies have caused domestic prices in
some years to exceed world prices, but the average effect over the price
cycle is to depress them.64
plum  deficit  for  the  years  indicated,  as a fraction  of  GNP  or GDP.  Figure
in parenthesis  is the  highest  figure  for  those  years.  For China,  figures
represent  financial  losses  of grain  bureau  enterprises,  as percentage  of
total  government  expenditure  and  GNP.
producer  prices higher than world prices,  by an average  of 20-21 percent.
However, an additional  'hidden"  tax was imposed  on all tradable  crops by
overvaluation  of  the  exchange  rate  and  protection  of  the  industrial  sector. The
study  found  this indirect  mechanism  to be by far  the  most significant  way of
taxing  .griculture,  overwhelming  even  the  apparent  protection  provided  by  pricing
policy  for  imported  food  crops. On  average,  the  total  effects  (from  pricing  and
the  hidden  tax)  were equivalent  to a tax  of 36-40  percent  or export  crops  and
a tax  of 5-6  percent  on imports.
In other  countries  not included  in this stu  ,  the  effect  of pricing  and
exchange  rate policy  has been even  worse for agriculture. In China,  grain
producers  are forced  to sell  part  of their  crops  at below-market  prices,  at a
cost  to  them  in  lost  revenue  in  1988  equivalent  to  1.7  percent  of  all  GNP (World
Bank,  1990). In  Tanzania  by 1984,  official  prices  for  export  crops  (almost  all
of  which  could  be legally  marketed  only  by  parastatals)  had  fallen  in  real  terms
to about  half their levels  of 1970,  in spite  of higher  border  prices. When
adjusted  for  overvaluation  of  the  currency,  the  official  prices  in  1984  were  less
than  20  percent  of their  values  in 1970.  In  Senegal,  groundnut  producers  only
received  about  half  the  export  value  of  their  crops. In  addition,  for  some  years
they  were  paid  in "bonds"  that  could  be  redeemed  for  cash  only  after  considerable
delay  (Caswell,  1985).
Such low-price  nolicies  have  important  unintended  effects  over  a period  of
time  (World  Bank,  1986). One  effect  that  was  particularly  pervasive  in  Tanzania
was the  emergence  of parallel  domestic  markets. This  tendency  was exacerbated65
by the  pan-territorial  pricing  policies  discussed  below. A second  is  a  decline
in  production. Though  it is believed  in some  circles  that  peasant  farmers  do
not respond  to price incentives,  this is clearly  not the case.  Countries  in
which producer  prices  have been severely  depressed  have consistently  found
production  declining. In the  early  1960s,  Sri  Lanka  accounted  for  a third  of
world  tea  exports,  while  Kenya's  market  share  was  less  than  3  percent. Over  the
ensuing  decades,  however,  Sri  Lanka  taxed  the  sector  quite  severely;  average  tax
rates  were over 50 percent  in  the 1970s  and  over 35 percent  in the  late  1970s
to  mid-1980s. Kenya's  taxation  was much  more reasonable;  in 1985,  rates  were
on a sliding  scale  based  on the  world  price,  with the  top  average  rate  about  15
percent. By the  early  1980s,  Sri  Lanka's  share  of the  market  had declined  to
19 percer  while  Kenya's  had  more than tripled  to 9 percent.  In Argentina,
another  country  with  a  strong  policy  bias  against  expurts,  it  has  been  estimated
that  a  more  neutral  policy  environment  could  have  doubled  agricultural  exports
(Sturzennegger,  forthcoming).
A third  effect  of such  pricing  policies  is to encourage  (in  some  cases,
virtually  force)  producers  to smuggle  their  crops  out  of the  country. Ghana's
Cocoa  Marketing  Buard's  pricing  policies,  combined  with overvaluation  of the
exchange  rate,  raised  the  effective  taxation  of cocoa  from  an alreadv-high  54
percent  in  the  late  1960s  to  89  percent  in  the  late  1970s. Ghana's  market  share
dropped  from  40 percent  to 18  percent. Neighboring  Cote  d'Ivoi.e's  share  rose
from  9  to  29 percent. Some  of Ghana's  decline  and  the  Cote  d'Ivoire's  rise  in
market  share  was due  to proc.ction  effects. But, since  the increase  in Cote
c.'Ivoire's  exportable  production  could  account  for  only part  of its increased
exports,  it  is  clear  that  a  significant  part  of  the  increase  in  exports  from  Cote
d'Ivoire  came from  cocE  ggled  out  of Ghana.  Ghana's  pricing  policies  not66
only impoverished  the Ghanaian  producers,  but also deprived  the treasury  of
revenue.
Other aspects  of pricing  policies  are generally  not as detrimental  to
producers as  depressing prices overall, but  have  serious consequences
nonetheless.  One  common  policy  fur  food  grains  ("pan-seasonal  pricing")  is to
maintain  prices  the  same  year-round,  irrespective  of  the  proximity  of  the  harvest
or the  state  of stocks. The  major  adverse  effect  of this  is to discourage  the
private  sector  from  holding  stocks,  siace  normally  prices  must rise  from  times
of abundance  (immediately  post-harvest)  to times  of scarcity  (immediately  pre-
harvest)  in  order  to  cover  the  costs  of carrying  stocks. As a result,  there  is
a chronic shortage  of private storage facilities  in almost all developing
countries,  lea  ing  storage  responsibility  largely  to the  parastatals. Because
of their  usual inefficiency  and undercapitalization,  physical  storage  losses
can  be quite  high.  Estimates  of losses  in Tanzania  run  as high as 30 percent
(Bryceson,  1985).  Pan-seasonal  pricing also encourages consumption  and
discourages  production  off-season,  when the  full  cost  of  providing  the  product
(growing  it  plus  storing  it  for  a long  period)  is  highest. This  effect  is  most
serious  in  countries  like  Peru,  where  each  of  the  two  major  regions  can  grow  rice
in the  season  when the  other  is  not  producing.
Another  policy  commonly  followed  for  boti exports  and food  crops ("pan-
territorial  pricing,)  is  to  pay  producers  the  same  price  throughout  the  country.
Taxpayers,  consumers,and  producers  close  to  consumption  or shipment  centers  are
essentially  forced  to subsidize  those  in  distant  locations,  where  prices  would
normally  be lower  because  of the  high  cost  of transporting  the  product. This
practice  is  usually  justified  as  a  measure  tu  promote  development  of  a  backward
region,  but  in general,  infrastructure  investment  would  be a far  better  way  of67
supporting  such  a  goal. In  some  countries,  this  policy  is  carried  to  an  extreme,
as in Peru,  where rice  producers  in the inaccessible  jungle  region  are  paid a
higher  price  than  those  in  the  coastal  region,  where  transport  costs  are  lower
by about  US$72  per  ton.  In  Tanzania,  costs  of transporting  maize  ranged  among
the  20 regions  from  22 to 660 shillings  per  metric  ton (US$3  to US$81  at the
official  exchange  rate)  in  1979. The  pan-territorial  pricing  generated  losses
for the National  Milling  Company of several  hundred shillings  on each ton
transported  from  the  remote  southern  region,  Ruvuma;  where  large  maize  surpluses
were  produced. Costs  have  also  been  shown  to  be  quite  high  in  Zambia,  in terms
of production  foregone  and  government  subsidies  (Kydd,  1989).
Pan-territorial  pricing  has  had two  very different  effects  in different
countries,  depending  partially  on the relation  between  official  and market
prices. In  Tanzania,  the  uniform  official  price  for  crops  has often  been  very
high  relative  to  the  market  price  for  remote  regions,  but  low  for  regions  where
transport  costs  are low.  This  has caused  a segmentation  of the  market. The
National  Milling  Company  buys  virtually  all  the  crop in outlying  areas,  while
a  thriving (but illegal)  private sector  handles the cr)p in other areas.
Official  channels  in  1984  handled  less  than  one-third  the  average  annual  quantity
of rice  handled  in the  1970s. This  is  typical  of  many  other  African  countries,
where in spite  of regulations  and rhetoric,  the public  sector  markets  only a
small  part  of the  harvest  (Hopcraft,  1987;  Green,  1989). This  also  means  that
most consumers  must  buy  grain  in  the  parallel  market,  where  prices  in  Tanzania
have  conmmonly  been  4  to  5  times,  and  sometimes  up  to  10  times,  the  official  price
(Hopcraft,  1987;  World  Bank,  1986). In Ethiopia,  the  parallel  market  price  of
tef (a  local  grain)  in  the  capital  rose  to over  7 times  the  official  producer
price  (Hopcraft,  1987). The  grain  sold  at  the  official  price  must  be rationed,68
and typically  goes to politically  powerful  urban groups  or the armed forces
(Arhin,  Hesp,  van der  Laam.  1985).
But in  the  other  countries,  the  combination  of low  consumer  prices,  pan-
territorial  and pan-seasonal  producer  prices,  and/or  a parastatal  marketing
monopoly  have driven  the private  sector  completely  out of many agricultural
markets. Or,  even  when the  parastatal  does  not  have  a de  facto  monopoly,  it  may
have to give private  processors  subsidies  to cover  losses  caused  by the low,
controlled  selling  price,  as  was the case  in  Mexico  until  recently. Colombia
uses  a  complicated  system  to subsidize  private  storage,  with  effective  rates  of
subsidy  (as  a  percentage  of  the  price)  varying  from  5  percent  to  14  percent  for
different  crops  in 1980,  and  changing  over  time  as  well. Any  of these  policies
that  force  the  parastatal  to cover  losses  incurred  on the  entire  domestic  crop
(and  often  on imports  as  well)  can  quickly  cause  operating  deficits  to balloon
out of control,  resulting  in the financial  and  efficiency  costs  indicated  in
table  3-1.
Management  and  Operation
In  addition  to  uneconomic  pricing  structures  over  which  they  sometimes  have
little control, parastatals  the world over are beset with a  plethora of
management  difficulties.  As  one  might  expect  of  agencies  whose  employees  handle
large  sums  of cash  and  exercise  considerable  control  over  other  peoples'  lives,
outright  corruption  is  a  persistent  problem.  Estimates  of  its  magnitude  are  hard
to come by, but to give some idea of its seriousness,  reports  from Senegal
indicate  that  the  government  admitted  fraudulent  losses  of  the  major  parastatal
ONCAD  of an amount  equal  to 44  percent  of the  public  sector  investment  budget.
In addition  to the direct siphoning  of funds (Bryceson,  1985), leakage  of69
supplies  purchased  by  the  parastatal  into  the  higher  priced  parallel  market  are
common  (Hopcraft,  1987).
But even disregarding  the out and out fraud,  parastatals  often  fulfill
their  missions  inefficiently,  if  at all.  Since  they  are  not good  forecasters
of crops  (partially  because  they  often  operate  without  basic  data)  they  end  up
buying, accumulating stocks, and  selling at  the  wrong  times, thereby
destabilizing  the  very  markets  they  were  intended  to  stabilize  (Idachaba,  1985).
(As  shown  in  Box  3-1,  in  30-35  percent  of  the  countries  and  export  crops  studied,
actual  domestic  producer  prices  were  less  stable  than  if  they  had  simply  followed
world levels.)  The segmentation  of markets  into official  and parallel  sub-
markets  also  magnifies  the  effect  of  supply  and  demand  shocks  in  each. Sometimes
prices  for the next harvest  are  not announced  until after  the crop has been
planted, exacerbating  the uncertainty  facing  nroducers.  This is standard
practice  in Zimbabwe  (Gael,  1988)  and Tanzania,  where it is justified  as a
measure to discourage  speculators.  (Ironically,  speculation  is considered
detrimental  precisely  because  of the  instability  and  uncertainty  it allegedly
createsl) In other  countries  (including  the  United  States),  late  announcement
of prices  is an unintentional  but inherent  result  of setting  prices  through  a
time-consuming  political  process.
But above  all, parastatal  marketers  operate  inefficiently  because  they
operate  inflexibly.  They  cannot  adapt  readily  to  changing  market  circumstances.
In Zimbabwe,  Kenya,  and  Malawi  in 1986,  for  example,  official  prices  were  kept
constant  in spite  of  massive  oversupply  and  severe  budgetary  losses  that  should
have lowered the price (Hopcraft,  1987).  Conversely,  in other countries,
official  prices  have been maintained  at low levels  even in times of major
shortages  (Ethiopia).  Private  marketers  have  been shown  to stabilize  producer70
prices  by  adjusting  margins  pro-cyclically. 8 Parastatals  simply  cannot  respond
flexibly  like  this,  because  it is usually  politically  impossible  for them  to
quickly  shed labor  and take other cost-cutting  measures  in a timely  manner.
Bureaucratic  inertia  delays  decisions,  so that a response  to a given  market
condition  may be completely  inappropriate  to the conditions  at the time the
response  is finally  made.
Reforms
While great  emphasis  is sometimes  placed  on reforming  parastatals,  it
should  be noted that many if not most of the problems  enumerated  here are
intrinsic  to an organization  structured  as a parastatal. Parastatals  are by
definition  public institutions  and therefore  political.  Their goals are
politically  determined.  Though  they  are  usually  enunciated  in  the  lofty  rubric
of social  welfare,  the  objectives  are to extract  wealth  from some  groups  and
bestow  it  upon  others.  Who  gains  and  who  loses  depends  on  the  relative  political
clout  of  different  groups. But  the  very fact  that  the  goals  are  non-commercial
implies  that  there  will  be  financial  and  economic  losses,  even  if  the  agency  were
otherwise  efficiently  run.  Mcreover,  its  political  nature  guarantees  that it
will be run  to  meet a variety  of objectives,  many  of them  noneconomic,  as all
of  its  operations  are  ultimately  judged  by  politicians,  not  by  impersonal  market
forces  that  force  commercial  enterprises  to  cut  costs.
With some exceptions,  parastatals  are headed  by political  appointees.
Politicians  universally  interfere,  often  and  arbitrarily,  in  everyday  management
8  For  example,  when prices  of an export  crop  fall,  margins  are  reduced  by
cutting  costs. This  means  that  produce.  prices  fall  less  than  they
would  if  margins  stayed  constant.71
decisions  (Nellis,  1986). And  the  major  decisions  (such  as  pricing)  are  often
taken  outside the  control of  the  agency's management.  All  of  these
characteristics  make it inevitable  that  the  operations  will be inflexible  and
inefficient.  And, as the  power  of the  state  gives  its  agents  (from  purchasing
agents  at  the  farmgate  to  top  managers)  the  ability  to  make  decisions  that  confer
financial  gain or pain on others  and  on themselves,  corruption  and fraud  are
inevitable  as well.  Finally,  the  de facto  or de jure  monopoly  nature  of the
parastatals,  and the assurance  that losses  will be covered  by the government
(either  through  direct  budget  transfers  or  through  governmental  guarantees  when
parastatals  borrow  in  commercial  markets)  ensures  their  immunity  from  incentives
to  operate  efficiently.  Because  these  problems  are  inherent  in  their  structure,
their  resolution  will require  more  than  wreform,"  as that  term  has  normally  been
used.
Heaningful  reform  would  require  abolition  of  monopoly  power,  exposure  to
competition,  removal  of government  subsidies  (including  the underwriting  of
commercial  loans),  and insulation  from  political  pressures,  as  well as  making
managers  accountable  and  giving  them  incentives  to  operate  efficiently  and  turn
a profit.  But this would mean that the parastatals  would no  longer  be
parastatals;  they would be commercial  enterprises.  In other  words, to be
reformed,  parastatals  must be liquidated  or privatized. Concurrently,  other
policy  reforms  could  more  efficiently  meet  some  of  the  parastatal's  social  goals.
Food subsidies  targeted  to the poor, for example,  could replace  generally
subsidized  food  prices  as  a  way  to  help  the  poor  without  burdening  producers  or
creating  huge deficits.
A number  of  countries  have  undertaken  piecemeal  reforms  such  as allowing
some private  sector  competition,  while still  maintaining  control  of pricing72
margins. Such reforms  may  be a step  in the  right  direction,  but the  threat  of
unfair  competition  from  a  parastatal  with  the  resources  of  the  government  at  its
disposal  will always  keep these  Lqarkets  from  operating  in a fully  competitive
way. Only  a  handful  of  countries  have  begun  serious  reform  of  the  type  outlined
above. In  Ghana,  Mali,  and  Nigeria,  export  crop  marketing  boards  have  recently
been abolished  and their  functions  privatized,  with good results. Nigeria's
abolition of marketing boards fur palm oil, cocoa, rubber, cotton, and
groundnuts,  together  with exchange  reforms  in 1986,  led  almost  immediately  to
a 6 percent  increase  in cash  crop  production  in 1987  in spite  of bad  weather.
Guyana  has retained  its  marketing  board  in  name  only,  completely  changing  its
role  from  directly  intervening  in  the  market  to  providing  infornmation  and  export
brokerage  services.  The results  have been favorable,  though the chp,tic
conditions  of  the  macroeconomy  has  been  a  serious  constraint.  Following  a  decade
of stagnation  under  government  parastatal  control,  the  banana  sector  in  Belize
was  completely  privatized  in  early  1985. This  generated  a flurry  of investment
and  improved  cultivation  practices,  with  a  consequent  rise  of production  by 150
percent  by 1987  and  expansion  still  continuing.  It  is  also  noteworthy  that  the
most vibrant agricultural  subsectors  in many countries  are those in which
governments  have played little if any marketing  role, such as fruits  and
vegetables  in  Chile  and  Mexico,  cut flowers  in  Colombia,  and  cocoa  in  Belize.73
II.  THE  QUESTIONABLE  GOAL  OF PRICE  STABILIZATION,
THE  GOVERNMENT'S  ROLE  IN OUTPUT  MARKETS
Objective  of Price  Stabilization
Governments'  efforts  to control  domestic  prices  is euphemistically,  but
almost universally,  known as  'price stabilization.'  Often the announced
intention  to 'stabilize"  price  is  little  more  than  a smoke  screen  to  obscure  the
reality  that  prices  are being  systematically  depressed  or (on  rare  occasion)
raised. When the  actual  policy  goal  is  to  stabilize  domestic  prices--that  is,
decrease  domestic  price  fluctuations  compared  to  world  price  fluctuations--the
rationale  tends  to  be  both  to  minimize  the  macroeconomic  effects  of  international
price  movements  and to reduce  the impact  of price  changes  on  producers  and
consumers.
One effect  of  price  movements  of  staple  commodities  (or  'wage  goods')  is
alleged  to  be a tendency  to create  or exacerbate  inflation. This  happens,  the
argument  goes,  because  increases  in crop  prices  drive  wages  up and start  an
inflationary  spiral,  while  crop  price  decreases  do  not  cause  a symretric  fall.
However,  economic studies and investigations  have failed to find such an
asymmetrical  effect of  crop price changes.  A  second  effect of price
fluctuations  comes  from  the  resulting  ups  and  downs  in foreign  exchange  flows,
which  could  potentially  destabilize  fiscal  and  monetary  policies  and  variables
if the commodity  is an important  export.  When the foreign  currency  inflows
following  a commodity  boom cause  the  real  exchange  rate  to appreciate  so much
that it  greatly  disrupts  other  tradable  goods  sectors,  the  country  is said  to
have  caught  'Dutch  disease."
In examining  actual  case studies  of countries  whose exports  are going
through  boom-bust  cycles,  one  finds  that the  macroeconomic  problems  sometimes74
attributed to  the  commodity price  fluctuations  are  really a  result of
macroeconomic  and  trade  policy  choices  (Box  3-1). In  many  countries,  booms  have
been  accompanied  by increased,  rather  than  reduced,  fiscal  deficits  and  foreign
borrowing,  turning  what  might  have been  a mild  and  appropriate  appreciation  of
the currency  into full-blown  Dutch disease.  Studies  have documented  that
expansionary  fiscal  and  monetary  policy  during  and  following  commodity  booms  in
Nigeria (oil),  Cote d'Ivoire (coffee  and cocja) Senegal (phosphates),  and
Colombia  (coffee)  have artificially  overvalued  exchange  rates  and devastated
agricultural  sectors  outside  the  booming  commodity.  Furthermore,  whether  or  not
fluctuations  in  foreign  exchange  earnings  are  undesirable,  stabilizing  domestic
prices  is likely  to have only  a marginal  effect  in reducing  the  magnitude  or
adverse impact  of exchange  flows. 9 'Price  stabilization'  often results  in
destabilization  of the government's  budget  which  then  leads  to  macroeconomic
problems,  and (in  the  case  of food  imports)  the  balance  of  payments. The  high
world  prices  of food  grains  in  1972-74  dramatically  increased  the food  subsidy
budgets  of countries  that  tried  to  maintain  low  domestic  prices,  such  as
Bairg.adesh,  Korea,  Morocco,  Pakistan,  Sri  Lanka,  and  Tanzania  (World  Bank,  1986)
BOX  3-1: COMMODITY  BOOMS  AND POLICY  RESPONSE:
AGGRAVATING  OR  AMELIORATING  THE "DUTCH  DISEASE'
An often-expressed  worry  in  developing  countries  is  that  concentration  of
cxCu  rt  earnings  in  primary  commodities  subjects  an economy  to large  shocks  when
the  commodities'  international  prices  or domestic  production  rises  or falls.
9  Stabilizing  domestic  prices  of exports  can  have some  effect  on foreign
exchange  flows  in  two  ways.  First,  it  keeps  producers  from  fully
adjusting  supplies  to  world  price  movements,  preventing  change  in
production  volume  from  magnifying  the  effects  of price  movements  and
thereby  making  foreign  exchange  revenue  slightly  more stable. Second,
if stabilization  is  done  by border  taxes  or subsidies,  it  may facilitate
countercyclical  fiscal  and  monetary  policy.75
When  export  earnings  increase  precipitously  as  a  result  of price  or production
changes,  the  result  has come  to  be called  'Dutch  disease,"  after  the  effect  on
the Dutch economy  of such increases  in its natural  gas exports.  Increased
foreign  exchange  earnings,  it  is  feared,  will  appreciate  the  real  exchange  rate.
reducing  incomes  in  tradable  goods'  sectors  outside  the  booming  sector  itself.
This expectation  is correct,  to one degree  or another.  But in spite  of the
pejorative  title, the  "Dutch  disease'  per se is not bad.  Exchange rar.e
appreciation  sends  the appropriate  signal  that domestic  resource  allocatio,ns
should  probably change,  with tradable sectors  not producing the "boom"  commodity
(notably  agriculture,  when oil or mineral prices  boomed) contracting.  How much
of a change actually takes place, of course, depends on how long the increase
in exchange  earnings  is expected  to last,  as well as such factors  as whether
capital  markets  are  sufficiently  well  developed  to  allow  temporarily  unprofitable
firms  to  borrow  and stay  in business  during  a  period  of currency  appreciation.
What has often  been  more damaging  to agriculture  then  the  direct  effect
of  the  increased earnings from the booming commodity, however, is  the
government's  policy  response  to the  boom.  Rather  than  using the  windfall  to
increase  savings  and  investment  (and  possibly  partially  pay  off  existing  external
debt)  while  following  contractionary  fiscal  and  monetary  policies,  many
governments  have  done  exactly  the  opposite--spending  lavishly  on  public
employment or questionable public subsidies.  When the boom ends, governments
are left  with large debts and expensive programs that are hard to cut back and
must be financed  by inflationary  budget  deficits. Public investment  institutions
are left  with an  atrophied  apparatus  for  evaluating  and selecting  among  potential
projects,  since  they were  able  to  avoid hard  choices when  resources were
abundant.
In response to  the coffee boom  in  1976-80,  government expenditure in
Colombia began growing rapidly in 1977  and accelerated even after world prices
peaked in  1980.  The average growth rate  over 1977-80  was 38.5  percent  per yea:.
Mest of the increase  was in government consumption,  which rose from 7.7  per-cent
of GDP in 1977  to 10.1  percent in 1980.  Government revenues grew modestly, and
the fiscal deficit expanded, financed mostly by external borrowing.  Monetary
policy was  expansionary.  The  net effect was  an  appreciation of  the  real
effective exchange rate (trade-weighted)  by 30  percent between 1975  and 1982.
While the  government's stated  obiective  was to diversify  exports into  non-coffee
agricultural  and  non-agricultural  commodities,  its  actual  macroeconomic pol;-ies
worked against this.  Non-coffee exports fell from 7.7  percent of GDP in 1976
to  4.3  percent  in  1983,  completely  reversing the diversification  that  had
occurred between 1967  and 1974.  Other countries whose governmental spending
and borrowing policies have similarly  exacerbated the impact  of commodity booms
on agriculture and other tradable sectors include  Mexico (oil),  Nigeria (oil),
Cote d'Ivoire (coffee  and cocoa), and Senegal (phosphates).
In addition to macroeconomic policy, trade policy also can exacerbate or
mitigate the  effects of  a boom.  In  a period  of foreign  exchange abundance, -zhere
is a natural  tendency for consumers and producers to spend some of  this on
increased imports.  When quantitative restrictions  on imports  prevent this from
happening, the  exchange rate appreciates  even  more than it  otherwise  would, with
the  consequent  negative  effects  on  exportable  sectors.  The  government's
restrictive trade policies  at the beginning of the boonr,  and  reluctance to76
liberalize  even after it was well underway,  was one factor  contributing  to
Colombia's  steep  appreciation. Trade  restrictions  may also create  unforeseen
distributional  consequences. In Kenya,  higher  coffee  prices  in 1976-79  were
initially  reflected  in higher producer income.  But capital controls and
restrictions  on imports  geeatly  increased  the  rents  to  suppliers  of capital  and
consumer  goods,  so  much  of the  gain  ended  up going  to  urban  areas.
The  experience  of a  number  of  countries  supports  a conclusion  that  a  more
appropriate  policy  environment--particularly  tighter  restraints  on government
spending  and fewer  import  restrictions--can  prevent  a mild appreciat  on from
deteriorating  into  full-blown  'Dutch  disease,"  or at  least  keep  the  patient  out
of the  emergency  room.
Sources:  D.L.  Bevan,  P.  Collier,  and  J.W.  Gunning,  1987,  "Consequences  of a
Commodity Boom  in  a  Controlled Economy:  Accumulation and
Redistribution  in  Kenya  1975-83,"  The  World  Bank  Economic  Review  1
(May);  S. Devarajan  and  J. de  Melo,  1987,  'Adjustment  with a Fixed
Exchange  Rate: Cameroon,  Cote  d'Ivoire,  and  Senegal,"  The  World  Bank
Economic  Review 1  (May);  W. Easterly  and J. Cuddington,  1986,
'Management  of Coffee  Export  Booms  in Colombia.";  B. Pinto,  1987,
"Nigeria  During  and  After  the  Oil  Boom:  A Policy  Comparison  with
Indonesia,"  The  World  Bank  Economic  Review  1 (May);  V.  Thomas,  1985,
Linking  Macroeconomic  and  Agricultural  Policies  for  Adjustment  and
Growth: The  Colombian  Experience,  Baltimore,  Md.:  Johns  Hopkins
University  Press.
Most  of the  adverse  microeconomic  effects  that  are  cited  to  justify  price
stabilization  have  to do  with the  uncertainty  created  by price  movements. To
the  extent  that  various  economic  agents  are  risk  averse,  this  added  uncertainty
deters  investment  and reduces  production.  While  economic  theory  is clear  that
uncertainty  acts  as an  added  cost  of  production,  the  magnitude  of the  effect  on
production  is an empirical  question,  and the answer seems to be that the
measurable  impact  is small  or non-existent. Regarding  the investment  effect,
most  studies  have  found  no  relation  between  instability  and  aggregate  investment
in the  economy,  though  a few  have found  negative  or positive  relations.
There  are  major  costs  in  price  stabilization  programs  that  are  often  not
recognized.  Prices  fluctuate  because  of  changes  in  supply  and  demand. Each  price77
change  sends  a  signal  to  every  producer  and  every  consumer.  The  price  system
is  an  information  system, and  government  cannot control prices without
engendering  ignorance  about  the  actual  supply  and  demand  for  a  product. If the
government  misleads  the  public  by  understating  the  costs  of  a  product,  there  will
be overconsumption;  if  government  misleads  producers  by holding  down  the  value
of a product, there will be underproduction.  Either  way,  resources  are
misallocated.
The benefits  of intervening  to forcibly  stabilize  prices  are brought
further into question by the  fact that price fluctuations  are sometimes
predictable.  When  a  freeze  damages  coffee  trees  in  Brazil,  for  instance,  coffee
producers  in  the  rest  of the  world  know from  experience  that  world  prices  will
rise and stay  high for a few  years.  There  is little  uncertainty. Farmers'
natural response  to such movements  is to increase  fertilization,  intensify
harvesting  efforts,  and  adjust  other  practices  to increase  supply  to  the  market
(and  conversely,  when prices  predictably  fall). Of course,  if  producer  prices
are  insulated  from  world  price  movements  by domestic  price  stabilization,  this
supply  resporqe  does  not  occur. While  such  insulation  decreases  the  magnitudes
of foreign  exchange  fluctuations  (footnote  9),  it also  lowers  average  profits
over  the  course  of a price  cycle,  and  makes  the  country  poorer. 10
Governments  also  use  domestic  price  stabilization  schemes  to  subsidize  food
prices  to consumers  in  years  when  world  prices  are  high.  This,  however,  is  an
inefficient  way  of  helping  the  pocr,  since  most  of  the  subsidy  goes  to  the  middle
and  upper  classes. One study  of the  rice  price  subsidy  in Peru  concluded  that
10  Countries  whose  exports  of a  commodity  are  constrained  by international
agreement  may  need  to lower  average  production,  but  even  here,  the  most
efficient  way to  produce  a given  quantity  of exports  may be to reduce
the  average  price  without  affecting  its  variability.78
36  percent  of the  subsidy  benefitted  the  middle  and  upper  classes  (Nash,  1983).
Anecdotes  from other countries--such  am bread being  used for animal  feed in
Egypt--illustrate  the  wasteful  folly  of untargeted  food subsidies.  It also
increases  the country's  import  dependency  in the longer  run by lowering  the
average  profit  of farmers  who grow the food  crop.  Better  ways of targeting
subsidies  are almost  always  possible. Finally  it should  be noted  that  to the
extent stabilizing  a crop's  price  makes its produc'ion  more attractive,  it
discourages  farmers  from  diversifying  into  other  crops  and  adopting  production
practices  that reduce  variability  of yield,  a  strategy  which in the long run
might  be  more effective  in reducing  risk.
Thus  both the  macro-and  microeconomic  foundations  of price  stabilizatior
policy  are shaky  at best.  And in spite  of their  efforts  to the contrary,
government  sponsored  stabilization  programs--especially  those  for  exports--often
actually  make real  domestic  prices  mora  unstable  than  world  prices  (Box  3-2).
But the  case for government-sponsored  stabilization  becomes  even  more tenuous
when the administrative  costs and incidental  effects  of the stabilization
mechanisms  themselves  are  considered.  Although  governments  in  a few  countries
(e.g.,  Chile,  Malaysia,  Papua  New  Guinea)  have  relied  mainly  on  burder  taxes  to
stabilize  domestic  prices,  most have opted for elaborate  and costly  direct
intervention  in  agricultural  markets,  as  the following  section  explains.
BOX  3-2: HOW SUCCESSFULLY  DO  GOVERNMENTS  STABILIZE  PRICES?
Almost  all  developing  governments  try  to  control  the  domestic  producer  and
consumer  prices of important  crops and food products,  either directly,  or
indirectly  through  parastatals  or border  tax  measures. One of the professed
intentions  of  these  efforts  is to  make  price  and  producers'  income  fluctuations
smaller  than  they  would  be in  the  absence  of control. How successful  have  the
schemes  been in meeting this goal.  To answer this question  requires  the79
estimation  of the  hypothetical without  stabilization  schemes,  instability  of
price  and  income. For  non-traded  products,  this  would  be a complicated  task,
but for  commodities  that  are imported  or  exported,  the  domestic  price  would  be
roughly  equal  to the  price on the international  market  converted  to domestic
currency  at the  prevailing  rate  of exchange. 1
Hypothetical  price series were constructed  for 15  crops across 37
developing  countries  (not  all  crops  in all  countries).  Instability  indexes  of
these series  were compared  to indexes  of series  of actual  domestic  producer
prices  for  the  corresponding  crops  and  countries. (All  prices  were deflated  by
a domestic  price  index  before  instability  indexes  were computed.) Both types
of price series  were also combined  with production  data to yield series  of
producer revenue with and without stabilization,  z.nd  instability  indexes
constructed  from  these  series. For  each  observation  (price  or  producer  revenue
for  a  crop  in  a  country),  the  difference  was  taken  between  the  instability  index
with and  without stabilization. Summary  statistics  across  all observations,
divided  by pioduct  group,  are  reported  below  in  Table  3-2-1.
TABLE  3-2-1: S-nary Statistics  for  Differences
In  Instability  of  Variables  A and  B
A:  °roducer  Price  Producer  Revenue
B:  Border  Equivalent  Border  Equivalent
Price  Producer  Revenue
Grain  Mean  -15.0  -12.0
(89  obs.)  Std.  dev.  12.7  13.1
Beverage  Mean  -6.9  -5.4
(29  obs.)  Std.  dev.  13.4  12.6
Fiber  Mean  -3.9  -2.5
(21  obs.)  Std.  dev.  11.3  12.8
Source:  0. Knudsen and J. Nash, 1990, 'Domestic  Price Stabilization  in
Developing  Countries,"  Economic  Development  and  Cultural  Change,  38
(April)  :539-58. Instat1lity  indices  calculated  on  basis  on  FAO  price
dt-A.e
For  each  product  category,  the  with-stabilization  variable  was  on average
more stable  that  the  hypothetical  without-stabilization  variable,  as indicated
by the fact that the mean difference  was negative.  It is also nioteworthy,
however,  that the size of this average reduction  is small relative  to theso
standard  deviation  within  the  sample. In other  words,  for  a sizable  fraction
of  the  cases,  actual  domestic  prices  and  producer  revenues  were less  stable  than
they  would have been in the absence  of any attempt  to stabilize  them.  For
grains,  this  was true  for  9  percent  of the  pr4ce  observations  and  15  percent  of
the  revenue  observations.  Corresponding  figures  for  beverages  are 31 and  31;
and  for  fibers  35 and  38.  (The  latter  two  categories  are  mainly  exports  from
developing  countries,  while  grains  are  mainly  imports.) Given  the  high  costs
of the stabilization  schemes  used,  they have failed  in their  objective  in a
remarkably  high  percentage  of cases.
1.  Changes in marketing  margins are only a minor source  of instability,
relative  to  movements  in  world  prices  and  exchange  rates,  so  margins  are
assumed  to  be constant.
Trade  Policy
The  necessary  coroilar;^  to  pricing  policies  that  cause  domestic  prices  to
deviate  from their  international  levels  is restricting  trade  with the  outside
world. This is  often  done  by giving  a  parastatal  marketer  exclusive  authority
to import  or export  the  crop.  But  even  where  this is  not done (and  sometimes
even where  it  is), governments  impose a  variety of  other controls on
interr.ational  trade  in  agricultural  products.
Commonly,  both  imports  and  exports  are  taxed,  with  the  volume  of  trade  in
many products  closely  controlled  and restricted  by requirements  that licenses
be obtained  froi  overnment  ministries. Venezuela  is  not unusual;  before  the
trade  reform  progLam  bega.;  in  June  1989,  only  5  percent  of  all  agricultural  (and
9  percent  of  agroindustrial)  product  categories  in  the  tariff  schedule  were  free
of some  restrictions.  (Tariffs  are  not  counted  here  as restrictions.)  Imports
of  20  percent  of  the  agricultural  (and  30  percent  of  the  agroindustrial)  products
were prohibited  altugether. In a large  sample  of developing  countries,  about
48 percent of food items and 37 percent  of agricultural  raw materials  are81
affected  by such  nontariff  measures  (Erzan,  et. al., 1988).  The effect  (and
probably  the  real  purpose)  of  such  restrictions  is  often  to  partially  compensate
for the  anti-agriculturEl  bias implicit  in  policies  of exchange  overvaluation
and  industrial  protection,  though  the  public  justification  is  usually  to  promote
self-sufficiency  in food.
Such  restrictive  tendencies  of policy-makers  have  been  reinforced  by the
industrial  countries'  agricultural  policies  that  have  depressed  and  destabilized
prices  of major food crops.  Developing  country  governments  restrict  imports
because  they  believe,  with  some  justification,  that  if  cheap  imports  were  freely
allowed,  the effect  on local  agriculture  would be devastating. However,  two
points  get lost in the  political  rhetoric  about  protecting  local  farmers  from
unfair competition.  One is that the government's  own exchange rate and
industrial  policies  create  much  more  serious  problems  for  agriculture  than  would
external  competition,  even from  subsidized  products. The  other  is  that  import
prices  are  "unfair"  because  they  are  a  gift  subsidized  by  taxpayers  in  industrial
countries.  An importing  country  that  duts  not  accept  the  gift  ends  up  producing
the  product  at a  cost  higher  than  its  import  price. It  may  be better  to  accept
the  gift,  allowing  the  agricultural  sector  (or  certain  agricultural  subsectors)
to contract  and  release  resources  to  be used  more  productively  in  other  sectors
(or  agricultural  subsectors). 11
11  The  issues  here  are  complicated.  Industrial  country  policies  may be
temporary,  which,  given  costs  of adjustment,  might  imply  that resources
should  not leave  the  agricultural  sector,  only  to  come  back  when the
subsidies  are  eliminated.  Even  this  possibility,  however,  does  not
necessarily  call  for  artificial  incentives  to  keep the  sector  from
contracting. There  is little  reason  to think  that  governments  are
better  predictors  than  the  private  sector  of  whether  and  when subsidies
will be eliminated.82
But,  such  economic  arguments  seem  unlikely  to carry  the  day in the face
of  political  diatribes  made  possible  by the  industrial  world's  subsidies.  And,
even  though  trade  restrictions  imposed  against  subsidized  agricultural  exports
may  not make economic  sense  from  an individual  developing  country's  point  of
view, they may have the same collective  economic  rationale  as do the GATT-
sanctioned  restrictions  on  imports  of  subsidized  manufactured  exports. That  is,
if all  or  most countries  impose  such  restrictions,  it  will  make it  more costly
for  the  exporting  countries  to  subsidize  the  exports  in  the  first  place,  thereby
deterring  the subsidies,  which are themselves  economically  inefficient  on a
global  level.
Restrictions  and  taxes  when  applied  to exports  have  the  effect  of  keeping
domestic  prices  low. In  many  countries,  the  major  pv pose is  to raise  revenue
for  the  government  by  taxing  export  producers.  In  others,  the  policies  are  aimed
at  keeping  domestic  prices  low  for  consumers  (beef  in  Mexico)  or  agroindustrial
processors (cotton in Venezuela, logs in Belize).  Sometimes the export
restrictions  are  made  necessary  by  subsidies  that  make  domestic  food  prices  lower
than  world market  prices.  When price  differences  are large,  of course,  the
restrictions  are widely  evaded.  In Venezuela,  a number  of products  were so
heavily  subsidized  that  as  much  as 20 to  35  percent  of  apparent  consumption  was
actually  contraband,  despite export prohibitions.  The  negative  effect of
depressing  export  prices  is  discussed  in section  B.2.a. But  trade  restrictions
have negative  effects  that go beyond  their  impact  on prices.  The licensing
procedure  itself  typically  imposes  an onerous  burden. In  Madagascar,  despite
recent  trade  policy  reforms,  exporters  still  are  required  to  have  51 documents
stamped  and  verified  three  times,  on  average.  An average  shipment  requires  three83
man-days  just  for  the  paperwork. Giving  bureaucrats  such  extensive  power  also
fuels  rent-seeking  and  corruption,  further  discouraging  exporters.
Many  governments  provide  heavy  protection  to  the  agroindustrial  sector  by
tariffs,  nontariff  trade barriers,  or export incentives  with the professed
intention  of benefitting  domestic farmers.  In reality,  a given level of
protection  on agroindustrial  production  gives  a  higher  level  of true  effective
protection  for  activities  with a low  domestic  value  added  than for  activities
with a  high  domestic  content.12 Thus,  the  links  forged  with local  agriculture
tend  to  be  quite  limited.  Instead,  this  trade  policy  produces  agroindustry  based
entirely  on imported  inputs. In the  Caribbean,  for  example,  agroindustry  tends
to  be  either  very  capital  intensive,  with  a  domestic  content  of  6  to  10  percent,
or quite  intensive  in labor  and  domestic  raw  materials,  with domestic  content
of  80  percent  or  more. The  protection  for  agroindustry  tends  to  favor  the  former
and  produces  such  anomalies  as  a large  soybean  crushing  industry  in  Trinidad  and
Tobago,  and  wheat  millers  in a  number  of tiny  Caribbean  islands.
12  As an example,  consider  two  hypothetical  agro-industries.  Industry  A
imports  oil-seeds  and  extracts  the  oil  for  local  consumption. It relies
on imported  capital  equipment,  raw  material,  and  intermediaLe  inputs
(fuel, lubricants, chemicals, etc.), so only, say 10 percent of the
price  of the  final  product  is either  cost  of local  nontradable  inputs
(e.g., labor) or profits.  That is, domestic value added is 10 percent.
Industry B processes fruits (which  are not of export quality) into jelly
for the local  market  Since the process does not require elaborate
machinery or imported raw  mate-ials, the domestic value added is, say  80
percent.  Now, suppose t;hat  imported inputs are not taxed and consider
the  effect  of a 20  percent  tariff  on imports  of both  edihle  oil.  8nr.
jelly. The  tariff  will raise  the  domestic  price  of  both  by 20  peLcenL.
But, since  the  domestic  context  of  A is  much smaller  than  that  of B, the
20 percent  rise  in the  price  of the  product  is reflected  in  a much
larger  rise  in the  return  to the  domestic  inputs  and  higher  profits  in
industry  A.  In this  example,  the  equal  tariff  gives  an effective
protection  rate  of 200  percent  to oil  production  and  25  percent  to
jelly-making.84
III. SUBSIDIZING  THE  LARGE  FARMER:
THE  GOVERNMENT'S  ROLE IN  INPUT  MARKETS
Governments  have  often  tried  to  compensate  for  explicit  or implicit  taxes
on agriculture  by providing  inputs--fertilizer,  credit,  irrigation  services,
improved  seeds,  and  electricity--at  subsidized  prices. These  subsidies,  which
by definition  are distributed  in proportion  to the  products'  sales,  have done
little  if anything  to compensate  the poorest  farmers,  who use few purchased
inputs,  produce  relatively  small  saleable  surpluses,  and are not  well enough
connected  to  be allocated  a fair  share  of inputs  whose  shortages  are  created  by
the system (e.g.,  credit).  One study in Morocco found 70 percent of the
subsidies  benefiting  the  richest  farmers  (Seddon,  1989). Instead  of  helping  the
poor,  subsidies  have  misallacated  resources,  skewed  rural  income  distribution,
imposed  a  burden  on  the  fisc,  and  sometimes  encouraged  environmental  degradation.
Fertilizer  Subsidies
Most developing  countries  subsidize  the  use  of fertilizer  by making  the
selling  price  lower  than  costs  of  producing  (or  importing)  and  distributing  it.
The implicit  agenda  here is the same  as with other  input  subsidies: maintain
tarmers'  political  support  by  (partalaly)  compensating  them  for  the  policies  that
depress  their  output  prices. Thc  public  justif.caticn  is  gencrally  couched  in
terms of encouraging  farmers to take advantage  of the higher yields that
fertilizcrs prod-ce. Rc-phrasod  _.i.  a  _ay  Ic.  flatt.erin.  to farmers,  the  idca
is that since farmers are too backward  to understand  that expenditure  on
fertilizer  pays  off  handsomely  in  higher  profits,  thev  would  be  unwilling  to  buy
much  of  it  if  they  had  to  pay  as  much  as  it  costs  to  produce. This  paternalistic85
attitude  is  just  one  manifestation  of  the  general  government  view  in  developing
countries that rural residents  are irrationally  unresponsive  to financial
incentives.  While such  myths  have long  ago  been  de-bunked  by serious  studies
(see,  for  example,  Schultz,  1964),  this  notion  continues  to form  the  basis  for
fertilizer  pricing  policy  in  many  countries.
There is little  question  that these subsidies  have at least  partially
achieved  their  ostensible  objective;  fertilizer  use  has  been  increased.  But  the
cost  has  been  high  in  a  number  of respects.  The  most  obvious  cost  is  the  burden
upon  the  fisc. Table  3-2  shows  estimates  of the  size  of subsidies  relative  to
total  price,  the  agricultural  budget,  and  GDP  in some  countries  for  which  data
is available. As this  last  comparison  makes  clear,  the size  of the  subsidy  is
large  enough  to  have  significant  adverse  consequences  for  the  fiscal  deficit  and
macroeconomic  variables  in  most  of these  countries.  Subsidies  that  ranged  from
0.4 to over 1 percent  of GDP in soma countries  obviously  added inflationary
pressure  to economies  that  could  ill  afford  it.
On  a  microeconomic  level,  underpricing  of fertilizer,  as  with  any  product,
results  in inefficiently  intensive  use.  When fertilizer  is priced  at $1 per
pound  (assuming  a subsidy  of 50  percent  of the  border  price  of $2)  farmers  will
apply  cnough  of it so that  the  value  the  marginal  pound  adds  to production  is
$1,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  pound  of  fertilizer  costs  society  $2  to  produce
or import.  While aggregate  quantitative  estimates  of this  kind of loss are
difficult  to make, it is clear that subsidies  that in most cases exceed  50
percent.  and in some  cases  approach  95 percent,  produce  large  distortions  and
thereford  large  costs.  ,urthermore,  overuse  of fertilizer  has environmental
effects.  In some areas,  it poisons  groundwater  and runs  off into rivers  or
coastal  areas,  where it  damages  wildlife  habitat  and  fisheries.86
The  costs  of  the  subsidies  are  further  magnified  by the  way in  which  they
are administered. Production,  distribution,  and importation  are frequently
handled  by inefficient  parastatal  organizations  that  have limited  incentives  to
achieve  cost savings,  since  losses  are  covered  by the government. One study
estimated  that  the  public  sector  fertilizer  plants  in  India  are  only  40  percent
as productive  as private sector plants (Srinivasan,  1986).  Imports are
controlled  by  the  government  in  ways  that  limit  the  competition  and  pressure  for
efficiency  that  free  imports  would  provide.
In  some  ways,  p3licies  seem  obsessed  with  uniformity.  Prices  (or  margins)
are  often  uniform  across  locations  and  seasons,  regardless  of  the  different  costs
of storing  and delivering  the fertilizer  to farms.  This encourages  use in
uneconomic  locations  and  seasons. In India,  it  also  meant  that  dealers  tended
to deliver  fertilizer  only  when they  could  do it cheaply,  reducing  fertilizer
availability  at  other  times  (Narayan,  1986). Often  only  one  or a few  varieties
of fertilizer  are  available,  forcing  farmers  to  uGe  the  same  kind on  crops  with
different  needs. A study  in Senegal  compared  the standard  fertilizer  sold  by
the  parastatal  with more appropriate  mixes,  and  found  that equal  yields  could
have  been  achieved  at  20  percent  lower  cost  if  bette:  blends  had  been  available.
Yet  in  other  ways,  r--n-unfrm.  t;s  the  ;-e.  The  degree  ^f subsidy  often
depends  on  the  type  (f fertilizer,  the type  cf crop to  which it  is  to  be  applied,
or the identity  cf the target  user, further  distorting  incentives.  This
sometimes  works against othe: worthwhile goals: in  Colombia,  the  only  crop for
which  fertilizer  subsidies  dLe av.i,e  is  coffee,  Lheity  Uii?Ale  L.ii  iaki  the
attempt  to  diversify  production.  It  also  leads  to  diversion;  in  Malawi,
estimates  of  leakages  range  from  10  to  25  percent  (Lele  and  Meyers,  1987).  The
private  sector  can  seldom  compete  with  the  subsidized  operation  of  the  parastatal87
in making or distributing fertilizer, even where there are no legal sanctions
for doing so. Thus, the private sector is crowded out, and farmers are left
without a reliable distribution  network, as one study found in  Morocco (Seddon,
1989).
TABLE 3-2:  Fertilizer Subsidies in Selected Countries*
As Z  of  As 2 of  As Z of
Country  Years(s)  Price  Ag. Budget  GDP
Colombia  1983  8
Cote d'Ivoire  1980  60-100  5  0.2
Egypt  1984  46-76
Gambia  1983-84  61-96  2
Hungary  1980-84  0.7
India  1980-85  0.4
Indonesia  1983-84  34-45
Mexico  1986  0.4
Nepal  1980-83  0.3
Nigeria  1980-83  75  32.1 (1985)  0.2
Pakistan  1980-84  0.7
Philippines  1980-81 a/  0.1
Sri Lanka  1981-83  57-74 (198)  1.0
Tanzania  1981-82  83  0.4
Turkey  1980-83  80 (1980-84)  1.0
Venezuela  1984  50  8  0.1
1987  0.4
Zambia  1980-84  1-25  29  0.4
a/  Subsidies abolished mid-1982.
*Sources: Seguro, et.  al.,  1986; Harris,  1984; World  Bank,  1988; Lele and
Christianson, 1988.
Irrigation
Irrigation  has  been  the  single  largest  investment  expenditure  in
agriculture.  The International Food Policy Research Institute estimated that
It  would  acco_nt  u,z  ov.. ha'f  c  al'  a;,-u'tural  investment  in the 1980s in
36 important developing countries.  Despite this emphasis, results have been
disappointing, whether  compared  to what was  projected, what  is technically
achievable, or what is produced under private irrigation schemes.  Many of the88
problems  are  traceable  to  the  policy  environments  in  which  the  investments  were
made,  particularly  the  pricing  of  water  at rates  far  too  low  to recover  costs.
In few  countries  do  water  charges  come close  to covering  even the  costs
of operating  and maintaining  the irrigation  system,  much less servicing  the
capital  costs to build it.  In a group  of 7 Asian countries  for  which such
estimates  are available  (Bangladesh,  Indonesia,  Korea,  Nepal,  Pakistan,  the
Philippines,  and  Thailand),  operation  and  maintenance  costs  exceed  user  charges
in  every  country  except  the  Philippines.  On  average,  these  costs  were  2.2  times
charges. Total  capital  and  recurrent  costs  were  an average  of 9.6  to  16.2  times
charges,  depending  on how the costs  were estimated.  In Mexico, the average
recovery  of  operation  and  maintenance  was  70  percent  between  1952  and  1970,  but
had  deteriorated  to 36  percent  by 1986  (World  Bank,  1989)  while  in  Venezuela  in
1987,  the  recovery  rate  was  estimated  at  no  more than  10  percent,  since  nominal
water  charges  had  not  changed  in  more than  20  years. In a sample  of  World  Bank
projects,  revenues  covered  only  7  percent  of  project  costs.
In  most  developing  countries,  charges  cover  no  more than  10 to  20  percent
of the  full  cost  of delivering  the  water (Postel,  1989). Providing  a valuable
resource  at giveaway  prices  has a number  of unJesirable  consequences.  One of
the  most  obvious  is  the  incentive  this  creates  for  inefficient  overuse  of  water.
Farmers  sometimes  flood  fields  in Sri  Lanka.  for  example,  as a substitute  for
weeding (Chambers,  1977). There  are  no incentives  to design  projects,  or for
users to behave, so as to conserve such a cheap (to farmers, that is, but not
to the economies) resottrce. Cnnsequentlv, only 25 to 30 percent of the water
diverted is typically available for use on the farm (Rangley,  1987).  Even less
is  available  to  the  users  near  the  lower  reaches  of  the  system,  since  those  near
the  head take  all  they  can  possibly  use.  This  overuse  of  water  in the  fields,89
as  well as the  large  quantities  that  leak  from  damaged  or obstructed  canals  in
transit,  wreak  environmental  havoc.  In India,  10 million  acres  of cultivable
land  have  been  lost  through  waterlogging,  with  another  25  million  threatened  by
salinization,  another  consequence  of overuse  (Jayal,  1985).  In Pakistan,  12
million  acres  are  waterlogged  and  10  million  saline  (World  Bank,  1982).  Pakistan
devotes  half  its  irrigation  budget  to  mitigating  the  salinization  (Postel,  1989).
In  Peru,  25  percent  of  the  80,000  irrigated  hectares  in  the  productive  coast  area
have  salinity  problems.  It  is  estimated  that  salinization  in  Mexico  reduLds  crop
output  by the  equivalent  of 1 million  tons  of grain  per  year - enough  to feed
5 million  people (Postel,  1989).  Worldwide,  FAO estimates  that  half of all
irrigated  land  is  salinized  to  the  extent  that  yields  are  decreased  (Carruthers,
1983).
Less  obvious  are  the  undesirable  effects  of the  enormous  rents  created  by
these  policies. The  "rents"  are  just  another  aspect  of the  underpricing:  when
the benefits  to the farmer  are 3 to 20 times  what he is charged  there  are
tremendous  incentives  to spend  resources  to  take  full  advantage  of  the  bonanza.
One  consequence  is  corruption  of  the  system  operators  that  control  who  gets  the
cheap  water.  Operators  sometimes  oppose  and circumvent  efforts  to publicize
operating  ru'les  and schedules,  since  this limits  their  discretion. At times,
they  create  artificial  shortages  to  increase  their  clout  (Bottrall,  1978). The
politically  powerful and well-to-do are  the main beneficiaries  of cheap
irrigation  all  over  the  world,  not  only  becaube  they  have  more land  to irrigate
but also  because  they  are  better  equipped  to lobby  for  preferential  treatmrant
in  des.gn  and  operation.  Irrigation  tends  to  widen,  rather  than  reduce,  income
disparities,  as studies  in  Mexico,  India,  and  Indonesia  have  shown  (World  Bank,
1983:  Rao. 1985;  Small,  1986).90
The  underpricing  distorts  project  design  decisions  as well.  Politicians
anxious  to  dole  out  as  much  patronage  as  possible  pressure  for  extensive  projects
that cover far more area than could be economically  justified.  Irrigation
pros'  cts  the  world  over  thus  have  been  implicated  in  aquatic  and  forest  habitat
destruction  (and  consequent  destruction  of fisheries  when eroded  soil  smothers
coastal  breeding  areas),  seawater  intrusion  into  rivers,  and  creation  of  breeding
grounds  for  disease  and  agricultural  pests  (Goldsmith  and  Hilgard,  1986;  Pelts,
1984;  Nair,  1985).  New  projects  that create  more patronage  are preferred  to
rehabilitation  of existing  ones.  (In  contrast,  in  the  Philippines,  where  user
groups  must  repay  part  of  the  construction  costs,  the  farmers  exert  pressure  for
mirimalist  design  - Small,  1986).  And since  pricing  does not guide  users'
decisions,  consumption  gives  no guidance  to project  designers  on how projects
should  be designed. Once  built,  dual  use  projects  tend  not to be operated  for
the benefit  of agricultural  water  users,  since  the low  prices  would  make the
project  appear  to  be  uneconomical.  Rather,  they  are  operated  so  as  to  maximize
power  generation,  making  the  project  look  financially  successful,  as has  been
documented  in  North  India  (Reidinger,  1974).
Finally,  the  underpricing  means  that  projects  must  be funded  from  general
Apart from  the  otvkios financial burden thic  imposes, it has other
ilsiqfio,us  effects.  It implies,  for  example,  that  irrigatioi,  a-eiucies  are  nut
answerable  to farmers. To the  contrary,  in irrigated  areas  in  some  countries,
the tarmers are little more Lhaui  state employees, since the government maKes
all .mporta;.t  prodLction  decisions,  as in.r.1rocco  (Seddon,  1989). Comparative
studies  in  the  Philippines,  Korea,  and  China  have  found,  r,ot  surprisingly,  that
agency  staffs  are  more responsive  to farmer  needs  when  their  funding  comes  from
the farners  (Small,  1986;  Nickun,  1982;  World Bank,  1982;  Wade,  1982).  And,91
conversely,  when farmers  feel their  needs are  met, they are more willing to
contribute  to funding  the  system. Thus,  farmers  are  willinig  to pay  handsomely
for  private  irrigation  systems  they  control. Funding  from  the  Treasury  rather
than from users also means that both operation and maintenance  and new
construction  tend  to be slighted  during  periods  of austerity,  as in the  1980s.
Many systems  now suffer  from inadequate  maintenance  and  years  of neglect.  In
contrast,  in the Philippines,  where the National  Irrigation  Agency  is funded
completely  by revenues  from  users,  farmers  participate  in  decision-making,  the
infrastructure  functions  well, and rice yields  have increased  impressively
(Postel,  1989).
Credit
Providing  cheap  credit  to farmers  has been a major way of subsidizing
production  and shoring  up political  support  in rural  areas.  But  the strategy
is costly  and ineffective.  Typically,  credit  is  provided  to a large  extent  by
donors  and  channelled  through  special  government  lending  institutions. The rates
charged  are below commercial rates and in inflationary environments are often
lower  than  the  rate  of  inflation, making  returi,s  negative  in  real  terms.
Political and other considerations  make it difficult to take action to collect
delinquent loans, resulting in high default rates, typically between 20 and 50
percent, but sometimes rising  as high as 80  percent (Feder,  et. al., 1989).  The
direct budgetary cost of these policies is e:  -. ordinarily  high by any measure.
Estimates of the  credit subsidies from  negative real rates alone (not  including
default co.ts) for six  Latin American countries show that the subsidies  have at
times  exceeded  government  expenditures  on research,  extension,  irrigation,  land
reform,  and education  and  health  in rural  areas (Elias,  1985).  In the late92
1970s,  credit  subsidies  in  Brazil  exceeded  5  percent  of  GDP (World  Bank,  1986).
In  Mexico,  the  cost  to  the  government  over  an  extended  time  has  been  greater  than
the  total  amount  lent. Subsidies  have  been  estimated  at 0.7  percent  of GDP  in
Mexico,  0.2  percent  of  GDP  in  Venezuela  and  up to 0.3  percent  of  GDP in  Jamaica
(World  Bank, 1989;  Knudsen,  1989;  World Bank, 1990).  In Asia, where lower
inflation  makes  negative  real  rates  less  of a problem,  the  default  costs  have
been  high --  50  percent  in  Thailand  and  India,  40 in  Malaysia  and  Nepal,  and  71
in Bangladesh  (Feder,  et.  al.,  1989). These  costs  either  inflate  governmental
budget  deficits,  or, when commercial  banks are forced  to absorb them, are
reflected  in  very  high.  rates  for  unsubsidized  loans. Subsidies  also  keep  deposit
rates  low,  both in order  to reduce  the cost  of the subsidy  and to discourage
borrowers  from  just re-depositing  their  loans  to  earn  the  interest.
The  government  involvement  in  rural  credit  is  based  on  the  perception  that
otherwise  credit  would  be unavailable  or available  only  at exploitative  rates.
Yet  when surveys  have  been  done,  it  turns  out  that  most farmers  have access  to
other  sources  of credit,  and the  informal  credit  markets  are  competitive,  not
monopolistic  (Harris,  1983; Singh,  1983; Wells, 1983).  The high rates of
interest  charged  by  informal  lenders  turn  out  to  be  due  to  high  transaction  costs
on small loans.  (Administrative  costs for small and medium loans can reach 20
percent  of the loan amount.) The government  institutions  cannot  avoid  these
costs,  but  often  fail  to  pass  them  on  to  borrowers,  further  increasing  the  real
subsidy.
Commercial  lenders,  of course,  cannot  match  the  subsidized  rates  and  are
crowded  out  of the  market. While  experience  in India,  Indonesia,  Korea,  Kenya
and other African  countries  has shown that even small farmers  can mobilize
savings  when  they  have  good  investment  opportunities  (AFTAG,  1989;  Wague,  1988;93
Cuevas, 1988; World  Bank,  1986), subsidized  ,.redit  programs discourage
development  of viable  rural  savings  institutions.  Thus,  the  apparent  shortage
of credit  is largely  illusory. The  problem  is caused  in large  measure  by the
institutions  whose raison  d'etre  is to solve  the probleml  Where true rural
financial  institutions  have  been  treated  with  benign  neglect,  they  have  thrived.
Savings  in  rural  credit  unions  in  Cameroon  grew  at  an  average  rate  of 25  percent
per  year  in  1982-87,  while  the  formal  banking  sector  was  in  trouble  (World  Bank,
1989). The  experiences  of 'Banques  Populaires'  in  Rwanda  and  other  rural  credit
institutions  in  Benin,  Burundi,  Cote  d'Ivoire,  and  Togo  have  been similar.  I.
the Philippines,  rural  credit  markets  have developed  through  sellers  of farm
implements,  most  of  whom  were  previously  farmers.  These  credit  markets  have  been
very flexible  and  efficient  in  meeting  farmer  needs.
Credit  has  proven  to  be an ineffective  vehicle  for  achieving  the  intended
objectives  of increasing  production  or  helping  small  farmers.  One  major  problem
is that money is fungible;  once lent, it can be (and often is) spent for
non-agricultural  investment  or consumption. This makes  credit  a poor  way of
redressing  the  anti-agricultural  bias  created  by policies  that depress  output
prices;  low  output  prices  make  returns  low  on  agricultural  investment,  increasing
incentives  to  divert  the  funds  to  other  uses. Studies  in  Mexico,  Pakistan,  and
the  Philippines  showed  that  only  25  to  50  percent  of  loan  funds  went to  increase
agricultural  investment.
Most  of the  subsidies  are  windfalls  to  large  farmers,  not  small-  holders.
As  with  all  subsidies  to  inputs,  large  farmers  benefit  most  because  they  use  the
most inputs. But  other  characteristics  of  the  credit  market  work  to reinforce
the  bias  against  small  borrowers. Because  there  is  not enough  credit  to  meet
the  demand  at the low  interest  rate,  the  money  must  be rationed. Making  a few94
large  loans  instead  of  many small  ones  is  a  way  of  minimizing  the  institution'.
administrative  costs  and risks  and so is the preferred  way of rationing  the
limited  supply  (Braverman  and Guasch,  1989).  From the  demand  side,  the  high
fixed  transactions  costs  in government-run  credit  markets  make it cheaper  for
small  borrowers  to go to the  informal  market.  In Bangladesh,  for  example,  the
Lotal  effective  cost (including  transaction  and  interest  costs)  foL  small  loans
is 146 to 169  percent  in the formal  market,  but  only 57 to 86 percent  in the
informal  (Ahmed,  1989). Another  cross-country  study  estimated  transaction  costs
to  be up to  245  percent  of the  official  interest  rate  for  small  loans,  but  3 to
56  percent  for  large  ones  (Cuevas,  1988),  indicating  the  seriousness  of  the  bias
against  small  borrowers.  In  the  formal  credit  market  in  Bolivia,  borrowers  must
incur  costs  of 18 percent  of the  loan  amount  even before  knowing  if the loan
would be approved,  compared  to a cost of 8 percent in the informal  market
(Ladman,  1984).
Making credit  cheaper,  in addition  to draining  the treasury,  has the
unintended  consequence  of  making  capital  cheaper  relative  to  labor.  Predictably,
this  leads  to  a  shift  to less  labor-intensive  production.  One study  showed  that
in  India  the  main  effect  of  the  availability  of  cheap  credit  was  the  substitution
of  purchased  inputs  and  machinery  for  labor,  with  only  a small  impact  on output
(Binswanger,  et. al., 1989).  Such changes  in production  techniques  further
impoverish  rural  landless  workers,  who are the poorest  of the poor in most
societies.95
IV.  SUBSIDIZING THE PRESENT  WITH THE FUTURE:  EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT  POLICIES
ON PUBLIC INVESTMENT  (OR HOW  TO MAKE  PORK OUT OF 'WHITE  ELEPHANTS)
Well-designed  public  investment  can complement  private investment  and
contribute  greatly  to increasing  productivity  in  agriculture  and  other  sectors.
Improving  infrastructure,  doing  basic  research,  disseminating  information  helps
lubricate  the  economy  and  aids  private  agents  in  maximizing  output  of the  most
valuable  products  and  responding  flexibly  and intelligently  to new investment
opportunities. But the sad fact is that public  investment  portfolios  have
suffered  ill  effects  from  periods  of both  boom  and  bust.
In the  periods  when foreign  exchange  was readily  available  (from  booming
commodity  exports  and external  credit),  particularly  in the 1970s and early
1980s,  public  investment  budgets  expanded  rapidly  along  with other  government
expenditure,  and  became  bloated  with  unproductive  large-scale  'white  elephants."
These provided  high visibility  for politicians  and made good "pork  barrel"
projects  for  local  constituents,  but  had  poorer  rates  of return  than  alternative
investments. Sometimes  the low rateb  of return  were due to the use by the
government  of investments  to discriminate  in favor  of certain  regions,  as in
Kenya,  where four large  projects  consumed  half of agriculture's  development
expenditure  and  crowded  out  investments  in  agricultural  research,  rural  physical
infrastructure,  and  human  capital. An ex post  evaluation  of the  World  Bank's
agricultural  investments  in  this  period  in  6  African  countries  showed  36  percent
(by  value)  had  negative  economic  rates  of return  (including  72  percent  of the
projects  in  Tanzania),  while  another  18  percent  had  positive  rates  of  return  less
than  10 percent,  which  is certainly  less  than  the  opportunity  cost of capital
(Lele  and  Meyers,  1987). (Even  this  bleak  picture  probably  overstates  the  value96
of the whole investment  budget, since  projects  by the Bank are presumably
subjected  to more stringent  scrutiny  than average.) An analysis  of Mexico's
agricultural  investment  portfolio  in 1986 (even  after  a considerable  degree  of
retrenchment)  showed  26  percent  of  the  projects  were  uneconomic,  with  a  benefit-
cost  ratio  less  than  one (World  Bank,  1989).
Another  unfortunate  result  of the expansion  of public  budgets  in this
period,  and a characteristic  that would later  haunt agricultural  investment
budgets,  was the large  and rapidly  rising  public  sector  payroll.  In Mexico,
public  employment  increased  by  700,000,  between  1981  and  1984,  before  reductions
began in 1985.  As a result  of a major  push for food self-sufficiency,  the
Ministry  of Agriculture  swelled  to 152,000  staff,  with 22 percent  located  in
Mexico  City,  far  removed  from  the  farm  community. In Tanzania  in the  mid-to-
late  19709,  public  sector  employment  was  growing  at 15-16  percent  per  year (Lele
and  Meyers). Much of  the  growth  in  payrolls  in  many  countries  was  concentrated
in the parastatals. In Tanzania,  70 percent  of public  sector  employees  were
working  for  the  parastatals;  only  10 percent  were involved  in providing  basic
services  in the  Ministry  of  Agriculture,  in spite  of the  fact  that  agriculture
accounted  for  around  52  percent  of GDP  and  80-85  percent  of employment  in the
early  1980s.
In  the  1980s,  rising  interest  payments  and  declining  capital  flows  forced
governments  to  cut  spending.  But  the  expenditure  cuts  were  not  made "across  the
board"--some  cuts were politically  easier to make than others.  Government
payrolls  were  hard  to  pare  down,  as  were transfers  to  money-losing  parastatals.
Consequently,  the  capital  budget  got squeezed  the  hardest. Thus,  in a sample97
of 24 countries'  expenditure  cuts  from  1974-84,11  capital  expenditures  fell  by
about  28 percent,  while  subsidies  (including  transfers  to  parastatals)  fell  by
only 11 percent  and the  public  sector  wage bill by 14 percent (Hicks,  1988).
By sector,  the  steepest  declines  were in infrastructure  (25  percent)  and the
productive  sectors (19 percent),  while defense and social sector spending
declined by  only  7  and  11  percent.  Even within  the  capital budget,
infrastructure  and  the  productive  sectors  declined  the  most (41  and  42  percent).
Thus,  investment  in  these  areas  was  a  declining  part  of  the  capital  budget,  which
was a  declining  part  of the  overall  budget,  which  was itself  declining.
Undoubtedly,  sone  relatively  unproductive  investment  projects  got  cut in
this  procecs. But  it is  also  clear  that  the  squeeze  hit  hard  at  maintenance  and
rehabilitation  budgeLs  (which  always  tend  to be low  priority  because  of their
low visibility)  and at many guod investments. Cross-country  information  on
exactly  what  happened  to  spending  on  different  categories  within  the  agricultural
budget  is  hard to  come  by.  But  Mexico's  pattern  does  not seem  to  be atypical.
There,  the  agricultural  budget  fell  in  real  terms  by 1987  to 26  percent  of its
level  in 1981.  In  the  meantime,  only  late  in the  game (1985)  was action  taken
to begin  unloading  some  of the  89 parastatals  (most  of them  a budgetary  drain)
under  the  control  of  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture.  Spending  on  specific  programs
within  the agricultural  budget  in 1987  as a percentage  of 1981 levels  was as
follows:  administration,  28;  technical assistance,  21;  university, 35;
irrigation,  26;  rehabilitation,  13; livestock,  19;  forestry,  44;  research,  41;
urban  water  conduction  and  storage,  24.  Of all  categoAies,  rehabilitation  was
hit the  hardest.
13  Results  were very  similar  in  another  smaller  sample  of  countries'  cuts
between  1979  and  1985.98
Venezuela's  agricultural  budget  has  also  shown  a  strong  bxis  toward  cutting
investment  (mostly  irrigation  and rural  roads)  rather  than current  spending.
There,  a budgetary  cut  of 61  percent  in  nominal  terms  between  1987  and  1989  was
achieved  by reducing  investment  by 95 percent,  while current  spending  grew  by
55 percent  (World  Bank,  1990). To a  very large  extent,  the  cuts  in investment
.were  made  to  continue  the  subsidies  (mainly  to  fertilizer  and  credit)  and  support
for  public  sector  financial  institutions,  which  together  by 1988  accounted  for
55 percent  of the  agricultural  budget. Rural  infrastructure  expenditures  were
only 35 percent  of amounts  budgeted  for them.  Because  of similar  patterns
throughout  the region,  agricultural  engineers familiar  with Latin America
estimate  that about  70 percent  of irrigation  schemes  suffer  from significant
deterioration  because  of lack  of  maintenance.99
CHAPTER  4
R  EFINING  THE  ROLE  OF GOVERNMENT  IN  AGRICULTURE
The  first  three  chapters  of  this  monograph  have  shown  how  government  policy
in  agriculture  has  been  Lostly  and  misdirected  both  in  developed  and  developing
countries.  In developed  countries,  it has cost the world's taxpayers  and
consumers  hundreds  of  billions  of  dollars  yet  has  failed  to  provide  low  cost  food
while sustaining  farm incomes. Furthermore,  it  has disrupted  world trade  and
threatens to  lead  to  future divisive trade conflicts that  could have
ramifications  well  beyond  agriculture.  It  has  enriched  larger  farmers  and  agro-
industrialists  and  probably  accelerated  the  replacement  of  the  family  farm  with
large farm businesses.  Possibly  most important  in the long run, it has
contributed  to  the  degradation  oi  the  environment--through  soil  erosion,  as  well
as pollution  of streams  and  rivers  and  ground  water.  In  developing  countries,
it  has impoverished  rural  people  while  not  providing  the  food  security  desired
by urban consumers  and policymakers. The immense  funding  that has gone to
subsidize  fertilizer,  credit,  and  urban  consumers  should  have  gone  to  developing
infrastructure  and  providing  education.  health  and  other  services  for  the  poor.
Instead  it  has been  largely  wasted  and  unfortunately  is irrecoverable.
This  need not continue. Many governments  are dissatisfied  with their
agricultural  policies  and  the  costs  that  they  induce.  Multilateral  negotiations
in the Uruguay  Round  will hopefully  establish  once and for all  that trade  in
agricultural  commodities  should  be treated  like  that  of all other  commodities
and  made subject to the  full  disciplines  of  the  GATT. Unfortunately,  to  bring
agriculture  fully  into  the  GATT  will be politically  difficult. And it cannot
be left to industrial  countries  alone.  Developing  countries  have a role in100
bringing  this reform  about.  But it requires  changes in how the role of
government  in  agriculture  is  perceived  and  how  developing  countries  participate
in the  GATT.
Redefining  the  Role  of the  Government
Many of the  unproductive  policies  described  in earlier  chapters  share  a
common cause--a  tendency by governments  in both developing  and developed
countries  to regard  any  perceived  problem  as potentially  resolvable  by taking
income  from  some  and  giving  it  to  others. This  problem  is  very  bas.c;  the  issue
is far  more  profound  than  would  be implied  by the terms  in  which  policies  are
usually  discussed. It is not  enough  just to recognize,  for  example,  that  all
of the  interventions  described  in 'arlier  chapters  have  costs  and  acknowledge
that  they  should  be  subjected  to  - .. ne  cost-benefit  criteria.  Nor  it  is  generally
sufficient  to eliminate  the legal  monopoly  of a parastatal.  The political
pressures  that  generated  the  detrimental  policies  or the  monopoly  power  remain
in place, largely  unchecked.  Cost-benefit  evaluations  can be manipulated
(especially  when factors such as effects on income  distribution,  regional
development,  and self-sufficiency  are  considered  legitimate  costs  or  benefits),
and  pricing  policies  of parastatals  can  create  de facto  monopolies  by driving
out  the  private  sector,  even  if there  are  no legal  barriers  to  entry. Thus,  as
long  as government  actions  remain  unconstrained  by basic  changes,  the  outcomes
are not likely  to be significantly  changed  by superficial  reforms. What is
needed  is a re-consideration  of the  government's  proper  role in agriculture,
with the  consequent  institutional  changes. A solution  to the  problem  requires
withdrawal  of most  government  intervention  from agricultural  markets and
recognition  of economic  rights--for  farmerr  to produce  whatever  commodities101
using  fficient  technologies  they feel  will best profit  them and sell their
products  freely  at  home  or  abroad;  for  traders  to  move  goods  in  the  expectations
of profits  unconstrained  by fear  of repression;  and  for  consumers  to buy  foods
at the  lowest  prices,  whether  from  foreign  or domestic  sources.
BOX 4.1:  COW HORMONES:  WOE TO THE  CONSUMER  LEST  HE BENEFIT
Cow  hormones  (bovine  somatotropin)  offer  the  potential  to substantiating
increase  milk production. Although  some  consumer  groups  contend  that the  use
of  hormones  has  not  been  adequately  tested  for  potential  health  effects  on  humans
that drink  milk, the Food and Drug Administration  has found  the milk safe.
Nevertheless,  the  United  States  No.  1 dairy  state  has  prohibited  its  use  until
at least  June 1, 1991.  The  Washington  Post (April  28, 1990)  states  the real
reason  for  the  ban:  "opponents  of the  hormone  said  that  the  potential  10  to 25
percent  increase  in  milk  production  and  resultant  lower  milk prices  would  harm
family  dairy  farms.' Of course,  it  would  benefit  consumers  of  milk,  but  as  with
most  farm  programs  they  must  be  protected  at (almost)  any  cost  from  lower  prices.
Yet, the  dairy  lobby  fears  that  the falling  prices  of milk  would  disrupt  the
dairy  price  support  program. Thrre  are  also  concerns  that,  if  milk  becomes  more
plentiful,  public  support  for  a  government  program  to  assure  plentiful  supplies
of  milk  will decrease.
A  re-examination  of  the  government's  role  in  agriculture  should  start  with
not only a concept of these rights, but also with recognition  that when
individuals  are allowed  to transact  freely,  the resulting  markets  work quite
well,  with a few  exceptions. Even in the case  of those  exceptions,  before  a
decision  is taken  to intervene,  it is necessary  to ask  whether  the  government
failures  are  likely  to  be  more  serious  than  the  market  failures.  Though  markets
have  their  weaknesses,  markets  have  not  resulted  in  paying  farmers  to  leave  idle
60  million  acres  (as  the  United  States  government  did),  or in  letting  mountains
of butter  slowly  rot (as  the  European  Community  does).  Nor  would the  market
send  a  signal  to  the  farmers  of  Ethiopia  to  absolutely  avoid  storing  any  of  their102
surplus  grain,  or  to  the  farmers  of  India  to  drown  their  crops  in  too  much  water,
or to the  farmers  of Brazil  to slash  and  burn :ain  forests  to graze  cattle.
The  best case  for  intervention  is in  activities  for  which  individuals  do
not absorb  the full  costs  or benefits  of their  actions,  that is,  where there
are significant  externalities.  In agriculture,  this includes  carrying  out  or
sponsoring  either basic  research  or  applied research that leads to  the
development  of inputs  or techniques  that  could  not (realistically,  be  patented.
Governments  all  over  the  world  carry  out  this  function,  though  many  extend  their
research  activities  into  areas  where  private  markets  could  be expected  to  work
well if  given  a  chance  (and  do  work  well  in  some  developed  countries),  since  the
resulting  products  could  be patented  and  privately  marketed--hybrid  seed,  for
example,  or  mecharical  production  hardware.  And, even in research,  the  need
for  government  intervention  may be decreasing. In the  United  States,  private
companies  already  conduct  74  percent  of all  agriculture  research,  and  the  role
of  private  companies  is  expected  to  increase  as  issues  like  patenting  new  forms
of  biotechnology  are  resolved. While  much  of  the  1  rrnment's  research  funding
is distributed  by members  of Congress  to their  constituents,  based  mainly  on
political  connections  and  not  necessarily  merits,  private  research  is directed
only  at achieving  the  maximum  return  on the  investment.
Another  area in  which individuals  do  not fully  absorb  the  cost  of their
actions is activities  with environmental  effects.  Farmers that over-use
pesticides  or fertilizers  or that  allow  their  land  to erode  impose  significant
costs  on fisheries  and  tourism  in some  countries,  since  the  runoff  poisons  or
smothers  coral  reefs,  estuaries,  and  other  breeding  and  juvenile  rearing  areas;
over-pumping  of groundwater  for irrigation  lowers  the  water table  and raises
costs  for  others. So far,  the  role  of  government  policies  in  controlling  these103
problems  has  been  predominantly  negative. Policies  that  underpriced  inputs  or
artificially  promoted  production  have encouraged  overus.e. And failure to
recognize  individual  property rights in some countries  removes a  farmer's
incentive  to invest  in anti-erosion  farming  techniques  to  ensure  the  long-term
viability  of the farm.  Governments  should  reform  their  policy  to put  primary
emphasis on the goal of preventing  environmental  degradation.  Then the
appropriate  policies  will  be  taxes  (and  perhaps  subsidies)  aimed  at  assuring  that
the full costs (and  benefits)  of the farmer's  actions  fall on him.. In the
suggestive  language  of environmental  economics,  the tax/subsidy  policy  would
"internalize  the  externalities."  This  has  already  been  done  in  Iowa,  one  of the
United  States'  largest  corn producing  states,  as the state legislature  now
imposes  penaities  on  excessive  run-offs  of  fertilizer,  pesticide,  or  erosion  from
private  farmland.
A final  area in  which agricultural  regulations  can  be justified  on the
grounds  of externalities  is  health  and sanitation.  It is usually  difficult  to
trace  the  source  of  an epidemic  among  crops  or livestock,  and  in  many  countries
it  would  be difficult  to  collect  from  the  party  responsible  an  amount  sufficient
to compensate  the  losers.  There is thus legitimate  reason  to regulate,  for
example,  the  import  of foreign  plants  and  animals  when there  is some  realistic
chance  that  they  might  harbor  pathogens. Unfortunately,  such  regulations  have
often  been  used as devices  to restrict  imports  to protect  domestic  production
from  foreign  competition,  rather  than for  their  legitimate  function;  again,  a
re-orientation  of objectives  is in  order.
In  addition,  there  are  a  few  cases  where  the  absence  of  an  important  market
or political  sensitivities  may justify  (or  necessitate)  limited  intervention.
The importance  of food  in the  budgets  of the  p or,  absence  of futures  markets104
in  developing  countries,  and  the  high costs  of insuring  small  transactions  may
mean that it is reasonable  to implement  well-targeted  food subsidies  for  poor
consumers,  meast:res  to  directly  support  incomes  of poor  farmers  in  ways  that  do
not  distort  price  signals,  and  measures  to  keep  price  instability  from  imposing
real  hardship  and  political  instability.  None  of  these  policies  is  without  cost,
however,  and  usually  the  best  policies  are  those  that  are  aimed  directly  at the
root  of  the  problem,  rather  than  the  symptoms.  For  example,  two  primary  reasons
for  the  failure of  farmers and  agroprocessors  to  insure themselves in
international  futures  markets may be macroeconomic  policies that generate
uncertainty  as  to  the  level  of  the  real  exchange  rate  and  restrictions  on  trading
in foreign  currencies.14  Here, the best policy  woulu be to improve the
macroeconomic  and exchange  rate policies,  rather  than trying to create  an
alternative  insurance  scheme  by stabilizing  prices.
If a  developing  country  government  intends  to stabilize  prices,  (perhaps
because  the  commodity  is  a basic  food  staple  and  a  large  part  of  the  poor's  food
basket)  the experience  of many countries  shows  that it is crucial  that the
government  pursue this goal in a manner that avoids government  control  and
ownership  of the crops.  Stabilizing  domestic  prices  by a system  of variable
border  taxes (and  possibly  subsidies)  instead  of by direct  procurement  makes
the system  transparent  and predic..able  (assuming  it operates  by well-known
rules). This  system  also  minimizes  the  possibilities  for  distortion  of  pricing
in the distribution  chain (i.e.,  by regulating  processing  and distribution
14  Small  farmers  in  developing  countries,  of  course,  would  probably  not
use  futures  markets  directly.  But  the  agroprocessors  or  other  lorge-
scale  marketers  that  buy  from  many  producers  could  be expected  to
do so, and would then be able to enter into contracts  with the
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margins). It also  eliminates  the  iesed  for  the  large  staff  and  costly  hardware
that are needed to  run a  procurement  program, and so  reduces both the
possibilities  for  corruption  and  the  size  of  the  agency's  budget.  Another  lesson
of experience  is  that  the  system  should  operate  under  rules  that  buffer  but  do
not  break  the  link  between  domestic  and  international  prices  exc^nt  at times  of
severe  instability. The purpose  of stabilization  is to insure  against  risks
associated  with international  commodity  price  movements. Just  as insurance  is
only  taken  out  to  guard  against  serious  risks,  so  the  stabilization  system  should
only  be used to reduce  the  largest  price fluctuations.  Within  a fairly  wide
band,  then,  the system  should  allow  domestic  prices  to move freely,  with the
variable  taxes/subsidies  only  bein6  used to buffer  the  effect  of very  high or
very low  international  prices.
Most  developing  countries  clso  lack  capital  markets  of a size  sufficient
to finance  rural  infrastructure,  such  as large  irrigation  projects  and roads.
Consequently,  the  government  may  have  to  carry  out  such  investments.  Even  here,
however,  while the investments  must be financed  in the first  instance  by the
government,  the taxpayers  should  not  necessarily  be forced  to foot the  bill.
In  most  or  all  irrigation  projects  and  some  road  projects,  the  beneficiaries  are
a clearly  identifiable  group of users,  from  whom the costs  can be recovered
through  taxes  or  user fees.
Unfortunately,  as pointed out in Chapter 3, the legitimate  roles of
government  in agriculture--especially  it..dstment  and  research--have  often  been
subordinated  to  roles  for  which  government  bas  shown  little  competence  such  as
interventions  in  markets  and  price  setting.  These  priorities  must be reversed
if agricultural  growth  is to resume. As Box 4-1 points  out, there  is ample
opportunity  to do this.106
Box 4-2  RESTORING AGRICULTURAL  INVESTMENT IN  DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
EXPENDITURE-SWITCHING
Adjustment  programs  aimed at restoring  conditions  conducive  to growth
often  must be carried  out at the same time as macroeconomic  stabilizasion
measures. For agriculture,  this  may  mean that  agricultural  public  investment
budgets (broadly  defined to include  expenditure  on legitimate  public  sector
activities  aimed  at enhancing  private  sector  productivity)  should  be  maintained
or increased  in the  midst  of overall  fiscal  austerity. One  way to do this  is
to reduce investment  funds going to other sectors,  while maintaining  or
increasing  agriculture's.  Politically,  however,  this  may  be  difficult  to  do  when
each  cabinet  minister  is scrambling  to guard  his budget. A more politically
palatable  alternative  may be to reduce  agriculture's  overall  budget,  while
switching  funds  to  appropriate  investments.  This,  however,  raises  the  question
of  how  much room  there  is  to squeeze  other  parts  of the  agricultural  budget.
In  Mexico,  one  country  where  good  information  is  available  on  expenditures,
it  is  clear  that  there  is  a  great  deal  of opportunity  to  cut  other  parts  of the
budget  sufficiently  to greatly  increase  the  budget  for  enhancing  productivity,
and even for improving  the "safety  net" f.r the truly  ne3dy.  The estimated
expenditures  in  1989  in  various  categories  related  to agriculture  are  presented
below:
Millions  US$
Credit  and  insurance  subsidies  (not  volumes)  1,700
Untargeted  food  subsidies  1,100
Targeted  food  subsidies  250
Electricity  subsidies  400
Fertilizer  subsidies  150
Irrigation  operating  and  maintenance  subsidies  100
Public  investment  in  irrigation  250
Research  and  extension  100
Total  4,050
Out  of the  total  expenditures  of $4.5  billion,  only  $0.35  billion  went  to
growth-enhancing  spending  (irrigation  and  research  and  extension),  with  another
S0.25  billion  going  to  create  a  safety  net  with  targeted  food  suhbsidies  (defined
as subsidies  with some  kind  of  means  test  to try  to assure  they  go only  to the
poor).  About 85 percent  of the spending  went to untargeted  food and input
subsidies.  If this part of the budget  were cut in half, the budget for
irrigation,  research  and extension,  and targeted  subsidies  could  be doubled,
while still reducing  overall  sectoral  spending  by over 28 percent.  It is,
however,  noteworthy  that such  decisions  could  not  be taken  by the  Ministry  of
Agriculture  acting  alone,  since  much of the spending  (around  90 percent)  is
outside  of its direct  control.  Such  a program  would  have to form  part of a
budget  package. But  the  fact  that  the  package  would  be expenditure  switching
among  agriculture-related  budget  categories  should  make it  more feasible  than
if  other  budget  categories  had  to  be  raided  to  support  agricultural  investment.107
Source: "Identifacation  and  Preparation  of  Sector  Operations:  Experience  from
Mexico  a.,d  Central  America,"  presentation  by Hans  Binswanger  at  RUTA-
IICA  Workshop  on Identification  and  Preparation  of Sector  Operations,
San  Jose,  Costa  Rica,  February  23,  1990.
Strengthen-.ng  GATT  and  Agricultural  Disciplines
In ':he  current  international  environment,  it  is unlikely  that  individual
developed or  developing nation governments  will  have  the  fortitude to
unilattrally  reform  their  own agricultural  support  and trade  programs. It is
noteworthy  that  even  two  strong  recent  reformers--Mexico  and  Venezuela--have  made
relatively  little  progress  in  agricultural  (especially  agricultural  trade)  policy
reform. Politically,  it is difficult  for one government  to fully  liberalize
its  trade  in agriculture  wnile  a major  trading  partner  continues  to subsidize
and dump  its surplus  supplies  into  international  markets,  threatening  to ruin
the farmers  of any  country  that  allows  these  surpluses  free  entrance  into  the
domestic  market. But  negotiations  ijf  agricultural  policies  are less  difficult
at the  bilateral  level  or prefer,.bly  at the  multilateral  level. Coordinated
reform  simply  eliminates  the  rationale  for  much  of the  intervention.  One  U.S.
farmer  said  it best in a recent  interview  (Washington  Post,  1990),  "Everybody
in the  world  has farm  subsidies  and  you  can  lose  your  shirt  to the  stroke  of a
pen...We  can't  fight  someone's  foreign  ministry,  so  we need  protection." But
he stands  solidly  behind  efforts  to  negotiate  freer  world  markets  so  he "would
be able  to  compete  without  worrying  about  politics."
To have  substantial  world  wide reform  take  place  first  requires  that  the
two strongest  subsidizers  of agriculture--the  United  States  and the  European
Community--agree  to reduce  or eliminate  their  subsidization  and protection  of108
the  agricultural  sector. In particular,  the  US has to give  up its  Section  22
waiver  under  the  GATT  and  the  EC  must  substantially  modify  its  CAP,  specifically
by eliminating  the  use  of  variable  levies  and  export  restitutions  (subsidies).
In doing  this, it must agree that tariffs  are the only recognized  form of
protection  strictly  allowed  in the  GATT  and  these  must  be bound  at low  or zero
levels. If the  US and  EC can  make such  a substantial  and  complete  move on its
agricultural  policy, the rest of  the industrial  world will soon follow.
Realistically,  to make such a concession  in policies requires  the type of
negotiating  forum  offered  by  the  GATT  where  the  political  costs  of such  reforms
can  be counter-weighed  by the  substantial  gains  in other  trade  areas,  such  as
in  services  or intellectual  property  rights. That  is  why the  Uruguay  Round  and
the  Rounds  of trade  negotiation  that  may follow  it  are  so important.
BOX  4.3:  GATT  AND  AGRICULTURAL  TRADE
The General  Agreement  on Tariffs  and Trade (GATT)  sets strict  rules  on
what countries  are  allowed  to do  with their  trade  regimes  and  with subsidies
for  all  products  that  are  traded. Governments  learned  long  ago  that if trade
is  not  governed  by  international  rules,  trade  wars  can  erupt  whereby  each  country
either  dumps their goods at subsidized  prices  on other countries'  domestic
markets  or erects  higher  and  higher  barriers  to trade.  This  is what  happened
in the  1920s  and it  helped  launch  the  Great  Depression. The  GATT is supposed
to avoid  this  possibility  by prohibiting  certain  types  of protection  (such  as
quantitative  restrictions  and some  other  nontariff  barriers,  limiting  tariffs
to  negotiated  levels,  and  outlawing  export  subsidies.  In  this  way trade  can  be
conducted  in a  largely  transparent  and fair manner to the benefit of all
countries.  Also,  with  each  negotiating  session  (called  Rounds),  the  tariffs  can
be lowered  through  the  principle  of reciprocity,  whereby  one country  reduces
tariffs if another  country does also.  Through the 'Host Favored Nation'
treatment  all  countries  benefit  from  these  negotiations  since  each  party  to  the
GATT  receives  the lower  negotiated  tariff,  that  is,  each  country  has  the  right
to  receive  the  most  favorable  tariff  for  its  trade.  Discrimination  among  trading
partners  is  prohibited. So far  nearly  a  hundred  countries  are  members  of GATT
and  are  obligated  to trade  under  its  rules.
Under  the  GATT,  most  trade  in  manufactures  has  prospered,  with  world  trade
in  1988  almost  six  times  its  1973  level. Yet  agricultural  trade  has floundered109
in a morass  of protection  and  export  dumping.  There  has been a gigantic  gap
between  what countries  should  do under the GATT and what they actually  do.
Unlike  manufactured  products,  agricultural  trade  has  not  been  liberalized.  More
worrisome  is  that  every  so  often  small  agricultural  trade  wars--for  example  over
pasta  or  poultry--break  out  between  the  major  trading  partners.  Like  in  any  war,
these  small  skirmishes  could  explode  into  major trade  conflicts,  even to the
extent  that  they  impinge  on all  trade. This  concern  has brought  the  major  and
even  minor  agricultural  trade  transgressors  to the  bargaining  table  in  Geneva.
There  is  great  dissatisfaction  with  this  state  of  agricultural  trade  and  finally
after  several  attempts  in earlier  Rounds  of trade  negotiations,  agriculture  is
being  addressed  in  the  current  negotiations  in the  Uruguay  Round.
How  did  this  come  about? How  is  it  that  this  very  important  bloc  of trade
has  been  excluded  from  the rules  of international  trade? First,  it should  be
understood  that the GATT itself  does not make any real distinction  between
agricultural  and industrial  commodities  in  applying  these  rules  except  in  very
special  circumstances  (Box  4.4).
The problem  has arisen largely  becauise  under threat  of United States
withdrawal  from  the  GATT  because  of  conflicts  between  GATT  provisions  and  Section
22  of  the  Agricultural  Adjustment  of  1935,  the  United  States  was  granted  a  waiver
in  1955. The  waiver  allowed  it  to  use  quantitative  restrictions  on  agricultural
imports  that  may interfere  with price  supports. Such restrictions  have been
applied  to  a  wide  variety  of  products  and  are  still  in  effect  for  dairy  products,
peanuts,  cotton,  refined  sugar,  and  sugar-containing  products.  Others  naturally
followed--not  through  the  formality  of  a  waiver--but  in  strict  violation  of the
GATT.  The EC widely and purposefully  controls  imports  through  the CAP and
variable  levies.  Agriculture  is  treated  differently  in  the  GATT  for  reasons  that
have  nothing  to do  with its  laws  but  because  of  political  imperatives--special
fivors  to  politically  important  constituents--and  because  other  countries  have
p3rmitted  it to continue.
But  what about  the  developing  countries? Is it  not important  that  they
also  reform  their  policies? As Chapter  3  pointed  out,  agricultural  policies  in
developing  countries  are  also  a self-defeating  tangle, imposing  high costs  on
farmers,  governments  and  to  some  extent  consumers.  But  the  current  Articles  of
the  GATT  actually  give  little  incentive  for  developing  countries  to  go  along  with
world-wide reforms and make substantial  changes in their policies.  This
reluctance  is caused  in  part by the  less-than-full  obligations  under  the  GATT
required  of developing  countries.  Unfortunately  the waiver of  the full110
obligations  for  developing  countries  is  not a  benefit  but  a cost  to developing
countries.  It  makes  developing  countries  less  than  full  members  of  the  GATT  and
less  able  to  win  concessions  from  their  trading  partners.  It  is  a  situation  that
must  not  continue.
Negotiations  in the  GATT  are  based  upon  reciprocity:  one  country  gives  a
trade  concession  and receives  in turn a trade  concession  from  another.  Each
party  benefits  and  most  importantly  all  countries  receive  the  trade  concession
because  of the rule  of Most Favored  Nation. As a result,  world  trade  becomes
more  liberalized.  But  the  key  is  the  reciprocity--one  country  giving  while  the
other  reciprocates.
BOX  4.4: GATT 'RULES'  ON AGRICULTURAL  TRADE
One  of  the  most  important  provisions  of  the  GATT  is  the  general  prohibition
of quantitative  restrictions  on trade  (article  XI),  with a few  exceptions:
o  Export  restrictions  to prevent  or relieve  food  shortages;
o  Import  restrictions  for  fish  and  agricultural  products  when  necessary
for enforcing  domestic  marketing  or production  restriction  programs,
or for eliminating  temporary  surpluses,  provided "that the import
restriction  shall  not  be  such  as  to  reduce  the  total  of  imports  relative
to the  total  of domestic  production";  and
o  Import  and export  restrictions  necessary  for applying  standards  to
commodities  classification,  grading,  or  marketing.
Export  subsidies  are prohibited  on processed  but not primary  products,
though  countries  are  advised  only  to "seek  to  avoid"  the  use  of  export  subsidies
on the latter.  If such subsidies  are used, the Code on  Subsidies  and
Countervailing  Duties  requires  that  countries  not apply  them  in a manner  that
will  lead  to  their  acquiring  "more  than  an  equitable  share  of  world  export  trade"
or that results  in material  price  undeLcutting. Domestic  subsidies  are not
prohibited,  but  the  code  attempts  to  regulate  the  use  of  domestic  subsidies  that
would  adversely  affect  the  trading  interests  of other  countries. The  GATT  does
not deal directly  with several  common  agricultural  trade barriers,  such as
unbound  tariffs,  variable  levies,  minimum  import  prices,  and  voluntary  export
restraint  agreements.ill
Sourcet Ballenger,  Doering,  and  Mervenne
By amendments  adopted  since  the  original  GATT  was negotiated,  developing
countries  have  been  "relieved"  of the  reciprocity  obligation  through  Part  IV of
the  GATT.  This  was supposed  to be a concession  given  in recognition  of their
less developed  status,  based  on the notion  in vogue  at the time that import
substitution  through  trade  restrictions  was the  road  to development. In fact,
this 'concession'  is a poison  and has contributed  to developing  countries'
extremely  protectionist  policy  inclinations. It is now  well recognized  that
integration  into  the  world  economy  is crucial  for  development. This requires
more  open  trade  regimes  in  developing  countries. But  it is  also  clear  that  it
is politically  difficult  to lower  trade  barriers,  since  the protected  parties
are often  better  organized  to exert  political  pressure  than  are the  potential
beneficiaries  of reform. GATT  tacitly  recognizes  this  by treating  freer  access
to  other  countries'  markets  ss  a  benefit  that  a  country  receives  in  exchange  for
incurring  the  cost  of  opening  its  own  market. This  reciprocity  principle  creates
a  constituency for  reduction of  protection--tht  potential exporters to
counterbalance  the  protectionist  lobby. But  by exempting  developing  countries
from  such  an  obligation,  GATT  has  undercut  the  incentive  for  governments  to  adopt
trade  policy  reforms  that  would  be in  the  best interest  of their  own countries
and the  world trading  system.  Other countries'  markets are opened to them
whether  or  not their  markets  are  ope-  to  others.
If  non-reciprocity  were  the  only  loophole  for  developing  countries  in  the
GATT  articles  it  would  be bad  enough--but  it is  not.  Unfortunately,  there  are
more;  in fact,  others  that  are  more  debilitating  to  developing  countries. One112
is  a clause  that  allows  protection  of infant  industries--another  reflection  of
the  development  theories  prevailing  when  the  GATT  was  negotiated.  Unfortunately
these  industries  never  grow  up and  generally  have  turned  into  perpetual  drains
on their  economies. But  in  particular,  Article  XVIII,  clause  B is the  kiss of
death.  It  allows  developing  countries  to  institute  whatever  protection  they  wish
for  balance  of  payments  reasons. This  includes  even  discarding  agreements  that
they  may  have  made in  negotiations  where  they  were forced  to give  reciprocity.
And  hiding  behind  Article  XVIII  B is  not  a temporary  expedient.  Some  countries
have  used  it  for more than  forty  yearsl South  Korea  even  tried  in 1989  to use
it to justify  its  protection  despite  balance  of payment  surpluses  in the  tens
of  billions  of dollars.
But the damage  caused  by Article  XVIII B goes beyond the deleterious
effects of  excessive protection  of domestic markets and the  inefficient
industries  that  this  creates. Such  an exception  means  that  the  agreements  that
could  be  won through  reciprocity  have  little  meaning  if  one  party--a  developing
country--can  obliterate  them  at  any  time  by  claiming  balance  of  payment  problems.
It is like signing  a contract  in disappearing  ink.  No wonder developing
countries  are unable to win  trade concessions  from industrial  countries.
Developing  countries  are  unable  to  give  binding  concessions  and  as  a  consequence
have  nothing  to  bargain  with  in  the  negotiations.  They  have  to  come  to  the  Round
with their  hand  out,  accepting  only  the  benefits  that  trickle  down  through  Most
Favored  Nation  treatment.  Thus,  the  protection  of  industrial  countries  continues
to discriminate  disproportionately  against  commodities  of most interest  to
developing  countries--while  developing  countries  strangle  their  economies  behind
high trade barriers.  It is then not surprising  to find that agricultural
products  which  are  of  particular  interest  to  developing  countries  are  much  more113
discriminated  against  in  trade  than  industrial  commodities  produced  by  developed
countries.
BOX  4.5:  THE  AGRICULTURAL  NEGOTIATIONS  IN THE  URUGUAY  ROUND
The next decade  could inzroduce  some of the  most profound  changes in
agricultural  policy  since  the  end  of the  Second  World  War.  For  the  first  time,
agricultural  policy  has been placed  on the  agenda  of the  multi-lateral  trade
negotiations  under  GATT  and  some  agreements  are  likely  to be reached  by the  end
of 1990.  These  agreements  will most likely  prepare  the  way for  a process  of
reduced  subsidization  of agriculture  by industrial  countries  and  more liberal
access  to  developed  countries'  markets. The  implications  of these  changes  for
developing  countries  could  be substantial  and  their  impact  could  go  well  beyond
all  the  development  assistance  to agriculture  of the  past 40 years (subsidies
both  direct  and indirect  are  estimated  to  be over $  200  billion  per  year).  In
other  words,  the  world  could  be  on  the  brink  of  profound  changes  in  agricultural
policy. Its  implications  for  food  importing  countries  (net  food  imports  in  1984-
86 stood at $  27 billion for these developing  countries)  and agricultural
exporting  developing  countries  (net  food  exports  for  these  countries  was $  17
billion)  could  be substantial.  And  for  world  agricultural  trade  in  general  the
effects could  be  considerable--possibly  with  effects comparable to  the
liberalization  of  manufacturing  products  that  accompanied  the  earlier  Rounds  of
multi-lateral  trade  negotiations.
The  major  issues  are  direct  subsidies  for  agricultural  production,  market
access,  and  export  subsidies  in industrial  countries. However,  most proposals
envision  that  developing  countries  would  have to  comply  with any  agreements  on
these issues  but on a longer time horizon.  In other words, special and
differential  treatment  would  not exempt  developing  countries,  only  extend  the
time  for  compliance.
Although  the negotiations  are intended  to be multilateral,  in practice
the  debate  has  been  primarily  between  the  EC  and  the  United  States  over  specific
trade  proposals. The  Cairns  group  has  been  another  major  third  party  that  has
influenced  the  negotiations.  While  both the  EC and the  US agree  that  reduced
subsidization  of agriculture  is in their  own  best interest,  the  extent  and  the
means for  achieving  this  objective  are  at odds.  The EC is  apparently  willing
to  reduce subsidization  but undeL a broad aggregate  measure that allows
flexibility  in  what  programs  and  commodities  are  selected  for  adjustments.  The
United  States  wants substantial  reduction  eventually  leading  to elimination  of
subsidies  and tariffication  of all  border  measures,  including  the  EC variable
levy. Japan,  another  major  player  in the  negctiations,  wants  the elimination
of export  subsidies  but the right  to support  certain  crops for  food security
reasons.
The  primary  issue  that is of concern  to  many food importing  developing
countries  is the  impact  on their  food  import  bill. Most global  models  predict
increases  in  world  prices  for  food  as a consequence  of full  agricultural  trade
liberalization.  However,  these  estimates  are  crude  and  based  in  many cases  on114
old data.  Furthermore,  the liberalization  is unlikely  to be only  partial  and
over  a long  period,  ten  years  or  more.  This  does  not  mean that  the  impact  may
be  minimal:  partial  trade  liberalization  especially  in  certain  commodities  could
have  major  impacts  on  world  prices  if  not  accompanied  by liberalization  in  other
areas. For  example,  lack  of liberalization  in  livestock  products  while  support
for  other  commodities  is reduced  or  eliminated  could  synthetically  maintain  the
demand  for  feed  grains  and  have  a substantial  impact  on  prices  for  food  grains.
Unfortunately,  the  possible  implications  of  partial  liberalization  outcomes  have
not as  yet  been researched.
An  additional  concern  is  what  will  happen  to  food  aid. A large  inducement
for  food  aid  has  been  the  disposal  of excess  stocks. If stocks  are  reduced  or
eliminated,  food aid may drastically  decline.  The Food Aid Convention  by
establishing  minimum  levels  of  food  assistance  could  be a  remedy. A renewed  and
increased  commitment  to  the  Food  Aid  Convention  could  help  ensure  that  this  form
of foreign  assistance  will not diminish  as a  result of an Uruguay Round
agreement.
What  Needs  to be  Done:  The  Bargain
The  dismal  state  of agricultural  policy  in the  world  cannot  be separated
from  the  lack  of obligations  that  developing  countries  have  taken  in  the  GATT.
The  development  of agriculture  is  important  to developing  countries  for  export
earnings,  poverty  alleviation,  and employment. It is also  widely recognized
that  industrial  development  needs  the  support  of a  viable  agricultural  sector.
Reform  of agricultural  policies  on a world  wide level  is then a prerequisite
for  the sustained  growth  of many developing  countries. To bring  about  reform
requires  that  agricultural  commodities  be  brought  fully  into  the  GATT--that  they
be treated  the  same  as industrial  products.  But  for  this  to  happen  requires  the
full  participation  of developing  countries  in  the  GATT--that  is for  developing
countries  to not  only  take  on the rights  of the  GATT  but  its  obligations  also.
Developing  countries  have made it known that they demand  a solution  to the
agricultural  problem  for  them  to accept  the  results  of the  Uruguay  Round.  If
they  are  true  to this  demand,  then  the  survival  of  the  GATT  hangs  in  the  balance.115
The conclusion  of the Uruguay  Round  of negotiations  thus is an ideal
opportunity  for a  bargain  to be struck  between  the developed  and developing
countries  of  the  world. The  elements  of  the  GATT  bargain  would  be  the  following:
(i)  Agricultural  trade  would  be  made subject  to  the  full  discipline  of the  GATT
by eliminating  the  waivers  and  exemptions  that  have thus far  set  agricultural
commodities  apart  from  other  products  in their  treatment  under  the  GATT.  (ii)
Developing  countries  would  be  brought  fully  into  the  GATT,  by eliminating  their
special  status  that  allows  them  to  avoid  reciprocity  in  trade  policy  reform  and
to protect  infant  industries  or use  quantitative  restrictions  for balance  of
payments  purposes. (iii)  All  countries  would  begin  reform  of  their  agricultural
policies  to reduce  the  myriad  of policy-induced  distortions  that plague  the
sector. Policies  that  would  require  reform  include  import  restrictions,  export
subsidies,  and  dumping  of surplus  commodities  by the  OECD  countries;  as  well  as
subsidies  to fertilizer,  irrigation  and  credit  which distort  trade  incentives
in  both  the  developed  and  developing  countries.
This kind of bargain  would be a major step in reducing  the role of
government  in  agriculture  back  to  the  core  functions  that  it  performs  best. It
would slow  down and  eventually  reverse  the  adverse  effects  that agricultural
policies  have  had on the  environment. It  would  have  the immediate  benefit  of
reducing  the  high fiscal  costs  of current  subsidies. This  would  contribute  in
the  U.S. to  reducing  the  budget  deficit;  in  the  E.C.,  to reducing  the  friction
over the  budget  of the Common  Market;  and in developing  countries,  to fiscal
stabilization  and  to restoring  agricultural  investment  budgets. For  developing
countries,  undertaking  full  GATT obligations  would lend  credibility  to trade
policy  reforms  (which  many countries  are  undertaking,  in any  case,  whether  or
not  under  the auspices  of the  GATT)  and increase  their  ability  to open other116
countries'  markets  in the  negotiations.  In  particular,  it  would  improve  their
negotiating  leverage  in products  in  which  they  have a special  interest  (e.g.,
tropical  and agricultural  products)  and  add  more pressure  for  reform  in those
areas. With  fewer  trade  distortions  in  international  markets,  commodity  prices
would  possibly  be significantly  higher,  and  would  certainly  be far  more stable
than at present.  This would eliminate  the raison  d'etre of many of the
interventions  in  agricultural  product  markets  by  developing  country  governments,
including  parastatal  involvement  in  pricing  policy  and  procurement,  since  these
policies  are often  intended  to protect  farmers  and stabilize  prices.  (Erzan
found  that  many agricultural  trade  policy  restrictions  in  developing  countries
are in response  to developed  country  policies.)  The deleterious  policies
discussed  in  Chapter  3 could  thus  be phased  out. With fewer  market-distorting
policies,  all  countries  would  find  fewer  reasons  to  challenge  imports  on  grounds
of  dumping  or  unfair  subsidies,  and  this  would  reduce  agriculture's  current  role
as an important  source  of friction  in trading  relationships.  On balance,  the
results  of such  a  bargain  would  indeed  be  a re-definition  of governments's  role
in  agriculture,  increased ectoral  efficiency  on  the  national  level,  and  a  more
smoothly  functioning  and  tightly  knit  world  agricultural  trading  system.117
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